Com. v. Motley
Decision Date | 28 April 1977 |
Citation | 372 A.2d 764,472 Pa. 421 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Matthew S. MOTLEY, Appellant. |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, Dist. Atty., Steven H. Goldblatt, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., Harry M. Spaeth, Jr., Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, and MANDERINO, JJ.
Appellant Matthew S. Motley was convicted by a jury of murder of the first degree. Post-trial motions were denied and a sentence of life imprisonment imposed. Appellant asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because the court erroneously instructed the jury on the standards for determining the voluntariness of appellant's statements to police. We agree, reverse the judgment of sentence, and grant a new trial.
On July 31, 1960, the body of Reynold C. Tropman was discovered in the bedroom of his Philadelphia apartment. Pieces of pillowcase bound Tropman's legs; a bloody handkerchief lay near his head. The Philadelphia medical examiner determined that death was caused by manual strangulation.
Appellant, who had worked from time to time for Mr. Tropman doing odd jobs and running errands, was arrested later that day. He subsequently was charged with murder. In 1962, appellant was convicted by a jury of murder of the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment. On an appeal taken as if timely filed 1 this Court reversed the judgment of sentence and granted a new trial. Commonwealth v. Motley, 448 Pa. 110, 289 A.2d 724 (1972). At the subsequent trial in January, 1973, a mistrial was declared when the jury was unable to reach a verdict. Appellant was again tried in January, 1974, and found guilty by a jury of murder of the first degree. Post-trial motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were filed. The trial court denied the motions and imposed sentence of life imprisonment. This appeal ensued. 2
In all cases of first degree murder this Court is required by statute to 'determine whether the ingredients necessary to constitute murder in the first degree shall have been proved to exist.' 3 In so doing we must consider the record in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth's case. Commonwealth v. Brown, 467 Pa. 388, 392, 357 A.2d 147, 149 (1976); Commonwealth v. Caye, 465 Pa. 98, 101, 348 A.2d 136, 137 (1975); Commonwealth v. Robson, 461 Pa. 615, 625, 337 A.2d 573, 578, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 934, 96 S.Ct. 290, 46 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975); Commonwealth v. Boyd, 461, Pa. 17, 22, 334 A.2d 610, 613 (1975); Commonwealth v. Bundy, 458 Pa. 240, 328 A.2d 517 (1974); Commonwealth v. Petrisko, 442 Pa. 575, 275 A.2d 46 (1971); Commonwealth v. Mount, 416 Pa. 343, 205 A.2d 924 (1965); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 410 Pa. 605, 190 A.2d 146 (1963); Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 406 Pa. 102, 176 A.2d 421 (1962); Commonwealth v. De Moss, 401 Pa. 395, 165 A.2d 14 (1960). The settled test for sufficiency of the evidence is whether, accepting as true all of the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom, upon which, if believed, the jury could have based its verdict, it is sufficient in law to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime of which he has been convicted. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 465 Pa. 442, 444--45, 350 A.2d 847, 848--49 (1976); Commonwealth v. Stanley, 453 Pa. 467, 469, 309 A.2d 408, 410 (1973); Commonwealth v. Paquette, 451 Pa. 250, 253, 301 A.2d 837, 383--39 (1973); Commonwealth v. Agie, 449 Pa. 187, 189--90, 296 A.2d 741, 742 (1972). Reviewing the record in this light we are persuaded that the jury's finding of the necessary elements of the offense is supported by sufficient evidence.
The Commonwealth proceeded solely on a theory of felony murder. 4 A statement which appellant gave to police after his arrest was admitted into evidence and constituted the bulk of the Commonwealth's case. in this statement, appellant said:
The jury could infer from this that the victim was killed by appellant in the course of a robbery. The statement was consistent with the findings of the medical examiner and the investigating officers who testified at trial for the Commonwealth. Thus, we conclude that the Commonwealth offered sufficient evidence to prove the ingredients necessary to constitute murder of the first degree.
We now turn to appellant's contention that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the standards for determining the voluntariness of his confession. We agree. 5
On the day following his arrest, prior to his arraignment, appellant made a detailed statement to the police implicating himself in the robbery and killing of Reynold Tropman. This statement constituted the heart of the Commonwealth's case against appellant. There was no independent evidence linking him to the crime.
Appellant testified that following his arrest, and throughout his lengthy interrogation, he was never advised of his constitutional right to remain silent and of his right to retained or appointed counsel. This testimony was essentially undisputed. 6 Appellant requested that the jury be instructed that the failure of the police to advise him of these rights was a 'significant factor' in determining whether the statement was voluntary. 7 The trial court refused. Appellant objected to this ruling and to the charge actually given on voluntariness.
It is unnecessary to decide whether the trial court erred in refusing the charge requested by appellant because we agree that the charge given was improper and requires reversal. It effectively removed the attending circumstance of the absence of warnings from the jury's consideration of the voluntariness of appellant's statements.
Appellant's original trial took place prior to the decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), which held that statements obtained during a custodial interrogation without having first informed the accused of his constitutional rights cannot be introduced at trial. 8 The rule applies only to trials commencing after the date of the Miranda decision, Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966), and is inapplicable to a Post-Miranda retrial, Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 89 S.Ct. 1677, 23 L.Ed.2d 253 (1969); Commonwealth v. Willman, 434 Pa. 489, 255 A.2d 534 (1969).
Although the Miranda rule is inapplicable, the Commonwealth must still demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that an incriminating statement is voluntary before it may be considered by the jury. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); Commonwealth v. Smith, 447 Pa. 457, 291 A.2d 103 (1972); Commonwealth ex rel. Butler v. Rundle, 429 Pa. 141, 239 A.2d 426 (1968). This Court has adopted the Massachusetts or 'humane' rule with regard to determining the voluntariness of statements by an accused. Commonwealth v. Joyer, 441 Pa. 242, 272 A.2d 454 (1971); Pa.R.Crim.P. 323(j). This procedure allows a defendant to attack the voluntariness of admissions at trial, even though a suppression court has held that statements admissible. The jury is instructed to disregard the statements if they determine the statements were involuntary. Commonwealth v. Coach, --- Pa. ---, 370 A.2d 358 (1977); Commonwealth v. Myers, --- Pa. ---, 371 A.2d 1279 (1977).
In determining voluntariness, the totality of circumstances surrounding the confession must be examined, Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 16 L.Ed.2d 895 (1966); Commonwealth v. Holton, 432 Pa. 11, 247 A.2d 228 (1968), to determine if 'the confession (was) the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker,' Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 1879, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037, 1057 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.); Commonwealth v. Hallowell, 444 Pa. 221, 282 A.2d 327 (1971).
The failure of police to advise an accused of his constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent are factors to be considered in the determination of voluntariness, notwithstanding the inapplicability of Miranda. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. at 740--41, 86 S.Ct. at 1764; Haynes v. State of Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 510--11, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 1341--42, 10 L.Ed.2d 513, 518--20 (1963); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. at 610, 81 S.Ct. at 1883 (opinion of Frankfurther, J.); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 433 Pa. 585, 592, 253 A.2d 109, 113, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 936, 90 S.Ct. 281, 24 L.Ed.2d 236 (1969); Commonwealth v. Walker, 433 Pa. 124, 127--28, 249 A.2d 283, 285 (1969); Commonwealth v. Hornberger, 430 Pa. 413, 415, 243 A.2d 341, 341 (1968); Commonwealth ex rel. Butler v. Rundle, 429 Pa. 141, 153, 239 A.2d 426, 432 (1968...
To continue reading
Request your trial