Com. v. Sherman

• Decision Date: 01 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. 05-P-1409.,05-P-1409.
• Citation: 864 N.E.2d 1241,68 Mass. App. Ct. 797
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Larry H. SHERMAN, Jr.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

864 N.E.2d 1241

68 Mass. App. Ct. 797

COMMONWEALTH v. Larry H. SHERMAN, Jr.

No. 05-P-1409.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

Argued September 11, 2006.

Decided May 1, 2007.

Tara Blackman, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

David J. Barend for the defendant.

Present: GRASSO, COWIN, & TRAINOR, JJ.

GRASSO, J.

On appeal from an order allowing a motion for a new trial, the Commonwealth contends that a Superior Court judge erred in concluding that the defendant's guilty plea was not intelligent. We agree and reverse the order allowing the new trial motion.

1. Background. Indicted for aggravated rape and assault with intent to murder, the defendant, Larry H. Sherman, Jr., pleaded guilty in 1993 to the lesser offenses of rape and assault. After colloquy, a judge accepted the jointly recommended disposition and imposed, for the rape, a sentence of six to ten years in prison, with six months to be served and the balance of the sentence suspended for a three-year probationary period.¹ Credit for time held in confinement awaiting trial resulted in the defendant's immediate release at the time of the plea.

In October, 1999, a second judge found the defendant in violation of his probation, revoked his probation, and ordered the defendant to serve the balance of his suspended sentence.² In April, 2003, the defendant moved for a new trial and to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that his plea was not intelligent and voluntary because (1) "the record reveals that he never admitted to facts sufficient to establish the elements of the crime of rape"; and (2) "the judge failed to inquire ... whether he pled guilty due to duress or coercion." Accompanying the motion was an affidavit of the defendant that supported the claim of coercion.³ The defendant alleged that his former attorney never visited him, failed to ask his version of events, and failed to prepare for trial. He also maintained that she "coerced and pressured [him] into pleading guilty" by claiming that the district attorney threatened to add a charge of kidnapping if he went to trial, by asserting that he would get a life sentence if found guilty, by falsely claiming that his chance of prevailing at trial was poor, and by failing to divulge that the alleged victim was not going to testify.

In opposition, the Commonwealth obtained an affidavit from the defendant's trial attorney that directly contradicted the defendant's claims of unpreparedness and coercion. Her affidavit detailed her efforts on behalf of the defendant. She engaged in a probable cause hearing in District Court; obtained a transcription of that proceeding; spoke to witnesses recommended by the defendant; provided the defendant with police reports, investigative reports, and grand jury minutes; and spoke with the defendant at length. Her discussions with the defendant covered relevant particulars, including the victim's background as a prostitute and drug addict, the victim's availability for trial and impeachability, the physical and fresh complaint evidence, the Commonwealth's offer of a split sentence with credit for time served, and the risks and benefits of proceeding to trial.

Defense counsel's affidavit related that the defendant was held on bail throughout the case and wished to be released from custody as quickly as possible. He decided to accept the Commonwealth's plea offer because he wanted to be released. On the day the defendant pleaded guilty, he did so with knowledge that the victim had not appeared.

2. The new trial motion. The hearing on the defendant's motion for new trial addressed both the intelligence and the voluntariness of the plea. In a subsequent written decision, the motion judge (who was not the plea judge) rejected the defendant's claim that coercion and duress rendered the plea involuntary. The motion judge concluded, however, that the record of the guilty plea colloquy did not establish that the defendant's plea was intelligent. He allowed the defendant's motion on that ground and ordered a new trial.

The motion judge erred. The Commonwealth's factual presentation at the guilty plea hearing, and the defendant's acknowledgment that he committed the acts alleged, constituted the requisite admission "to facts constituting the unexplained element" to render the plea intelligent. Commonwealth v. McGuirk, 376 Mass. 338, 344, 380 N.E.2d 662 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1120, 99 S.Ct. 1030, 59 L.Ed.2d 80 (1979). Commonwealth v. Correa, 43 Mass.App.Ct. 714, 717, 686 N.E.2d 213 (1997).

a. Raising the issue of the intelligence and voluntariness of a guilty plea. Under the terms of Mass.R.Crim.P. 30(c)(2) and (3), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), a motion for a new trial must specify the grounds for the relief claimed, and as the moving party, the defendant must, where appropriate, accompany the motion with an affidavit or affidavits in support of his position. Whether an affidavit must accompany a new trial motion that relies solely on the contemporaneous record of the guilty plea proceeding has not been explicitly decided previously. We conclude that the rule does not impose such a requirement.

Ordinarily, if the defendant wishes to present evidence in support of the grounds raised in his motion for new trial, he must submit an affidavit to support his contention. See Commonwealth v. DeMarco, 387 Mass. 481, 485 n. 10, 440 N.E.2d 1282 (1982); Commonwealth v. Saarela, 15 Mass.App.Ct. 403, 407, 446 N.E.2d 97 (1983). However, "[a]s explained in Commonwealth v. Foster, 368 Mass. 100, 108 nn. 6 & 7, 330 N.E.2d 155 (1975), a defendant attacking a conviction based upon a guilty plea has a choice between two tactics. He may stand on the contemporaneous record, the record made in the case through the stage of the colloquy and conviction. If the defendant chooses this route, it is not open to the Commonwealth to introduce extraneous evidence tending to show that the defendant in fact acted freely and intelligently in tendering the plea. . . . Alternatively, the defendant may offer extraneous evidence to supplement (or contradict) the record, but in that event the Commonwealth has a like right to offer evidence." Commonwealth v. Nolan, 19 Mass.App.Ct. 491, 492, 475 N.E.2d 763 (1985) (citation omitted). "When a defendant has received a constitutionally inadequate plea colloquy, he is entitled to withdraw that plea." Commonwealth v. Colon, 439 Mass. 519, 529, 789 N.E.2d 566 (2003). See Commonwealth v. Foster, 368 Mass. at 102, 330 N.E.2d 155. Consequently, a defendant who challenges the intelligence or voluntariness of his plea and relies solely on the contemporaneous record of the proceeding for that challenge need do no more than file with his motion a copy of the record of the plea proceeding being challenged. The record will then establish the constitutional adequacy or inadequacy of the colloquy.

b. Intelligence of the plea. Here, the defendant's challenge to the intelligence of his plea rested solely on the contemporaneous record of the plea proceeding.⁴ In such circumstances, the question is wholly a matter of law. We consider, then, the correctness of the motion judge's determination that the defendant's guilty plea was not intelligent.⁵

The intelligence of the defendant's plea hinges entirely on the third basis for intelligence: the defendant's admission to facts recited during the colloquy. See Commonwealth v. Correa, 43 Mass.App.Ct. at 717, 686 N.E.2d 213 (intelligence requirement can be satisfied by judge explaining elements of crime to defendant; counsel's representation that he has explained to defendant elements he admits by his plea; or defendant's stated admission to facts that constitute unexplained elements). The colloquy does not contain an explanation by the plea judge of the elements of rape or a representation by the defendant's attorney that she explained to the defendant the elements he admitted by his plea. Thus, we turn to the prosecutor's factual recitation and the defendant's acknowledgment.

The prosecutor stated,

"On or about October 27th of last year, 1992, at 3:40 A.M., two Fairhaven police officers responded to the Riverside Cemetery, having received calls from residents in the area with respect to screaming emanating from the cemetery. Upon arrival at the cemetery, they observed a young woman later identified as [the victim] running from the cemetery area. She was naked from the waist down and had an article of clothing, a yellow T-Shirt, tied around her neck.

"Based on information received from the victim and further investigation, specifically information received with regard to a vehicle that [the victim] had gone to the cemetery in, the defendant was located, and clothing that he was wearing was consistent with that described by the victim. . . . She subsequently identified him as the person who picked her up on the morning of October 27th. He took her to the cemetery and forcibly raped her when she declined to have sex with him voluntarily in exchange for United States currency."

After this factual recitation, the plea judge asked the defendant, "Is that true?" and the defendant responded, "Yes."

Here, the prosecutor's factual recitation and the defendant's acknowledgment that he committed the acts detailed therein were sufficient to constitute an admission to the "unexplained elements" and establish that the defendant's plea to rape was intelligent. See Commonwealth v. Colantoni, 396 Mass. 672, 678-679, 488 N.E.2d 394 (1986); Commonwealth v. Bowler, 60 Mass.App.Ct. 209, 210-211, 800 N.E.2d 720 (2003). The rape statute follows the common-law definition of rape and requires the Commonwealth to prove that the defendant (1) had sexual intercourse, (2) by force or threat of force against the will of the victim. Commonwealth v. Lopez, 433 Mass. 722, 726-727, 745 N.E.2d 961 (2001). By any reasonable measure, the defendant's admission that he raped the victim when she refused to have sex with him...