Com. v. Patterson
| Decision Date | 20 March 1980 |
| Citation | 488 Pa. 227,412 A.2d 481 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Winfield C. PATTERSON, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Robert B. Lawler, Chief, Appeals Div., James Jordan, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before EAGEN, C. J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, NIX, LARSEN, FLAHERTY and KAUFFMAN, JJ.
Appellant, Winfield C. Patterson, was convicted by a jury of three counts of murder of the first degree. Since the Commonwealth was seeking the death penalty, the jury further deliberated and found aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances. Post-verdict motions were denied and appellant was sentenced to death. This direct appeal followed.
Appellant first argues that the suppression court erred in failing to suppress statements given to police. The facts are as follows.
On February 21, 1977, police discovered the bodies of Victor Soto, his wife Betty Soto, and her fourteen-year-old daughter, Wanda McKim, in their home at 1231 South 46th Street in Philadelphia. Mr. and Mrs. Soto had been bound with electrical cord and stabbed repeatedly while Ms. McKim was found submerged in a bathtub full of water.
Police at the scene learned that Mrs. Soto had another daughter, Helen McKim, who had recently moved out of the Soto household. Police learned that Helen had struck her mother with a hammer a week or so before the killings. Police discovered that Helen was living at the home of Mrs. Ruth Stroman at 4821 Kingsessing Avenue in Philadelphia. At the Stroman home, police found Helen McKim, Sharlinda Stroman, William Blannon and appellant. All four agreed to go to police headquarters to be interviewed concerning their knowledge of the victims. Before leaving, however, Ruth Stroman told a Detective Hildred Allen that appellant and Blannon had been around the Soto residence over the past weekend. 1
Appellant and his companions arrived at the Police Administration Building at 6:35 P.M. Appellant was questioned by Detective Harry McCabe for approximately thirty minutes about his knowledge of the slain family and their relationship with Helen McKim. McCabe testified that appellant was not under arrest and that appellant was very cooperative in answering questions. Appellant agreed to take a polygraph examination, but he was found unfit for the examination because he had been smoking marijuana all day before arriving at police headquarters.
At 8:30 P.M., Sergeant Herbert Gibbons, the detective in charge of the case, told appellant that he was free to leave and that the police would give him a ride home. Appellant, however, informed Sergeant Gibbons that he preferred to wait until police were done questioning his girlfriend, Sharlinda Stroman. Appellant, who was not a suspect at this time, remained in the waiting room overnight. 2 The next morning appellant was given breakfast. During the period between 8:30 P.M. and 7:00 A.M. the following morning, appellant was not questioned.
During the night, William Blannon told police that he alone had gone to the Soto residence on Saturday evening and killed the three victims. Sharlinda Stroman, on the other hand, told police during questioning that she, Blannon and appellant had been together at her home all day Saturday. Because of the inconsistencies between the statements of Blannon and Stroman, Sergeant Gibbons instructed Detective Francis Ansel to interview appellant concerning Blannon's whereabouts on Saturday. During an interview between 7:05 A.M. and 8:45 A.M., appellant told Ansel that he had been with Blannon all Saturday evening except for a ten-minute period when Blannon left to buy beer. Appellant also told Ansel he did not know who had killed the three victims. Detective Ansel testified that appellant appeared normal and alert and had no trouble answering questions. Ansel further testified that appellant was not a suspect; however, the officer felt appellant was providing a false alibi for Blannon.
Appellant remained in the visitor's area between 8:35 A.M. and 11:00 A.M. During this period, Sergeant Gibbons was reviewing all of the statements given to police and noticed the discrepancies between the statements given by Blannon, appellant and Stroman. At 11:00 A.M., Gibbons instructed Detective Guster Richardson to give appellant his Miranda warnings and advise him he could be charged with hindering the prosecution of Blannon if he insisted on providing a false alibi for Blannon. Appellant was given his Miranda warnings, which he waived. During this interview, appellant informed Detective Richardson that he had confused the events of Friday with Saturday's events; appellant contended he had gone out alone on Saturday and could not account for Blannon's activities on that evening. The interview concluded at 12:30 P.M. when appellant agreed to take a polygraph examination.
The polygraph examination was conducted by Officer Ramon Martinez, who conducted a pre-examination interview with appellant from 1:00 P.M. to 2:00 P.M. The polygraph examination itself was conducted between 2:00 P.M. and 2:30 P.M. When appellant asked how he had done, Martinez informed him he had not done very well. Appellant then told Martinez he would tell what had happened. Martinez gave appellant paper and told him to write down what had occurred. Appellant then wrote out a confession admitting complicity in the killings which he signed at 3:07 P.M. Martinez then informed Sergeant Gibbons of appellant's confession. Gibbons, who testified he was surprised by the confession, instructed Detective Martin Buck to take a formal statement. Buck again gave appellant his Miranda warnings which he again waived. Appellant admitted that he had helped tie up Mr. and Mrs. Soto before Blannon had stabbed them and that he had helped strangle Wanda McKim. Appellant read and signed the confession at 4:52 P.M. Detective Buck testified that appellant had been alert and talkative during the interview, and had not been subjected to force or threats.
Appellant was arraigned at 9:03 P.M. When advised that he was being charged with three counts of homicide, appellant stated, After he had been arraigned, appellant also told Officer Alfred Bertolino that he had only killed the young girl.
The suppression court, after hearing this testimony, made findings of fact and conclusions of law and ruled that all of appellant's statements were admissible. Although appellant did not testify at the suppression hearing he testified at trial that he had not written or signed the confession and that he had been detained overnight and that the confession was the product of force and threats of force. That testimony was rejected as incredible by the trial court in denying appellant's post-verdict motions.
Appellant claims that the suppression court erred in refusing to suppress his statements. In support of this contention, appellant apparently argues (1) the exculpatory statements were the product of custodial interrogation without the required Miranda warnings; (2) his inculpatory statements were the product of an unnecessary delay between arrest and arraignment; and (3) his waiver of his Miranda rights was not knowing and intelligent. We find no merit to any of appellant's contentions.
As we stated in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 467 Pa. 146, 151-52, 354 A.2d 886, 889 (1976):
"
Reviewing appellant's arguments in light of this standard, we are convinced the suppression court was correct in ruling that appellant's statements were admissible.
Appellant's argument that his exculpatory statements were the product of custodial interrogation without the required Miranda warnings is contrary to the suppression court's findings. It is admitted that no Miranda warnings were given before appellant's first two interviews. The Commonwealth argues, and the suppression court so found, that the initial two interviews were not "custodial interrogation," as appellant was not in custody. We agree.
In Commonwealth v. O'Shea, 456 Pa. 288, 291, 318 A.2d 713, 715 (1974), we stated:
We further stated:
"Moreover, the test for custodial interrogation 'does not depend upon the subjective intent of the law enforcement officer-interrogator, but upon whether the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant...
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