Com. v. Mulica
Decision Date | 09 March 1988 |
Citation | 520 N.E.2d 134,401 Mass. 812 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. John K. MULICA, Jr. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Thomas G. Shapiro, Boston, for defendant.
Robert J. Bender, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Com.
Before WILKINS, LIACOS, NOLAN and LYNCH, JJ.
The defendant was convicted of embezzlement from the Newburyport Five Cents Savings Bank (bank), of procuring a bank employee fraudulently to convert money of the bank, and of aiding that bank employee to falsify bank records, in violation of G.L. c. 266, §§ 52 and 53A (1986 ed.). On appeal, the defendant contends that supplemental jury instructions concerning criminal responsibility and the exclusion of certain documentary films constituted reversible error. We transferred the case to this court on our own motion and now reverse his judgments of conviction and order a new trial.
1. Criminal responsibility. A cash audit of the bank in December, 1982, disclosed a shortage of $204,000. The defendant, who had recently resigned as a vice-president and a trustee of the bank, was charged with taking the money. The defendant testified on his own behalf and admitted his role in taking the funds during a period spanning approximately October, 1980, to December, 1982. However, he presented evidence of lack of criminal responsibility which he contended was attributable to a mental condition known as post- traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 1 To place the issues before us on appeal in their proper context, we relate the evidence offered to support the defense theory in some detail.
The defendant described particular combat experiences during his service as an eighteen-year-old Marine machine gunner in Vietnam in 1966 and 1967, which involved witnessing the gruesome deaths of numerous friends and fellow members of his company. A cousin with whom he was close also was killed. He further testified to sleep difficulties and recurrent memories and nightmares since his return from Vietnam, problems which intensified beginning in 1979. Also beginning around 1978, the defendant accumulated six to eight guns which he kept in his bedroom. Since resigning from the bank, the defendant had been treated with Thorazine, Stelazine, and Dalmane, and had been awarded disability benefits by the Veterans' Administration for PTSD. Of especial relevance to the issues on appeal, the defendant testified that he had spent the entire amount taken from the bank on daily gambling at The Yankee Greyhound dog track in Seabrook, New Hampshire. According to the defendant, he bet up to $2,000 a day. He described his experience while at the racetrack as one of being "back in the action ... a very hyped up intense feeling." He had begun gambling on a daily basis sometime around 1980.
Additional testimony by the defendant's life-long friends portrayed the defendant upon his return from Vietnam as a changed person who had become nervous, irritable, and agitated. His agitation apparently subsided, but reemerged in 1979 or 1980.
It was part of the defense theory that the defendant's emotional difficulties, as manifested in intensifying problems with agitation, sleeping, gambling, and drinking, were precipitated by his promotion in 1979 to bank vice-president and the particular psychological meaning this promotion held for him. The defendant's estranged wife testified that the defendant felt compelled to gamble and "would be really wound up" upon his return from the dog track. She further testified about his agitation, sleep difficulties, and the fact that through the fourteen years she was with the defendant, from 1968 to 1982, he slept with his eyes open and feet constantly tapping. Two employees of the dog track testified respectively that the defendant was "the strangest bett[o]r" who consistently bet in a manner that would ensure that he lost money and that he gave away money to various people at the track.
The defendant also presented two expert witnesses who diagnosed the defendant as suffering from PTSD and who explained how the above-noted constellation of behavior or symptoms was indicative of PTSD. They viewed these symptoms, as well as the defendant's embezzling, as manifestations of and attempts to manage emotionally overwhelming feelings resulting from his Vietnam experiences. Dr. John P. Wilson, a psychologist who has treated PTSD among many Vietnam veterans, testified that both the gambling and embezzling were expressions of self-destructive feelings stemming primarily from the psychological dynamics of survivor guilt and attendant feelings of depression and worthlessness. These dynamics, Dr. Wilson believed, led the defendant to embezzle and gamble self-destructively in order to be caught and punished. Dr. Wilson viewed the gambling as serving the additional psychological function of making the defendant feel intensely alive and aroused so as to ward off depression and recurrent images of his combat experiences.
Dr. Sheldon D. Zigelbaum, the defendant's treating psychiatrist since 1982 and a specialist in the treatment of PTSD, testified similarly that the defendant suffered from PTSD. He elaborated that the defendant's compulsion to gamble, which he viewed as a symptom of PTSD, served to recreate, in an unconscious attempt to finally gain relief from, the Vietnam experience of risk and danger. Dr. Zigelbaum viewed the defendant's embezzling also as an escalation of a pattern of risk-taking conduct previously evidenced by striving for promotions, speculating in real estate, maintaining an extramarital affair, and more moderate gambling. Both expert witnesses were of the opinion that the defendant lacked substantial capacity to restrain himself from taking the bank's funds as a result of PTSD.
In his opening statement, the prosecutor argued to the jury, inter alia, that the defendant began embezzling in October, 1980, "as a result of gambling." Accordingly, he cross-examined the defendant's expert witnesses in an apparent effort to discredit their diagnoses of PTSD and instead suggest to the jury that the defendant's embezzling, if related to any emotional defect at all, was related solely to a problem with compulsive gambling. 2
From Dr. Zigelbaum, the Commonwealth elicited testimony that the defendant met the diagnostic criteria for the separate DSM-III category for pathological gambling. On redirect examination, the witness clarified that individuals may descriptively meet the criteria for more than one diagnostic category but that the proper diagnosis depends upon an understanding of the underlying dynamics rather than the most immediate or florid symptoms.
The judge's initial instructions on criminal responsibility were in accordance with the defendant's requests and the law under Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 226 N.E.2d 556 (1967); the defendant did not object to that charge. 3 During the course of deliberations, however, the jury asked the question: "With regard to a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, would pathological gambling be perceived by the law as a valid form of insanity?" A lengthy bench conference ensued in which the Commonwealth reiterated its position, arguably adopted by the judge, that pathological gambling was not, as a matter of law, a mental disease or defect causing inability to conform to the requirements of the law. The defendant urged reinstruction on the definition of mental disease or defect and the government's burden of proof, arguing that the expert witnesses' rejection of the particular diagnosis of pathological gambling, as applied to the defendant, did not preclude jury consideration of evidence about gambling in their deliberations regarding criminal responsibility. Ultimately, the judge advised the jury that he would not answer the question directly and gave the following supplemental instruction: (Emphasis...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Com. v. Parker
...of the instruction.' " Commonwealth v. Nieves, 394 Mass. 355, 362, 476 N.E.2d 179 (1985), and cases cited. Commonwealth v. Mulica, 401 Mass. 812, 818, 420 N.E.2d 134 (1988). We need not decide whether a separate intoxication instruction on the ability to form a shared intent is required whe......
-
Marques v. Bellofram Corp.
...5 It lay well within the judge's discretion to admit the videotape for the purpose or purposes mentioned. See Commonwealth v. Mulica, 401 Mass. 812, 820-821, 520 N.E.2d 134 (1988); Szeliga v. General Motors Corp., 728 F.2d 566, 567-568 (1st As far as we can make out from the present record,......
-
Com. v. Fuller
...to impose any obligation on a trial judge to provide a further explanation of the terms in issue here. Cf. Commonwealth v. Mulica, 401 Mass. 812, 816-820, 520 N.E.2d 134 (1988) (mental disease and defect instruction focusing the jury on one particular type of mental disease or defect may ha......
-
Com. v. Lapointe
...is nothing for this court to review. See Commonwealth v. Zion, 359 Mass. 559, 564, 270 N.E.2d 395 (1971). Cf. Commonwealth v. Mulica, 401 Mass. 812, 520 N.E.2d 134 (1988). 3. The defendant takes issue with the self-defense instructions given in this case. Specifically, the defendant contend......