Com. v. Nunnally, 95-SC-379-CL
| Decision Date | 18 January 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-SC-379-CL,95-SC-379-CL |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Movant, v. Patrick NUNNALLY, Respondent. |
Mike Conliffe, Jefferson County Attorney, Martin Z. Kasdan, Jr., Amy G. Benovitz, Assistant Jefferson County Attorneys, Louisville, for Movant.
Frank W. Heft, Jr., Chief Appellate Defender, Jefferson District Public Defender, Sheila Redmond, Assistant District Defender, Jefferson District Public Defender, Louisville, for Respondent.
The Commonwealth has requested certification pursuant to CR 76.37 of one (1) question of law. The operative facts are as follows:
On March 22, 1995, a petition for an involuntary hospitalization was taken, pursuant to KRS Chapter 202A, on Respondent, Patrick Nunnally, by a social worker at Central State Hospital, following an unprovoked attack by Respondent on a hospital staff member. Respondent was a voluntary patient at the time of this attack.
A preliminary hearing was held in Jefferson District Court on March 29, 1995, and probable cause was found to proceed with the commitment hearing. The District Court, however, ordered a hearing on a 60-day commitment, rather than a 360-day commitment as requested by the social worker. The District Court found that because Respondent's prior hospitalization was voluntary, rather than involuntary, Respondent did not meet the criteria of KRS 202A.051(4)(g), which permits a 360-day involuntary commitment.
A final hearing was held on April 11, 1995, after which Respondent was committed to Central State for a period not to exceed 60 days. The Commonwealth then filed a Motion for Certification of Law, which we granted.
The specific question presented to this Court is as follows:
Whether a previous voluntary hospitalization brings a patient within KRS 202A.051(4)(g) and subject to a 360-day involuntary commitment.
We answer this question in the negative.
According to KRS 202A.051(4)(g), a petition requesting a 360-day hospitalization requires that the patient have "been hospitalized in a hospital or a forensic psychiatric facility for a period of thirty (30) days under the provisions of this chapter or KRS Chapter 504 within the preceding six (6) months." The Commonwealth seeks a clear and plain meaning approach in interpreting this statute and argues that "[t]he statutory language is plain and, certainly, exceptions that have not been made cannot be read as such." George v. Commonwealth, Ky., 885 S.W.2d 938, 940 (1994). The Commonwealth contends that the language of KRS 202A.051(4)(g) is unambiguous and makes no distinction between voluntary and involuntary hospitalization; therefore, a voluntary patient is no less hospitalized than an involuntary patient under the statute. Furthermore, the Commonwealth notes that the provisions of KRS Chapter 202A do, in fact, address, in KRS 202A.021, the circumstance in which one is voluntarily admitted to a psychiatric hospital, and, thus, such a patient falls within the purview of KRS 202A.051(4)(g).
The Commonwealth's argument is a worthy one, however, it fails to recognize another one of our holdings with regard to statutory construction: "As with any case...
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Young v. Com.
...Although this argument has some appeal, our function is not to legislate, but to ascertain the legislative intent. Commonwealth v. Nunnally, Ky., 920 S.W.2d 523 (1996); Beckham v. Board of Education of Jefferson County, Ky., 873 S.W.2d 575 (1994). This statute, which was originally compiled......
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Bowden v. Sandler, No. 2008-CA-001279-MR (Ky. App. 5/29/2009), 2008-CA-001279-MR.
...the plain meaning of the statute's provisions. Indeed, as Bowden correctly notes, our Kentucky Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Nunnally, 920 S.W.2d 523 (Ky. 1996), indicated that Chapter KRS 202A.400 is to be narrowly applied. In that case, the Commonwealth sought a 360-day commitment of ......