Com. v. Pitts, No. 3 EAP 2008.

• Decision Date: 20 October 2009
• Docket Number: No. 3 EAP 2008.
• Citation: 981 A.2d 875
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Dexter PITTS, Appellee.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

981 A.2d 875

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Dexter PITTS, Appellee.

No. 3 EAP 2008.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted April 23, 2008.

Decided October 20, 2009.

Hugh J. Burns, Jr., Esq., Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Mr. Dexter Pitts, for Dexter Pitts.

BEFORE: CASTILLE, C.J., and SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY and GREENSPAN, JJ.

OPINION

EAKIN, Justice.

The Commonwealth appeals from the Superior Court's order vacating the order denying appellee, Dexter Pitts, relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq., dismissing Pitts's PCRA petition, and granting PCRA counsel's request to withdraw; the Superior Court remanded for the filing of an amended PCRA petition. Finding the Superior Court erred in concluding PCRA counsel did not comply with the dictates of Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 379 Pa.Super. 390, 550 A.2d 213 (1988) (en banc)¹ for withdrawal, we reverse.

In January and May, 2003, Pitts pled guilty to simple assault and ten counts of burglary. He was sentenced to an aggregate 21 to 42 years imprisonment and a consecutive ten-year probation term. Plea counsel, who also represented Pitts at sentencing, filed a petition to vacate and reconsider sentence on the basis of Pitts's remorse, drug addiction, age, and the fact the burglaries did not involve violence, as no one was present in the hotel rooms he burglarized; the motion was denied.² No direct appeal was filed.

In June, 2003, Pitts filed a pro se PCRA petition alleging he pled guilty based on counsel's mistaken advice that he would receive a maximum sentence of five to ten years imprisonment. PCRA counsel was appointed, but did not file an amended petition. Instead, counsel filed a no-merit letter pursuant to Turner/Finley, alleging she had reviewed Pitts's files, the notes of testimony from his pleas and sentencing, and had communicated with Pitts. See Original Record D-5, Turner/Finley Letter, 7/22/04, at 1. Based upon this review, she stated the issue raised in Pitts's PCRA petition—the voluntariness of his plea— lacked merit, and gave a thorough explanation of why the issue was meritless. Id., at 3-5. Counsel further averred there were no other viable issues which could be raised in an amended petition, id., at 1, and accordingly sought leave to withdraw from the case. Id., at 5. After giving the requisite notice of its intent to dismiss Pitts's petition without a hearing, see Pa. R.Crim.P. 907(1), and receiving no reply from Pitts, the PCRA court dismissed the petition as meritless and granted counsel's request to withdraw.

Pitts filed a pro se appeal, in which he did not raise the guilty plea issue argued in his PCRA petition. Instead, he raised a new issue: whether PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise plea counsel's ineffectiveness for not filing a direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Pitts, No. 2929 EDA 2004, unpublished memorandum at 2 (Pa.Super. filed January 26, 2006).

The Superior Court vacated the PCRA court's order and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, concluding:

In view of [Pitts's] claim that he communicated his desire to appeal to [plea counsel], we find that [Pitts] has pleaded sufficient facts upon which PCRA counsel could have amended the petition to include a claim of [plea] counsel ineffectiveness. Had PCRA counsel pleaded these facts and obtained an affidavit from [Pitts] which attested to them, an evidentiary hearing on this claim would have been warranted.

* * *

Moreover, [Pitts] has stated that he asked his PCRA counsel to amend the petition to include this claim and that she neglected to do so. In our view, such an allegation, if believed by the PCRA court, satisfies the arguable basis prong of the PCRA ineffectiveness claim. Moreover, if PCRA counsel failed to raise this meritorious claim, we may only conclude that [Pitts] suffered prejudice (i.e. the loss of the reinstatement of his direct appeal rights). [Commonwealth v.] Lantzy, [558 Pa. 214, 736 A.2d 564, 572 (Pa.1999).]

Id., at 5-6. Thus, although Pitts had not filed affidavits asserting he asked plea counsel and PCRA counsel about a direct appeal, the Superior Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing on Pitts's layered ineffectiveness claim.

The Commonwealth moved for reconsideration, which the Superior Court granted. The Superior Court again vacated the PCRA court's order, this time focusing on PCRA counsel's Turner/Finley letter. See Commonwealth v. Pitts, No. 2929 EDA 2004, unpublished memorandum at 4, 915 A.2d 148 (Pa.Super. filed October 27, 2006) ("Although [Pitts] contends that his PCRA counsel rendered ineffective assistance, we must first determine whether the PCRA court properly permitted counsel to withdraw.") (citing Commonwealth v. Friend, 896 A.2d 607, 612 (Pa.Super.2006)). The court concluded the PCRA court improperly permitted counsel to withdraw on the basis of her no-merit letter. Id., at 5. It noted counsel did not analyze whether Pitts could mount a successful challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence:

While we recognize that a claim challenging the discretionary aspects of sentence is not cognizable under the PCRA, see Friend, supra at 616 n. 15, counsel did not even articulate whether [Pitts] could satisfy the requirements for reinstatement of his direct appeal rights under Commonwealth v. Lantzy, , 736 A.2d 564 ([Pa.] 1999) and its progeny. If the PCRA court reinstated [Pitts's] direct appeal rights, [he] could petition for review of the sentencing claims that his [plea] counsel raised....

Id., at 6. The Superior Court also noted PCRA counsel did not explore whether plea counsel was ineffective for failing to raise other challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentence in the motion to vacate and reconsider sentence. Id., at 6-7. Accordingly, the court concluded PCRA counsel had not complied with the Turner/Finley withdrawal requirements because, although the no-merit letter indicated Pitts's dissatisfaction with the length of his sentence, it failed to explain why Pitts could not obtain relief on this claim. Id., at 7.

Further, the court addressed PCRA counsel's failure to discuss plea counsel's failure to file a direct appeal:

Although the existing record does not permit us to conclude whether [Pitts] asked his [plea] counsel to file a direct appeal, we find PCRA counsel's silence on this issue troubling. It is inconceivable that any PCRA counsel would not inquire into the reasons for his/her client's failure to pursue a direct appeal. If PCRA counsel considered this issue, discussed it with her client, and then discounted it, she should have explained her reasons for doing so in the no-merit letter. However, if [Pitts] asked his [plea] counsel to file an appeal (as he indicates in his appellate brief), [PCRA] counsel should have filed an amended petition and sought an evidentiary hearing.

Id., at 8. The court determined PCRA counsel failed to comply with Turner/Finley; thus, it vacated the PCRA court's order and remanded "for the filing of an amended [PCRA] petition in which counsel properly pleads and proves (1) each of the claims raised in [Pitts's] pro se petition, (2) any issues raised in subsequent discussion/correspondence with [Pitts,] and (3) any other issues apparent from the certified record." Id., at 8-9 (emphasis in original). It further ordered PCRA counsel to approach Pitts about signing an affidavit regarding his assertion he asked plea counsel to file a direct appeal. Id., at 9 (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(A)(12) and (D) (petition must include facts supporting petition and place in record where they appear; to extent they do not appear in record, petition must include affidavits, documents, and other evidence showing such facts)).

We granted allowance of appeal to determine whether the Superior Court erred in creating new Turner/Finley requirements, sua sponte, by finding PCRA counsel's no-merit letter defective for failing to address issues Pitts never raised, and which were not apparent from the record. See Commonwealth v. Pitts, 596 Pa. 258, 942 A.2d 893 (2008).

In PCRA proceedings, an appellate court's scope of review is limited by the PCRA's parameters; since most PCRA appeals involve mixed questions of fact and law, the standard of review is whether the PCRA court's findings are supported by the record and free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Strong, 563 Pa. 455, 761 A.2d 1167, 1170 n. 3 (2000).

The Commonwealth argues the Superior Court should not have addressed whether PCRA counsel's no-merit letter met the Turner/Finley requirements, as any claim regarding the no-merit letter was waived—Pitts did not raise it in the PCRA court during the 20-day response period provided by Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). The Commonwealth further argues PCRA counsel's no-merit letter complied with the Turner/Finley requirements, and the Superior Court should not have, sua sponte, created the requirement that counsel explain why all conceivable claims for relief are meritless.

Pitts counters by asserting the first time he could challenge PCRA counsel's stewardship was on collateral appeal from the denial of his PCRA petition, as that was the first time he was no longer represented by PCRA counsel; therefore, the issue regarding counsel's withdrawal was not waived. He echoes the Superior Court's conclusion that PCRA counsel should have realized he was unhappy with his sentence and the only way to challenge the discretionary aspects of his sentence was to obtain reinstatement of his direct appeal rights; this required PCRA counsel to file an amended PCRA petition alleging plea counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to file a direct appeal.

In examining the adequacy of PCRA counsel's no-merit letter before addressing the merits of Pitts's ineffectiveness claim, the Superior Court relied on Friend. There, the defendant filed a timely pro se PCRA...