Com. v. Seabolt
| Decision Date | 04 May 1984 |
| Citation | 668 S.W.2d 571 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellant, v. Jeanetta SEABOLT, Appellee. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
David L. Armstrong, Atty. Gen., Catherine C. Staib, Sp. Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, Frankfort, for appellant.
Samuel Manly, Louisville, for appellee.
Before DUNN, LESTER and McDONALD, JJ.
This appeal is from a circuit court opinion and judgment declaring K.R.S. 244.290(4) unconstitutional. This statute provides:
In any county containing a city of the first or second class or in any city located therein in which sale of distilled spirits and wine is permitted under KRS Chapter 242, the respective legislative body of such city or fiscal court, of such areas, shall have the power by duly enacted ordinance, to permit the sale of distilled spirits and wine by the drink on Sundays from 1 p.m. until a closing hour to be established by the legislative body of the area concerned, by hotels, motels, and restaurants which are licensed for the retail sale of distilled spirits and wine by the drink and which have dining facilities with a minimum seating capacity of one hundred (100) people at tables and which receive at least fifty percent (50%) or more of their gross annual income from the dining facilities by the sale of food.
Pursuant to K.R.S. 244.290(4), the city of Louisville duly enacted Ordinance 111.036(3) permitting the issuance of limited licenses for Sunday sales of distilled spirits.
The factual background of this case is well summarized by District Judge Thomas Garvey's findings of fact:
On Sunday, July 25, 1982, the Defendant, Jeanetta Seabolt, holder of State and City of Louisville Liquor Licenses for the Lemon Tree Lounge, located at 1715 Berry Boulevard, in Louisville, sold a drink of distilled spirits. The Defendant was cited by a representative of the Louisville Office of Alcoholic Beverage Control for violation of KRS 243.020(1), KRS 244.290 and City Ordinance 111.036(3) for selling liquor by the drink on Sunday without a license.
It was further stipulated that the Lemon Tree Lounge has a capacity to seat approximately two hundred twenty (220) persons at tables, but that the Defendant serves only snack foods and that the Defendant does not receive at least fifty percent (50%) of her gross annual income from dining facilities. The Defendant had previously applied for a license to sell liquor on Sunday, but was denied. [Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Jefferson District Court].
Jeanetta Seabolt wanted to test the law for reasons, brought out in oral argument, of perceived discrimination. In reality, it was neighborhood taverns, etc., against hotels, motels and restaurants. Seabolt and others in her situation feel they are losing patrons on Sundays because they can't sell distilled spirits by the drink, the result being that the patrons are being weaned away to the hotels, motels and restaurants during the other days of the week.
Seabolt moved in the Jefferson District Court, without success, to dismiss the citation against her on constitutional grounds. She was convicted and fined $100 plus court costs for her violation. She then appealed to the Jefferson Circuit Court.
The Jefferson Circuit Court, by opinion and judgment, declared K.R.S. 244.290(4) unconstitutional, and null and void in its entirety; however, we find some discrepancy in the circuit court's opinion, as evidenced by this language:
In finding KRS 244.290(4) unconstitutional, this Court finds the statute, void and ineffective for any purpose, not merely from the date of this ruling, but from the time of the enactment of the Statute. However, this invalidity and ineffectiveness is limited to the case presently before the Court. Since the law is found to be void, it imposes no duties.
In effect, we have a trial court holding a statute unconstitutional for one case.
Discretionary review was granted by this court to address the constitutionality issue. This court stated in Lewis v. Smothers, Ky.App., 663 S.W.2d 228 (1984), that the "liquor business" is in a class by itself subject to broad legislative control and regulation. It is not treated like other businesses due to its special and unique character. In that rationale, this court did no more than follow our highest court's reasoning as found in Alcoholic Beverage Control Board v. Woosley, Ky., 367 S.W.2d 127 (1963); Kentucky Alcoholic Beverage Control Board v. Klein, 301 Ky. 757, 192 S.W.2d 735 (1946); and Harris v. Cannon, 304 Ky. 3, 199 S.W.2d 429 (1946).
Our highest court, as late as 1982, in Alcoholic Beverage Control Board v. Taylor Drug Stores, Inc., Ky., 635 S.W.2d 319, 322-23 (1982), said:
[I]f there is any reasonable basis for legislation that treats one class of people or their business or occupation differently from another, the courts should uphold this legislative choice. It is well known and long...
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Temperance League of Kentucky v. Perry
...eligible to sell alcoholic beverages would not constitute special legislation within the meaning of § 59. Compare Commonwealth v. Seabolt, Ky. App., 668 S.W.2d 571 (1984) (which upholds the constitutionality of a statute that allows only restaurants, which seat a minimum of one hundred pers......