Com. v. Paccia
| Decision Date | 29 October 1958 |
| Citation | 338 Mass. 4,153 N.E.2d 664 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. Joseph C. PACCIA. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
John R. Wheatley, Dist. Atty., Warren H. Lindberg, Asst. Dist. Atty., Brockton, for plaintiff.
Cortland A. Mathers, W. Bridgewater, for defendant.
Before WILKINS, C. J., and RONAN, SPALDING, COUNIHAN and CUTTER, JJ.
The defendant was charged by complaint with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor 'upon a certain public way, or place to which the public has a right of access, to wit: Snell Place' in Brockton. Upon an appeal to the Superior Court, the case was tried without a jury. The defendant was found guilty. His bill of exceptions presents the question whether the trial judge correctly denied four requests for rulings.
There was evidence which would warrant the following findings. The defendant was operating a motor vehicle and was under the influence of liquor, but he operated only on a part of Snell Place and an adjacent parking lot, both of which are owned by a Mrs. Reynolds. Snell Place runs east and west between South Main Street and Montello Street, both of which run north and south. At the north and south sides of the westerly entrance to Snell Place are a restaurant and a market building. The surface of Snell Place is black top. Behind the two buildings the black top area widens to form a parking space, which is maintained by Mrs. Reynolds and her lessees.
Snell Place has been owned by the Reynolds family for some years. The black top surface was laid about three years ago. Within the past twenty years Snell Place has been blocked off several times to prevent the passage of vehicles entering from South Main Street and the establishment of prescriptive rights. Mrs. Reynolds has also removed on several occasions city of Brockton signs saying 'Snell Place.' No taking of the place by eminent domain proceedings by any public body has ever been made. It is possible for vehicles to pass over the portion of Snell Place owned by Mrs. Reynolds from South Main Street to her eastern boundary, and then to continue east across an unsurfaced roadway to Montello Street. Such passing does take place from time to time and nothing is done to prevent it.
The defendant in substance requested the judge to rule (1) that the commonwealth had failed to prove that the defendant had operated in a 'place to which the public has a right of access'; (2) that '[p]rivately owned property to which the public has access only by virtue of being business invitees is not' such a place within G.L. c. 90, § 24; (3) that § 24 refers to a place to which the public has a 'legal right of access as distinguished from * * * a place to which the public has access at the pleasure of an individual' owner; and (4) that the conferring of a parking privilege upon members of the public by the owner or person in control does not constitute a 'right of access' within § 24. All these requests were denied and the defendant duly excepted.
In General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp., Ltd. v. Brow, 327 Mass. 225, 227-228, 98 N.E.2d 608, 609, this court held that the coverage of a compulsory motor vehicle insurance policy issued under G.L. c. 90, § 34A, insuring against liability for...
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...254 Mass. 566, 568, 150 N.E. 829 (1926), and Commonwealth v. Clancy, 261 Mass. 345, 348, 158 N.E. 758 (1927). In Commonwealth v. Paccia, 338 Mass. 4, 6, 153 N.E.2d 664 (1958), the Supreme Judicial Court construed that language to encompass only public ways or ways in which the general publi......
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Leone v. Doran
...v. Hayden, 211 Mass. 296, 97 N.E. 783; Libby v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 273 Mass. 522, 525--526, 174 N.E. 171; Commonwealth v. Paccia, 338 Mass. 4, 6, 153 N.E.2d 664. See Nickerson v. Boston Elev. Ry., 319 Mass. 220, 223, 66 N.E.2d The relevant portion of G.L. c. 90, § 12, provides as foll......
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Commonwealth v. Belliveau, 09-P-467.
...of the concept of a “place” as the site of operating under the influence. Despite the added term, the court in Commonwealth v. Paccia, 338 Mass. 4, 6, 153 N.E.2d 664 (1958), concluded that operation under the influence on a private way connecting two public ways was not operation upon the r......
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Commonwealth v. Hourican
...only to conduct clearly covered”); Commonwealth v. Zubiel, 456 Mass. 27, 33, 921 N.E.2d 78 (2010) (same). Compare Commonwealth v. Paccia, 338 Mass. 4, 6, 153 N.E.2d 664 (1958); Commonwealth v. George, 406 Mass. 635, 637–640, 550 N.E.2d 138 (1990) (both construing the statute punishing the o......