Com. v. Santana

Decision Date04 November 1983
Docket NumberNo. 282,282
Citation468 A.2d 488,321 Pa.Super. 299
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Albert SANTANA, Appellant. Oct. Term 1979.
CourtPennsylvania Superior Court

Page 488

468 A.2d 488
321 Pa.Super. 299
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania
v.
Albert SANTANA, Appellant.
No. 282 Oct. Term 1979.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Submitted Sept. 6, 1983.
Filed Nov. 4, 1983.

Page 489

[321 Pa.Super. 300] Joseph N. Bongiovanni, III, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Jane Cutler Greenspan, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for Com., appellee.

Before ROWLEY, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.

POPOVICH, Judge:

This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence by the appellant, Albert Santana, for receiving stolen property entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. 1 We affirm.

The facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict-winner, consist of the following: At approximately 8:30 p.m. on July 8, 1977, Officers Schmidt and Dzara, of the Philadelphia police department, were patrolling the 900 block of Marshall Street when they heard a burglar alarm going off. They parked their vehicle and began checking the stores in the immediate vicinity. During this search, the officers received a call over the portable radio they were carrying. As a result of that radio call, the officers looked over to 6th [321 Pa.Super. 301] Street, which is next to Marshall, and observed at a distance of about 100 feet "three Spanish males coming from a vacant lot, carrying air conditioners." (N.T. 16) Appellant was in possession of one unit while the two others, his brothers, were each holding an end of another air conditioner. The officers did not proceed after these individuals. Rather, following the receipt of a second radio call, the officers drove around to 921 North 6th Street, which is right next to the vacant lot, and saw that the front door to the Hahnemann Medical Center, which was shut down for repairs caused by fire damage, was broken. The lock was hanging and the door jam was apart.

After observing the front of the building, Officer Schmidt walked along the side of the structure, through the vacant lot and towards the rear. At this time, he observed three windows which were covered by a large metal screen. Holes were cut in the windows and alongside of the metal screen were parts of broken air conditioner vents hanging from the window frames. All of the windows were on the first floor, street level. Following this, Officer Schmidt and his partner walked over to and knocked on the door at 917 6th Street, which is the house next to the vacant lot and the place where the officers noticed that the appellant was carrying the unit he was holding. The door was opened by a small child and the officers could see from their vantage point an air conditioner lying on the floor of the hallway. The officers identified themselves and appellant's brother, Efran, who was standing next to the unit and was observed earlier assisting his brother Richard hauling it across the lot, ran upstairs. Officer Dzara pursued Efran upstairs and arrested him along with the appellant, who was about to take a bath in the second floor bathroom. Also, a second air conditioner was located upstairs and confiscated by the police. During this time, Officer Schmidt checked the first floor restroom and found Richard washing his hands. He also was arrested.

Both officers testified to having an unobstructed view of the trio as they made their way across the vacant lot with [321 Pa.Super. 302] air conditioners in hand. In fact, Officers Schmidt and Dzara gave a detailed description of what the three were wearing when they first saw them. From the verdict rendered it is obvious that the trier of fact discounted appellant's testimony denying the presence of the air conditioners (Fedders models)

Page 490

in the home when seized. The court also was presented with evidence that the Administrative Coordinator for the hospital identified the Fedders air conditioners as belonging to the institution. Additionally, the manager of the hospital testified that he gave no one permission to enter and remove the air conditioners from the premises. To reiterate, from the verdict, it is apparent that the judge did not believe appellant's testimony that he had not left the premises 15 to 20 minutes prior to his arrest. In fact, appellant stated that he had remained home all day.

Appellant's version of what had occurred was not persuasive and he, along with his brother Richard, were found guilty of receiving stolen property. See note 1, supra. Efran, being a juvenile, was not tried as an adult.

Following the denial of a portion of appellant's post-trial motions, sentence was imposed and this appeal was filed. The issues presented for our review by the appellant appear in his brief to this Court in the "Statement of Questions" section and consist of:

I WAS THERE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO WARRANT THE TRIAL JUDGE IN ASSUMING THAT [THE] VALUE OF THE AIR-CONDITIONERS EXCEED[ED] $50?

II DID THE MOTION JUDGE ERR IN FAILING TO QUASH THE ARREST AND/OR SUPPRESS THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF A WARRANTLESS AND CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM ARREST AND SEARCH AND SEIZURE?

Before addressing the merits of appellant's claims, we need to respond to the Commonwealth's argument that neither of the issues raised has been "properly preserved [321 Pa.Super. 303] for appellate review." 2 For as it sees the question, "[a]lthough the Commonwealth does have a copy of 'boilerplate' motions filed by the co-defendant [Richard Santana], there is no record of any such motions being filed by this defendant[-appellant]." (Commonwealth's Brief at 4) In support of its position, the Commonwealth cites us to Commonwealth v. Gravely, 486 Pa. 194, 404 A.2d 1296 (1979), Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31, 331 A.2d 213 (1975) and Pa.R.Crim.P. 1123(a).

Initially, we note the inapplicability of Gravely, which required the submission of specific, written post-trial motions to preserve any issue for trial and appellate review, since its effective date (September 4, 1979) occurred after the alleged post-trial motions were filed on behalf of the appellant here, i.e., in January of 1979. See Commonwealth v. Davenport, --- Pa.Super. ---, 452 A.2d 1058 (1982). Thus, we must look to the guide posts created prior to Gravely to determine whether appellant's claims have been preserved for our consideration.

At the outset, it needs to be mentioned that the standard in effect prior to Gravely has been roundly criticized as a patch-work of remedial law that gave little, if any, direction to the bench and/or bar in assessing when and if an issue was or was not preserved for review. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 478 Pa. 172, 386 A.2d 495 (1978) (NIX, J., Concurring Opinion); Commonwealth v. Lennox, 270 Pa.Super. 254, 411

Page 491

A.2d 514 (1979); Commonwealth v. Roberson, 258 [321 Pa.Super. 304] Pa.Super. 471, 393 A.2d 455 (1978); see also Commonwealth v. Holmes, --- Pa.Super. ---, 461 A.2d 1268 (1983). Notwithstanding such a fact, we must decide if appellant's claims have...

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  • Com. v. Mason
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • May 4, 1992
    ...460 Pa. 31, 331 A.2d 213 (1975); Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974); Commonwealth v. Santana, 321 Pa.Super. 299, 468 A.2d 488 (1983). However, we would observe that a review of the suppression hearing transcript evinces sufficient probable cause to just......
  • Com. v. Stadtfeld
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    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • September 11, 1995
    ...427 A.2d 1385 (1985); see also McCormick v. Allegheny General Hospital, 364 Pa.Super. 210, 527 A.2d 1028 (1987); Commonwealth v. Santana, 321 Pa.Super. 299, 468 A.2d 488 (1983). We are limited to the content of the appellant's Petition since no testimony (only oral argument by counsel) was ......
  • Com. v. Potts
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    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • December 8, 1987
    ...v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31, 331 A.2d 213 (1975); Commonwealth v. Shain, 324 Pa.Super. 456, 471 A.2d 1246 (1984); Commonwealth v. Santana, 321 Pa.Super. 299, 468 A.2d 488 (1983); Commonwealth v. Vitacolonna, 297 Pa.Super. 284, 443 A.2d 838 (1982). Instead, our appellate courts insist upon specific......
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    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • August 24, 1995
    ...court in a post-verdict motion. Perez's weight and sufficiency arguments are therefore technically waived. See Commonwealth v. Santana, 321 Pa.Super. 299, 468 A.2d 488 (1983). Even so, the trial court chose to address the issue of sufficiency of the evidence. When an issue is waived for fai......
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