Com. v. Otis

• Decision Date: 13 July 1987
• Citation: 528 A.2d 249,364 Pa.Super. 464
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Brian L. OTIS, Appellee. 409 Harrisburg 1986

Page 249

528 A.2d 249

364 Pa.Super. 464

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Brian L. OTIS, Appellee.

409 Harrisburg 1986

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Nov. 18, 1986.

Filed July 13, 1987.

Daniel J. Barrett, Dist. Atty., Athens, for Com., appellant.

David B. Keeffe, Sayre, for appellee.

Before WIEAND, MONTEMURO and JOHNSON, JJ.

WIEAND, Judge:

As a result of a fatal vehicular accident, in which a vehicle operated by Brian Otis crossed the center line of a two lane highway and collided with an oncoming vehicle, Otis was charged with involuntary manslaughter ¹ and homicide by vehicle. ² Following a preliminary hearing, the involuntary manslaughter charge was dismissed, but the charge of homicide by vehicle was returned to court for further proceedings. ³ After an information had been filed and Otis had been arraigned on the charge of homicide by vehicle, Otis filed an omnibus pre-trial motion which included a motion to dismiss. The trial court reviewed the record of the preliminary hearing, held that the evidence was insufficient, and dismissed the charge of homicide by vehicle. The Commonwealth appealed. ⁴

At or about 6:00 p.m. on July 6, 1985, Brian Otis was operating his vehicle eastwardly on Route 6 in Bradford County when the vehicle crossed into the westbound lane and collided head-on with a Volkswagen van approaching in the opposite direction. Robert Wright, the driver of the van, and his six year old daughter, Shannon, were killed as a result of the collision. Three other children were injured. When questioned by State Trooper George G. Gibblets, Otis said that he had not slept for thirty-six hours prior to the accident and had fallen asleep at the wheel before crossing into the opposing lane of travel. However, he told his girl friend that he had not fallen asleep prior to the accident.

The Commonwealth bears the burden at a preliminary hearing of establishing at least a prima facie case that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably the one who committed it. Commonwealth v. Prado, 481 Pa. 485, 393 A.2d 8 (1978); Commonwealth v. Mullen, 460 Pa. 336, 333 A.2d 755 (1975). To sustain that burden it is well settled that the Commonwealth must produce evidence,

such as to present "sufficient probable cause to believe that the person charged has committed the offense stated" United States v. Johns, [4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 412, 413, 1 L.Ed. 888 (1806) ]; in other words, it should make out a prima facie case of guilt. It should be such that if presented at the trial court, and accepted as true, the judge would be warranted in allowing the case to go to the jury.

Commonwealth ex rel. Scolio v. Hess, 149 Pa.Super. 371, 374-75, 27 A.2d 705, 707 (1942) (emphasis in original).

Commonwealth v. Wojdak, 502 Pa. 359, 367-368, 466 A.2d 991, 995-996 (1983).

The offense of homicide by vehicle is defined as follows:

Any person who unintentionally causes the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any law of this Commonwealth or municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic except section 3731 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) is guilty of homicide by vehicle, a misdemeanor of the first degree, when the violation is the cause of death.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3732. In Commonwealth v. Heck, 341 Pa.Super. 183, 491 A.2d 212 (1985), allocatur granted, 509 Pa. 535, 505 A.2d 251 (1986), a panel of this Court held that the statute could pass constitutional muster only if it were interpreted so as to require for conviction a degree of misconduct which rose to the level of criminal negligence. ⁵

In Commonwealth v. Wilkinson, 278 Pa.Super. 490, 420 A.2d 647 (1980), this Court held that "the evidence presented at the subsequent preliminary hearing ... was sufficient to hold [the defendant] for trial on homicide by vehicle on the ground that the death of [the deceased victim] was caused when [the defendant] improperly drove into an opposing lane of traffic." Id. at 498, 420 A.2d at 651 (footnote omitted). And in Commonwealth v. Eichelberger, --- Pa.Super ---, 528 A.2d 230 (1987), this Court held that evidence showing that a driver had suddenly allowed his vehicle to cross the center line of a two lane roadway and collide with an oncoming vehicle was sufficient to support a verdict of guilty of homicide by vehicle.

Earlier decisions of this Court have also held that allowing a vehicle to cross the center line and invade the lane for traffic moving in the opposite direction is evidence of recklessness sufficient to sustain a conviction for involuntary manslaughter. In Commonwealth v. Smoker, 204 Pa.Super. 265, 203 A.2d 358 (1964), the defendant was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter after the car which he had been driving crossed into the wrong lane and struck an oncoming vehicle, killing a passenger in the approaching vehicle. The evidence there suggested that the defendant had fallen asleep shortly before the accident. On appeal, this Court affirmed, saying:

While admitting that a specific intent to kill or harm is not required for conviction of this crime, the defendant contends that there must at least be an intent to do what he did. If he means by this that he must have intentionally driven into the wrong lane, this is not the law. It is enough that he intentionally drove his car and recklessly failed to drive it in its proper lane, driving it instead, because of inattention to what he was doing, into the wrong lane....

Of course, the burden was upon the Commonwealth to prove [the defendant's] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but under the evidence the jury was warranted in finding that it did so. The mere fact that he drove on the wrong side of the road, without any visible reason or compulsion to do so, would warrant the jury in inferring that he did so negligently and, particularly in view of the great danger involved in such conduct under the circumstances, that he did so recklessly. Nothing appeared in the evidence to show that he was forced off the road, that he was faced with a sudden emergency or that any other fact existed which might have relieved him of...