Com. v. Phelps

Decision Date16 October 1906
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. PHELPS.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
COUNSEL

John F. Noxon, Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

Herbert C. Joyner, for defendant.

OPINION

MORTON J.

This is an indictment in three counts for receiving and aiding in the concealment of stolen goods. There was a verdict against the defendant on all of the counts, and the case is here on exceptions by him to the refusal of the court to instruct the jury as requested.

Taking the exceptions which have been argued in the order of the requests to which they relate, the first was to the refusal of the court to instruct the jury as follows: '1. That if the jury find that the defendant Phelps did not know that the goods had been stolen until after they had been shipped to Troy, New York, then his connection with them out of the commonwealth will not warrant a conviction on this indictment. 2. That if defendant did not know and had no reasonable ground to suspect that the goods had been stolen until after they were shipped out of this state, and after that time had nothing more to do with the goods in this state, then the jury will not be justified in finding the defendant guilty.' Taking the requests literally, it may well be doubted whether they raise the point which the defendant has argued, and whether in any aspect of the case they could have been properly given. Although possession out of the commonwealth of goods stolen in the commonwealth would not of itself warrant a conviction for receiving them and aiding in their concealment here, evidence of such possession would be competent against one accused of that offense.

But assuming that the requests were intended to raise and did raise the question whether a guilty knowledge or belief first acquired outside of the state would warrant a conviction, we think that if there was any evidence warranting such a contention, the matter was sufficiently covered by the charge. Phelps was a witness in his own behalf and admitted receiving the goods in Williams-town but denied any guilty knowledge or felonious intent, and testified that he 'never knew the goods were stolen until he was arrested.' He did not contend or testify that he first acquired such knowledge outside of the state. There would seem, therefore, to have been no evidence warranting a conclusion that he first obtained knowledge that the goods were stolen outside the commonwealth. But the court instructed the jury as follows: 'With reference to the knowledge or belief of the defendant that these goods were stolen property, I instruct you that he would be guilty if when he received these various lots of goods he knew or believed that they had been stolen or if at any time thereafter and while he had these goods or any portion of these goods in the state of Massachusetts he knew or believed that the...

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