Com. v. Reynolds

• Citation: 89 Ky. 147,12 S.W. 132
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. REYNOLDS.
• Decision Date: 26 September 1889
• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky

12 S.W. 132

89 Ky. 147

COMMONWEALTH v. REYNOLDS.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

September 26, 1889

Appeal from circuit court, Fleming county; A. E. COLE, Judge.

"To be officially reported."

P. W Hardin, Atty. Gen., J. H. Powers, and Cochran & Son, for the Commonwealth. Wadsworth & Son, for appellee.

PRYOR J.

The appellee, John J. Reynolds, was indicted in the Fleming circuit court, under an act of the legislature entitled "An act to prohibit the sale of vinous, spirituous, and malt liquors in Fleming county, with certain penalties annexed," etc. The sale of the whisky is conceded, and the defense maintained on the ground that at the time the defendant was a pharmacist and druggist residing in Flemingsburg, and sold the pint of whisky on the prescription of a regular practicing physician, to be used as a medicine by the wife of one Hall, who was then sick in bed, and required the liquor and a medicine. It was sold in good faith, and with no purpose to violate the law. Such are the facts of the case. A verdict having been rendered for the appellee, the common-wealth is prosecuting this appeal insisting that a bona fide druggist, under the provisions of this special act, has no right to sell whisky as a medicine on the prescription of a regular practicing physician. On the other hand, it is argued that if such is the construction to be given the act it is unconstitutional. We deem it unnecessary to discuss the constitutional question, as the legislature may as well prohibit the sale of whisky by a druggist as by a grocer or merchant; but the important inquiry arises: Is the prohibition of such a sale within the spirit and meaning of the act in question? If we follow the letter of the act, this question might be answered in the affirmative; but, when looking to the legislative intent, there is little difficulty in determining the point raised. That which is within the letter of a statute, but not within the intention of the law-maker, should be excluded when we come to construe the law. We have a statute prohibiting any one from selling or giving vinous or spirituous liquors to an infant, and imposing a penalty for its violation. It will not be contended that the giving of wine to an infant for sacramental purposes, or by a physician as a medicine, when done in good faith, would be a violation of that statute, or that such was the legislative intent. The special act under consideration makes it...