Com. v. Romberger
| Decision Date | 19 September 1973 |
| Citation | 454 Pa. 279,312 A.2d 353 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. James Alan ROMBERGER, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Carl B. Stoner, Jr., Harrisburg, for appellant.
Marion MacIntyre, Asst. Dist. Atty., Harrisburg, LeRoy S. Zimmerman, Dist. Atty., Harrisburg, for appellee.
Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX, and MANDERINO, JJ.
This is a direct appeal from a conviction for first degree murder and a sentence of death imposed in accordance with the verdict of the jury. Appellant challenges the admissibility of statements made by him to investigating officers, allegedly taken without a previous warning of his right if indigent to the presence of counsel free of charge during the interrogation, as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). We agree and reverse the conviction. 1
The record shows that on November 4, 1965, the Harrisburg City Police received a missing person report concerning Joy Blanche Keifer, a resident of that city. The appellant had been on a date with Miss Keifer the previous evening and was the last person known to have seen her. No November 5, a Detective Barbush of the city police interviewed the appellant at the school which employed his mother and appellant maintained that he had left Miss Keifer in front of her apartment early on the morning of November 4. He expressed a desire to aid the investigation to discover her whereabouts.
The next morning, November 6, the body of Joy Keifer was discovered in Wildwood Lake, near Harrisburg. At about 12:30 p.m. that afternoon, Detective Barbush, accompanied by two Pennsylvania State Troopers, went to appellant's residence. They advised him that he had a right to obtain counsel and to have counsel present and that he did not have to make any statements, as such statements could later be used against him. They requested appellant to follow them to City Hall in his car, and appellant did so, accompanied by one of the State Troopers. They arrived at City Hall about 1:10 p.m. and, after brief inteviews at which appellant was again given the warnings noted above, it was determined that he should take a polygraph test. At 2:35 p.m., the appellant, accompanied by two city detectives and two State Troopers, went to the State Police office in Harrisburg so that a State Police polygraph expert, Lieutenant Murray, could administer that test.
Appellant was interviewed by Lieutenant Murray until 5:30 p.m. During that time, the Lieutenant explained the operation of the polygraph and told the appellant that he shoud get his facts straight before answering the questions because the machine would detect any falsehood. In response to these admonitions, appellant altered his story four times, each time admitting more and more of the facts leading up to the murder, yet never actually admitting to the commission of the homicide.
At 5:30 p.m., appellant ordered and was provided with sandwiches which he ate until about 6:00 p.m. The interview was resumed and appellant was given substantially the same warnings mentioned earlier. A polygraph test was administered, and subsequently appellant agreed to show investigating officers the scene of the death. At this time, appellant steadfastly maintained that: He had driven to the lake with the deceased and an argument had developed; the deceased had left the car, and appellant, being unable to find her, had driven back to Harrisburg. Subsequently, he became concerned and returned to the lake where he had discovered her body.
After showing the officers the scene of the crime, appellant was brought back to state police headquarters and charged with murder. He was arraigned and fully warned of his rights including the right to free counsel if indigent. Subsequently, he agreed to give first an oral and then a signed written statement admitting to the homicide.
At trial, Lieutenant Murray testified as to the various contradictory versions of the incident given by appellant during the interview. The signed confession was also introduced into evidence.
It is uncontested that, prior to the arrignment, appellant was never warned of his right to Free counsel, if indigent. Appellant therefore argues that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to have counsel present during the interrogation. We must agree.
At the outset, it should be noted that the trial of this crime (beginning January 9, 1967) followed the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (decided June 13, 1966). The Miranda safeguards are therefore applicable to this case even though the interrogation itself (November 6--7, 1965) pre-dated that ruling. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882, (1966); Commonwealth v. Yount, 435 Pa. 276, 256 A.2d 464 (1969); Commonwealth v. Sites, 427 Pa. 486, 235 A.2d 387 (1967).
Miranda clearly holds that, before an accused is subjected to custodial interrogation:
'In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under this system then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he was the right to consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.' 384 U.S. at 473, 86 S.Ct. at 1627.
The Commonwealth maintains that this warning was unnecessary because the defendant was not in custody within the meaning of Miranda at least until the visit to the lake shortly before the arraignment.
We held in Commonwealth v Marabel, 445 Pa. 435, 441, 283 A.2d 285, 288 (1971) that:
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After four hours of interrogation at the police station, appellant could not...
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