Com. v. Preziosi

• Decision Date: 23 April 1987
• Citation: 399 Mass. 748,506 N.E.2d 887
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Thomas L. PREZIOSI.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 887

506 N.E.2d 887

399 Mass. 748

COMMONWEALTH v. Thomas L. PREZIOSI.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Essex.

Argued Jan. 6, 1987.

Decided April 23, 1987.

Andrew Silverman, Boston, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for defendant.

Richard A. McGovern, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Com.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, LIACOS, ABRAMS and NOLAN, JJ.

HENNESSEY, Chief Justice.

The defendant, after a jury trial in the Superior Court, was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to a term of five years at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Concord. ¹ He appealed. He asserts error in the judge's instructions as they related to the failure of the police to test for fingerprints. The Appeals Court ordered dismissal of the appeal because of the defendant's failure to file a "timely notice of appeal." Commonwealth v. Butts, 21 Mass.App.Ct. 972, 489 N.E.2d 1017 (1986). We granted further appellate review. We consider the merits of the appeal, and we affirm the judgment of conviction.

On the night of October 2, 1981, Nicholas Alexandrou was working as the manager at a Burger King restaurant in Saugus. Alexandrou remained alone in the restaurant, doing paperwork, after it closed. At approximately 1:20 A.M., Alexandrou heard "knocking on the front door." When the knocking persisted, Alexandrou went to the restaurant office and telephoned the Saugus police department. As Alexandrou returned to the dining area, he was met by a man inside the restaurant, ² who pointed a pistol at Alexandrou and said, "I want the money." As they walked to the office, Alexandrou noticed that there was a woman standing behind the man with the pistol. Alexandrou recognized them as the same couple who had dined in the restaurant the previous evening. Alexandrou testified that, on that previous evening, the two had been brought to his attention by a cashier because of a dispute about restaurant policy on the use of coupons. Alexandrou testified that he had observed the couple for "about an hour" on that previous evening.

The defendant took the cash receipts, locked Alexandrou in a walk-in freezer, and escaped with his companion. Alexandrou was rescued from the freezer by a police officer. The defendant had handled a telephone and a screwdriver while on the premises, and these items were seized by the police, but no tests for fingerprints were done on them. The defendant and Butts were later arrested and identified by Alexandrou as the robbers.

The defendant was convicted on September 29, 1982. The judge sentenced the defendant, but then revoked the sentence on the defendant's request for a one-week stay of execution of sentence. On October 6, 1982, the stay was vacated and sentence was imposed. On November 19, 1982, the defendant filed pro se a motion for leave to file the notice of appeal late. The judge granted the motion on December 1, 1982. The Appeals Court dismissed the appeal because "[t]he record fails to disclose any 'excusable neglect' ... for [the defendant's] not filing a timely notice of appeal...." Commonwealth v. Butts, 21 Mass.App.Ct. 972, 972, 489 N.E.2d 1017 (1986). The defendant petitioned for a rehearing of his appeal, which the Appeals Court denied. We granted the defendant's application for further appellate review.

1. The issue whether the Appeals Court, in dismissing the appeal, was correct in reasoning that the defendant did not show "excusable neglect" has not been briefed by the parties, nor do we have a sufficient record before us on which to decide the issue. The Commonwealth stated in argument before us that the defendant's appeal is properly before us. Because this is a criminal case in which a prison sentence was ordered, and in the interest of judicial economy, we consider the merits of the defendant's appeal.

2. At trial, a portion of the defense was devoted to questioning why the police had never conducted fingerprint tests on the screwdriver or the telephone. The defendant argues that the judge's instructions precluded the jury from considering this issue. ³ See Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-486, 399 N.E.2d 482 (1980). Neither defendant objected to the judge's instructions, nor did either defendant propose jury instructions on the issue. "It is a fundamental rule of practice that where a party alleges error in a charge he must bring the alleged error to the attention of the judge in specific terms in order to give the judge an opportunity to rectify the error, if any." Commonwealth v. McDuffee, 379 Mass. 353, 357, 398 N.E.2d 463 (1979), citing Commonwealth v. Freeman, 352 Mass. 556, 563, 227 N.E.2d 3 (1967). See Mass.R.Crim.P. 24 (b), 378 Mass. 895 (1979). Where the defendant fails to object to the judge's instructions, the standard of review is whether the jury charge "was so erroneous that it created a 'substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.' " Commonwealth v. Murray, 396 Mass. 702, 705, 488 N.E.2d 415 (1986), quoting Commonwealth v. Pickles, 393 Mass. 775, 776, 473 N.E.2d 694 (1985), and Commonwealth v. Freeman, supra, 352 Mass. at 563-564, 227 N.E.2d 3. We "view the charge in its entirety since the adequacy of instructions must be determined in light of their over-all impact on the jury." Commonwealth v. Sellon, 380 Mass. 220, 231-232, 402 N.E.2d 1329 (1980). "Moreover, in determining whether the instructions create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, we view the absence of any objections ... as relevant." Commonwealth v. Ely, 388 Mass. 69, 73-74, 444 N.E.2d 1276 (1983), citing Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 148, 430 N.E.2d 1198, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137, 102 S.Ct. 2967, 73 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1982).

The defendant argues that this case is controlled by Commonwealth v. Bowden, supra. We disagree. In that case, the defendant objected to the judge's instructions. ^{4 4} Id. 379 Mass. at 485, 399 N.E.2d 482. Moreover, in that case, the judge explicitly instructed the jury to disregard the fact that the Commonwealth failed to test for fingerprints. Id. at 486, 399 N.E.2d 482. In this case, on the other hand, the judge did not specifically mention the failure to test for fingerprints. From the judge's language, there is a possibility that the jury may have inferred that the failure to test for fingerprints was irrelevant; nevertheless, the judge's instructions did not direct that result. Cf. Commonwealth v. Phong Thu Ly, 19 Mass.App.Ct. 901, 902, 471 N.E.2d 383 (1984). In addition, the judge fully instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence, the Commonwealth's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the identification of the defendant. Finally, the inference which could have been drawn from the failure to test for fingerprints does not go directly to the defendant's guilt or innocence. Cf. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 20 Mass.App.Ct. 902, 903, 477 N.E.2d 609 (1985) ("while a positive fingerprint test would have ruined the defendant, a negative fingerprint test could not have been particularly helpful to him"); Commonwealth v. Walker, 14 Mass.App.Ct. 544, 548-549, 441 N.E.2d 261 (1982). The defendant was positively identified on several occasions by the victim of the robbery, who had had the opportunity to observe him for approximately one hour on the evening before the robbery. See Commonwealth v. Walker, ...