Com. v. Saranchak

• Decision Date: 22 November 2002
• Citation: 810 A.2d 1197,570 Pa. 521
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Daniel M. SARANCHAK, Appellant.

810 A.2d 1197

570 Pa. 521

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Daniel M. SARANCHAK, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted on Briefs July 9, 2001.

Decided November 22, 2002.

Stuart Brian Lev, Alexandra B. Fensterer, for Daniel Saranchak.

Robert A. Graci, Claude A. Lord Shields, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Before ZAPPALA, C.J., and CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR and EAKIN, JJ.

OPINION

Justice SAYLOR.

This matter arises out of a capital, post-conviction petitioner's court-approved waiver of counsel and withdrawal of state post-conviction relief proceedings, and his subsequent retraction.

On October 15, 1993, Donald M. Saranchak robbed, shot, and killed his uncle and grandmother. He pled guilty to murder generally and was sentenced to death based upon aggravating circumstances involving the commission of the murders during the perpetration of a felony and the convictions of multiple murders. The judgment of sentence was affirmed on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Saranchak, 544 Pa. 158, 675 A.2d 268 (1996). Saranchak subsequently sought relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546 (the "PCRA"), which was denied by the PCRA court. On appeal, however, this Court issued a per curiam Order remanding for the appointment of new counsel and the filing of a new PCRA petition. After the Defender Association of Philadelphia was appointed as substitute counsel, it proceeded to file the petition and pursue post-conviction review.

Pending hearing on this petition, however, Saranchak submitted a letter to the PCRA court indicating that he wished to discharge his attorneys and forego further legal proceedings. The PCRA court conducted a colloquy on July 31, 2000, at which time Saranchak confirmed that he understood the nature of the capital proceedings, his entitlement to counsel, and his rights under the PCRA, but nevertheless maintained his wish to waive such rights. The PCRA court expressed satisfaction that Saranchak's waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; accordingly, it removed the Defender Association as counsel and dismissed the post-conviction petition.

The Defender Association filed a notice of appeal challenging the PCRA court's order, together with a motion seeking a stay of execution (which was then scheduled for November 8, 2000), pending appellate review of the waiver determination.

By Order dated October 25, 2000, this Court held the matter in abeyance pending supplementation of the record with expert, psychiatric opinion concerning Saranchak's competency to effectuate a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel and to pursue further collateral proceedings. Subsequently, the Commonwealth filed a copy of the report of Larry A. Rotenberg, M.D., Director of Psychiatry at the Reading Hospital and Medical Center, containing the opinion that Saranchak had the ability to effectuate an appropriate waiver.¹ The PCRA court conducted a hearing, at which Dr. Rotenberg's report was admitted into evidence, and the psychiatrist testified to his findings and was subject to cross-examination. On the basis of the supplemental record provided, this Court concluded that the PCRA court had made sustainable legal findings supporting its order approving the discharge of the Defender Association as Saranchak's counsel and the withdrawal of his post-conviction petition. Accordingly, by Order dated November 6, 2000, the Court denied the motion for stay of execution and dismissed the Defender Association's appeal based on lack of standing.

On November 7, 2000, the Defender Association filed a next-friend petition seeking a stay of execution in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Although the district court denied relief following a hearing, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued the requested stay on the Defender Association's subsequent application. The Commonwealth immediately sought relief from the stay in the United States Supreme Court.

While the Commonwealth's application was pending, the Defender Association filed a second motion for stay of execution in this Court. In addition to reporting the entry of a stay by the Third Circuit, the Defender Association indicated, for the first time, that Saranchak had expressed a willingness to accept a stay and permit next-friend representation of his rights and interests. Such application, however, was withdrawn after the United States Supreme Court declined to vacate the stay implemented by the Third Circuit.

On November 20, 2000, Saranchak applied for reconsideration of this Court's November 6, 2000 order, attaching to his application a statement reflecting his desire to retract his waivers, to exercise his right to challenge his convictions and sentences through any appropriate legal means, and to be represented in this effort by the Defender Association. On February 7, 2001, this Court issued an Order directing that the PCRA court conduct a colloquy to determine the veracity of the statement and to assess Saranchak's intentions. Mr. Justice Castille filed a dissenting statement, in which he observed, inter alia, that the procedural rule governing allowance of reargument does not contemplate a change of mind following waiver as a basis for reconsideration. See Commonwealth v. Saranchak, 564 Pa. 250, 251-60, 767 A.2d 541, 543-46 (2001) (Castille, J., dissenting) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 2543). The colloquy proceeded, and the transcript confirmed the veracity of the signed statement and independently reflected that Saranchak wished to pursue post-conviction relief and for the Defender Association to represent him. Therefore, this Court is now presented with the question of whether Saranchak's reversal prior to termination of the appeal proceedings commenced by the Defender Association constitutes a ground upon which the post-conviction proceedings may be reinstated.

Saranchak's argument is that, due to the graveness of the punishment of death, a capital petitioner's most recent expression of his wishes in relation to the pursuit of post-conviction relief should control. The Commonwealth emphasizes the validity of Saranchak's waiver in the PCRA court, as previously confirmed by this Court, contending that we should look no further. In this regard, the Commonwealth asserts that reinstatement relief is beyond the standards governing reargument and predicts that its affordance in this case would subject appellate jurisprudence to the will or caprice of appellants.

Most jurisdictions permit a capital defendant to waive direct appellate review and/or post-conviction proceedings, and Pennsylvania is no exception. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bronshtein, 556 Pa. 545, 554, 729 A.2d 1102, 1106 (1999) (upholding the validity of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of a capital prisoner's right to pursue post-conviction remedies). But see State v. Martini, 144 N.J. 603, 677 A.2d 1106, 1112 (1996) (determining that, due to the court's independent duty to ensure the integrity of death sentences, a capital defendant may not waive post-conviction review as to certain issues). Further, we acknowledge the Commonwealth's respectable view regarding the procedure for reargument which is supported in the text of Rule of Appellate Procedure 2543.

Nevertheless, this Court previously has not squarely addressed the question presented here in the capital arena,² in which concerns for reliability are foremost. See Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 584, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 1986, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988) ("The fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment gives rise to a special `need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment' in any capital case." (citations omitted)). Moreover, we have recognized the increasing legislative constraints on post-conviction review, including its effective limitation to proceedings on a single, counseled petition. See generally Williams, 566 Pa. at 565, 782 A.2d at 524. In light of the subject matter, considering the existing restraints on serial petitions, given that the General Assembly has not spoken to the present situation, and recognizing the guiding preference for merits review in capital cases, we believe that the better course lies with the reinstatement alternative. Accord Smith v. Armontrout, 865 F.2d 1515, 1516-17 (8th Cir.1988); cf. St. Pierre v. Cowan, 217 F.3d 939, 948-50 (7th Cir.2000). Further, in this unique situation, we will not invoke standing principles on account of the Defender Association's involvement as the ostensible, initial appellant to defeat the present effort to obtain merits review of Saranchak's post-conviction claims. Cf. Smith, 865 F.2d at 1516-17.³

The post-conviction petition is reinstated and the matter remanded for resolution in accordance with the applicable law and rules.

Justice CAPPY files a concurring opinion.

Justice CASTILLE files a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice Eakin joins.

Justice CAPPY, concurring.

Although I find myself attracted to the sound jurisprudential argument set forth by the learned author of the dissent, I am constrained to acknowledge the pragmatic view offered by the majority in recognizing that a sentence of death is different.

Accordingly, I join only in the result offered by the majority opinion.

Justice CASTILLE, dissenting.

The Court today grants the petition of the Federal Court Division of the Defender Association of Philadelphia ("Federal Defender") for reargument of this Court's unanimous order dismissing, on grounds that the Federal Defender lacked standing, its vicarious appeal of the order of the PCRA court dismissing Daniel Saranchak's PCRA petition following his record waiver of both counsel and collateral review. The Court then employs the Federal Defender's improper vicarious appeal as a basis to reinstate...