Com. v. Pare

• Decision Date: 08 May 1998
• Citation: 427 Mass. 427,693 N.E.2d 1002
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. David PARE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1002

693 N.E.2d 1002

427 Mass. 427

COMMONWEALTH v. David PARE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Essex.

Argued April 9, 1998.

Decided May 8, 1998.

Carol A. Donovan, Committee for Public Counsel Services, Boston, for defendant.

Elan H. Graydon, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Before WILKINS, C.J., and ABRAMS, LYNCH, GREANEY, FRIED, MARSHALL and IRELAND, JJ.

GREANEY, Justice.

The defendant was convicted by a jury in the Superior Court of three charges of indecent assault and battery on John (a pseudonym), a child under fourteen years of age, G.L. c. 265, § 13B. The Appeals Court reversed the defendant's convictions and set aside the jury's verdicts because the defendant's trial counsel had been improperly denied access to arguably privileged counseling and treatment records of John, and, in particular, certain records of John's evaluation by a "sexual information and trauma team" (team) at the Center for Family Development (center). Commonwealth v. Pare, 43 Mass.App.Ct. 566, 582, 686 N.E.2d 1025 (1997). Before reaching this result, the Appeals Court examined the records in question, and concluded that they contained information that reasonably could have supported the defendant's contention that he had committed no crimes. ¹ We granted the Commonwealth's application for further appellate review. We also have examined the disputed records. We agree with the result reached by the Appeals Court and substantially with the reasoning in its opinion. Accordingly, we reverse the defendant's convictions and set aside the jury's verdicts.

The background of the case is stated in the Appeals Court's opinion, id. at 567- 570, 686 N.E.2d 1025. For purposes of our decision, it is sufficient to point out only the following. (1) The accusations of sexual abuse against the defendant made by John (who was the son of the defendant's girl friend and ten years old when the first accusation was made) came over three years after the last alleged incident of abuse and John's last contact with the defendant. (2) The defendant denied the allegations, asserting that John had fabricated them because he believed that the defendant had introduced the mother to drugs (she had been incarcerated for selling drugs) or had made them as the result of improperly suggestive influences. John's credibility thus became the critical issue before the jury. (3) The defendant's trial counsel made a procedurally proper pretrial motion, supported by a lengthy affidavit, to examine records of John's treatment and counseling and of the sexual abuse evaluation of John made by the team at the center. ² It was during the interviewing and counseling process in that evaluation that John first made the allegations of sexual abuse against the defendant. The defendant's pretrial motion to examine John's records was denied after the motion judge examined them in camera and determined that the bulk of the records, including all of the team's materials, were "irrelevant." ³ (4) The issues concerning access to, and admissibility at trial of, the disputed records are governed by the five-stage protocol, noted below, provided for by Commonwealth v. Bishop, 416 Mass. 169, 181-183, 617 N.E.2d 990 (1993), not the revised protocol provided for by Commonwealth v. Fuller, 423 Mass. 216, 226, 667 N.E.2d 847 (1996), which was decided after the charges against the defendant had been tried. ⁴ We turn now to the issues on further appellate review.

1. As has been noted, Stage 1 of the Bishop protocol requires that a judge deciding a defense motion for access to records claimed to be privileged must make a privilege determination and "reduce his or her decision, and the reasons therefor, to writing, with specific reference to the privilege or privileges claimed and found." Commonwealth v. Bishop, supra at 181, 617 N.E.2d 990. The motion judge here made "Findings as to Privilege Determination Stage One" and stated, as to the entirety of the records, "that a privilege has been asserted pursuant to psychotherapist-patient privilege (G.L. c. 233, § 20B[a ] ); [and] the social worker-client privilege (G.L. c. 112, § 135)." We agree with the Appeals Court, see 43 Mass.App.Ct. at 570-572, 686 N.E.2d 1025, that this purported "finding" did not comply with the first requirement of the Bishop case. The mere assertion of a privilege or privileges does not establish that any such privilege or privileges in fact exist and apply to protect the records sought to be examined. A judge considering a motion for examination of allegedly privileged records, therefore, must, as a threshold matter, specify in a written memorandum which privilege or privileges he or she finds actually apply to provide protection to the documents or category of documents in issue so that the defendant may proceed to Stage 2 of the inquiry. We need not further concern ourselves here with the privilege determination requirement because the Commonwealth agrees that the records should be examined in camera by the appellate courts (as they were by the motion judge) to determine whether they contain relevant information which triggers consideration of Stages 3 through 5 of the Bishop protocol. ⁵

2. The Appeals Court defined the standards of relevancy that apply to the Bishop protocol, see 43 Mass.App.Ct. at 572-574, 686 N.E.2d 1025, and, after examining the disputed records, including the team-related materials compiled during John's evaluation at the center, discussed at length why and how the information in the withheld materials would be relevant to, and supportive of, the defendant's position. Id. at 575-582, 686 N.E.2d 1025. In this latter regard, the Appeals Court considered the evidence at the trial and pointed out that, among other uses, the information in the records would (a) provide a basis for the defense to retain and present an expert to express opinions about the suggestive or coercive propensities of the techniques used in the team's interviews of John, id. at 578, 686 N.E.2d 1025; (b) permit a challenge through cross-examination of the testimony of important Commonwealth witnesses who had suggested to the jury that the team's evaluation was neutral in approach and designed only to get at the truth, id. at 579, 686 N.E.2d 1025; (c) furnish several other opportunities to question the fairness and reliability of the evaluation made by the team, id. at 580, 686 N.E.2d 1025; and (d) disclose pertinent facts about John's ability accurately to perceive, remember, and recount and indicate his possible motives for falsely claiming that he had been abused, id. at 578, 686 N.E.2d 1025. These matters went directly to the issue of John's credibility, the core issue to be resolved by the jury in light of the defendant's contentions that John's accusations were fabricated and probably induced by the team's improper use of improper techniques in its evaluative assessment.

Our independent examination of the disputed records confirms the Appeals Court's observations and conclusions. We reject the Commonwealth's argument that the information in the withheld records and in the team's evaluation was cumulative of other evidence at the trial. We therefore agree with the Appeals Court's determinations that "the documents reflecting John's allegations of sexual abuse and his related counseling and treatment were presumptively relevant ... [and in fact] were actually relevant to [the] defense. [As a consequence,] it was reversible error to deny [defense] counsel [and the prosecutor] access thereto in accordance with the Bishop protocol; and ... the Superior Court's denial of access created a reasonable, if not substantial, risk of an erroneous conviction." 43 Mass.App.Ct. at 582, 686 N.E.2d 1025. The defendant is entitled to a new trial, at which (after the defense counsel and prosecutor have examined the records) the judge should proceed to take up and rule on the remaining steps in the Bishop protocol. Id. at 582 n. 25, 686 N.E.2d 1025. ⁶

3. Before leaving this topic, we need to make one other point. In the course of its discussion of the "Relevancy Determination," the Appeals Court, id. at 574, 686 N.E.2d 1025, said the following:

"Initially, we note that the facts of this case do not implicate the principal public policy rationale which prompted the Bishop procedures, i.e., minimizing the potential reluctance of rape and sexual abuse victims to seek needed therapy. See Bishop,[supra ] at 176 ; Fuller, [supra ] at 221-222 . In cases in which children of tender years, like John, are subjected to diagnostic evaluations at the behest of an adult without the necessity of their assent, the concern that disclosure of the records of that evaluation will create a 'chilling effect ... preventing those in need from seeking ... help,' Commonwealth v. Collett, 387 Mass. 424, 428 (1982), seems of much reduced significance" (footnote omitted).

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