Com. v. Pappas

• Decision Date: 21 August 1981
• Citation: 425 N.E.2d 323,384 Mass. 428
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. James PAPPAS.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 323

425 N.E.2d 323

384 Mass. 428

COMMONWEALTH v. James PAPPAS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Argued May 5, 1981.

Decided Aug. 21, 1981.

Robert M. Raciti, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

Willie J. Davis, Boston, for defendant.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and LYNCH, JJ.

HENNESSEY, Chief Justice.

On September 3, 1980, a District Court judge dismissed complaints against James Pappas charging negligent motor vehicle homicide, operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and driving to endanger. The judge dismissed the complaints because he concluded that the failure of police officers to issue a citation at the time and place of the violation was contrary to G.L. c. 90C, § 2. The Commonwealth appealed to the Appeals Court and we transferred the case to this court on our own motion. We reverse.

In support of the defendant's motions to dismiss the complaints, evidence was presented to the judge which tended to establish the following facts. At approximately 3 P.M. on June 23, 1980, the defendant, a retired Waltham police officer, was involved in a single vehicle accident in Waltham in which a pedestrian was seriously injured. Within a few minutes, two Waltham police patrolmen, whose duties included traffic law enforcement and to whom citation books had been issued, arrived at the scene along with ambulance officers who transported the injured pedestrian to Waltham Hospital. The two patrolmen arranged for the removal of the defendant's motor vehicle from the scene and for the resumption of the orderly flow of traffic. Shortly thereafter, one of the patrolmen transported the defendant to the nearby home of the defendant's sister and then returned to the scene of the accident. ¹

At 3:30 P.M., the same day, a Waltham police lieutenant was designated "Temporary Officer in Charge of the Traffic Division" to investigate the accident which had taken place some thirty minutes earlier. When the lieutenant arrived on the scene at approximately 3:35 P.M., the two patrolmen who had first arrived on the scene did not know that the accident victim had been pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital at 3:11 P.M. Although the lieutenant knew when he arrived that the accident victim had died, no evidence available at the scene other than a damaged fence indicating that the defendant's motor vehicle had traversed a sidewalk suggested that the defendant had been driving so as to endanger the lives and safety of the public. Both patrolmen at the scene advised the lieutenant that in their opinion the defendant was not under the influence of alcohol, although "he had had a couple of pops."

The lieutenant, accompanied by a police sergeant and the two patrolmen, proceeded to the defendant's sister's home, arriving at approximately 3:40 P.M. The defendant was sitting at a table where, according to his affidavit, he had consumed "half a dozen shots" of vodka. The lieutenant observed no alcoholic beverages or glasses in the area. The defendant's slurred speech, as well as other behavior, caused the lieutenant to form an opinion that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol. The two patrolmen stated to the lieutenant, "He sure got awfully drunk awfully fast." The defendant was advised of his rights and asked to accompany the officers to the police station, ² where he took a breathalyzer test which indicated a blood alcohol content of nineteen one hundredths. ³ The defendant was released on bail and later, at about 7:30 P.M. the same day, he was given a traffic citation for "operating under the influence of liquor," "homicide by motor vehicle," and "operating so as to endanger."

General Laws c. 90C, § 2, as amended, requires a police officer assigned to traffic enforcement duty to "record the occurrence of automobile law violations upon a citation, filling out the citation and each copy thereof as soon as possible and as completely as possible .... A failure to give the original of the citation to the offender at the time and place of the violation shall constitute a defense in any trial for such offense, except where the violator could not have been stopped or where additional time was reasonably necessary to determine the nature of the violation or the identity of the offender or where the court finds that some circumstance, not inconsistent with the purpose of this section, namely, to cause violators of automobile law to be brought uniformly to justice, justifies the failure." Two purposes underlie the citation requirements of G.L. c. 90C, § 2. The first purpose is apparent from the common name of the statute, the "no-fix" law. The nature of traffic citations renders them uniquely suited to manipulation and misuse, and G.L. c. 90C, § 2, is intended to prevent such abuses by eliminating unreasonable or unnecessary delay. See 1965 Senate Doc. No. 839, at 2. The second purpose served by the statute is to afford prompt and definite notice of the nature of the alleged offense to the putative violator. "The statute ... is designed to prevent a situation in which a person cannot establish a defence due to his being charged with a violation long after it occurs." Commonwealth v. Gorman, 356 Mass. 355, 357-358, 251 N.E.2d 892 (1969). Neither of these statutory purposes is furthered by the action of the judge below.

The susceptibility of "traffic tickets" to unequal and arbitrary disposition at the hands of traffic officers, and the requirement of prompt notice to the offender,...