Com. v. Paquette

• Decision Date: 16 March 1973
• Citation: 301 A.2d 837,451 Pa. 250
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Edmund Joseph PAQUETTE, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 837

301 A.2d 837

451 Pa. 250

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Edmund Joseph PAQUETTE, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 16, 1973.

Edward C. Connolly, Warminster, for appellant

Amos Davis, Dist. Atty., John Woodcock, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Hollidaysburg, for appellee.

Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION

NIX, Justice.

When the appellant, Edmund Paquette, brought his 6 1/2 month old stepdaughter to the emergency room of the Mercy Hospital, on January 31, 1970, she was cyanotic, blue in color, and had no respiration or heartbeat. As the child's life functions returned, bruise marks on her forehead and chin became evident. She died four days later.

The appellant was charged with murder and was tried before a judge, sitting without a jury. He was found guilty of murder in the second degree and, after his post-trial motions were denied, he was sentenced to from five to ten years imprisonment. This direct appeal follows.

The appellant contends that the trial judge erred in denying his demurrer because the Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient: (1) to show that the wounds he allegedly inflicted caused the baby's death; (2) to show that he was in any way responsible for those wounds; or (3) to establish malice. The appellant contends further that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Finally, he contends that the judge who suppressed his extra-judicial statement and who later sat as the finder of fact at the trial erred in allowing the Commonwealth to elicit the contents of that statement at the Suppression Hearing. We find no merit in these contentions.

On appeal from a criminal conviction, the test for sufficiency of the evidence is:

'whether, accepting as true all the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom upon which if believed the jury could properly have based its verdict, it is sufficient in law to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime or crimes of which he has been convicted.'

Commonwealth v. Oates, 448 Pa. 486, 489, 295 A.2d 337, 338 (1972). See also, Commonwealth v. Agie, 449 Pa. 187, 296 A.2d 741 (1972); Commonwealth v. Palmer, 448 Pa. 282, 292 A.2d 921 (1972); Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 440 Pa. 143, 269 A.2d 886 (1970). We will proceed to examine the evidence of each of the elements challenged by the appellant.

The appellant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of the causal connection between his alleged conduct and the victim's death. The attending physician, Dr. Burket, testified that from his examination, the child exhibited traumatic hematomas on both sides of the face, the ears, the lower parts of the jaws and both eyes. She was critically ill, showing evidence of cerebral irritability and definite hindrance of respiratory and circulatory functions. Dr. Adams, a consulting neurosurgeon diagnosed the case as traumatic brain injury with cerebral contusions and blood in the subarachnoid space. Dr. Burket concluded from observations during the last twenty-four hours of life that the infant died from gradual deterioration of the respiratory function influenced by the cardio-respiratory center in the brain incidental to some type of injury or hematoma. The pathologist who conducted the autopsy testified that pneumonia was the immediate cause of death and that a subdural hematoma and flakes of blood in the interior of the brain were contributing factors.

A defendant's actions are the legal cause of death if they are a direct and substantial factor in bringing it about. Commonwealth v. Stafford, Pa., 299 A.2d 590 (1973) (J--453); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 445 Pa. 276, 278, 284 A.2d 734 (1971). This is a stricter test than the 'proximate cause' test of tort law, Commonwealth v. Root, 403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 (1961), and the Commonwealth must prove causation beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Carn, 449 Pa. 228, 296 A.2d 753 (1972); Commonwealth v. Embry, 441 Pa. 183, 185, 272 A.2d 178 (1972); Commonwealth v. Radford, 428 Pa. 279, 236 A.2d 802 (1968).

We are convinced that the evidence here was sufficient to allow a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the head injury and resulting hematoma were a direct and substantial factor in the victim's death. The attending doctor diagnosed the baby's condition as critical, and the prolonged comitose state did result in pneumonia and death. Such occurrences are not uncommon. See, Commonwealth ex rel. Peters v. Maroney, 415 Pa. 553, 204 A.2d 459 (1964); Commonwealth v. Scovern, 292 Pa. 26, 140 A. 611 (1927). A defendant cannot escape the natural consequences of his act merely because of foreseeable complications. See, Commonwealth v. Stafford, supra; Commonwealth v. Cheeks, 423 Pa. 67, 223 A.2d 291 (1966); Commonwealth v. Williams, 304 Pa. 299, 156 A. 86 (1931).

The appellant next contends that the evidence was insufficient to connect him in any way with the alleged head injuries. Admittedly, there were no eyewitnesses to the alleged beating; but the Commonwealth need not prove its case directly. Circumstantial evidence can be as reliable and persuasive as eyewitness testimony. Commonwealth v. New, 354 Pa. 188, 47 A.2d 450 (1946); See I Wigmore § 26 (3d Ed. 1940).

There was a dispute between the version of the defense and that of the Commonwealth as to whether or not the child had bruised tissue at the time she was delivered into the custody of the father. Admittedly, the Commonwealth's evidence to support its position that all of the bruising occurred during the time the child was under his exclusive care was weak. This is not controlling, however, since the medical evidence, offered by the Commonwealth, clearly establishes repeated and severe blows to the infant as being the origin of the factors causing death. Such a finding is completely incompatible with the defense's theory that the injuries were either sustained by a fall from the couch to the floor or an epileptic fit while the child was in the bath. Considering the number of bruises, their severity and their positioning about the head and the face, the fact-finder was justified in rejecting the possibility of accidental or self-inflicted injury particularly when recognizing the mobility of a 6 1/2 month old baby.

Where, as here, an adult has sole custody of a child for a period of time, and, during that time the child suffers wounds which unquestionably are neither self-inflicted nor accidental, the evidence is sufficient to allow a jury to infer that the adult inflicted the wounds. State v. Loss, Minn., 204 N.W.2d 404 (1973). See, generally, Commonwealth v. Johnson, 162 Pa. 63, 29 A. 280 (1894); Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 346 Pa. 497, 31 A.2d 155 (1943).

The appellant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of malice. Legal malice

'consists either of an express intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, or of a 'wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences and a mind regardless of social duty,' indicating an unjustified disregard for the probability of death or great bodily harm and an extreme indifference to the value of human life.'

Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 428 Pa. 188, 193--194, 236 A.2d 768, 771 (1968). Malice can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances, such as the use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the body of another human being. Commonwealth v. Oates, 448 Pa. 486, 295 A.2d 337 (1972); Commonwealth v. Palmer, 448 Pa. 282, 292 A.2d 921 (1972); Commonwealth v. Commander, 436 Pa. 532, 260 A.2d 773 (1970); Commonwealth v. Lawrence, supra. Malice can also be inferred from the nature of the wounds where the defendant is not using a deadly weapon. Thus, in Commonwealth v. Steele, 448 Pa. 518, 295 A.2d 334 (1972) we held that a jury could infer malice from the fact that the defendant struck his wife, who was ten inches shorted and 40 to 50 pounds lighter than he, so as to fracture five ribs, cause hemorrhaging of the liver, a black eye, and numerous contusions and abrasions of the scalp. In Commonwealth v. Bowden, 442 Pa. 365, 276 A.2d 530 (1971), we allowed a jury to infer malice from the fact that the defendant relentlessly beat his 4 1 , 61 lbs....