Com. v. Senk
| Decision Date | 27 September 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,2 |
| Citation | 223 A.2d 97,423 Pa. 129 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Frank Earl SENK (), Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Gailey C. Keller, Bloomsburg, for appellant.
Nickolas B. Piazza, Berwick, for appellee.
Before BELL, C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.
On April 5, 1962, the appellant, Frank Earl Senk, was convicted, by a jury in Columbia County, of murder in the first degree. Sentence was fixed at death. An appeal to this Court followed, and we affirmed the judgment, 412 Pa. 184, 194 A.2d 221 (1963). Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, and on June 22, 1964, vacated our order of affirmance and remanded the case to this Court for further proceedings, not inconsistent with its decision in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). See, 378 U.S. 562, 84 S.Ct. 1928, 12 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1964).
On August 25, 1964, acting in accordance with the above mandate, we remanded the record to the court of original jurisdiction with directions to hold a post trial hearing, consistent with the requirements of due process, to determine if in-custody incriminating statements, particularly a written confession made by Senk to investigating police officers and used against him at trial, were his voluntary acts. We further directed, that after said hearing, the trial court file a written report of its findings and conclusions with this Court for further consideration.
After remand, counsel for Senk appeared before and advised the trial court, that following full discussion with their client, he had agreed and requested that any further hearing be waived, and that the issue of the voluntariness of the incriminating statements be determined on the existing record. 1 Counsel also requested the opportunity to file a written brief and present oral argument. The court approved and followed the procedure requested. Later, it filed an able and comprehensive report with this Court detailing its findings as to the factual circumstances incident to the giving of the incriminating statements involved, and concluded that the evidence thereof was properly admitted at trial and the issue of voluntariness was for the jury to resolve. We have carefully studied this report in conjunction with the trial record. We approve and affirm the factual findings and the pertinent conclusion set forth therein. They are amply substantiated by the record. We are also persuaded that they are true and correct.
Since all of the circumstances incident to Senk's admissions and confession are fully detailed in the lower court's report, they will not be repeated here. However, for the purpose of one question that presently needs discussion, it must be noted that the incriminating statements were made at a time when Senk was without the benefit of legal counsel, had not been offered such assistance, and also before he was given adequate warning of his right to remain silent. 2 The question follows: Did the absence of effective warning of these constitutional rights per se render evidence of the incriminating statements inadmissible at trial? We conclude not.
Since this case was tried before the announcement of the United States Supreme Court rulings in Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), and Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), these cases do not control: Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966). The fact that the new standards governing in-custody interrogation enunciated in Escobedo and Miranda were not followed during Senk's interrogation does not in itself vitiate and render inadmissible evidence of the incriminating statements that this interrogation produced. See, Johnson v. State of New Jersey, supra, and Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 907, 86 S.Ct. 1344, 16 L.Ed.2d 360 (1966).
We are cognizant that the above may be in conflict with our ruling in Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117, 213 A.2d 670 (1965), wherein we stated that Escobedo applied to cases not yet 'final' as we therein defined that term. However, Negri was decided when great confusion and disagreement existed in the courts as to the impact of the ruling in Escobedo, and we specifically stated that our ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Com. v. Heckathorn
...by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.' Accord: Commonwealth v. Senk, 423 Pa. 129, 223 A.2d 97.3 The testimony is ambiguous as to whether he was advised of his right to remain silent, and is not as clear and as positive as it ......
-
Hall v. PA BD. OF PROBATION AND PAROLE
...federal interpretation in Commonwealth ex rel. Wilkes v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 113, 222 A.2d 856, 858-859 (1966), and Commonwealth v. Senk, 423 Pa. 129, 223 A.2d 97, 99 (1966). 11. The specific provision at issue is found at 61 P.S. § 12. On remand the board again denied the application for paro......
-
Senk v. Zimmerman
...L.Ed.2d 1039 (1964). This issue was litigated in the state courts and Senk's confession was ultimately found to be voluntary. 423 Pa. 129, 131, 223 A.2d 97 (1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 914, 87 S.Ct. 1694, 18 L.Ed.2d 638 (1967). See also United States ex rel. Senk v. Russell, 396 F.2d 445 ......
-
Com. v. Snyder
...whose trials had not begun as of June 13, 1966 and the Escobedo decision to trials commenced after June 22, 1964. See Commonwealth v. Senk, 423 Pa. 129, 223 A.2d 97 (1966). Trial in the instant case commenced more than three years before June 22, 1964 so that appellant cannot avail himself ......