Com. v. Shields

• Decision Date: 14 April 1988
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Thomas J. SHIELDS.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 987

521 N.E.2d 987

402 Mass. 162

COMMONWEALTH v. Thomas J. SHIELDS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Worcester.

Argued Dec. 7, 1987.

Decided April 14, 1988.

Conrad W. Fisher, Worcester, for the defendant.

Harry D. Quick, III, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Com.

Marjorie Heins, Boston, for Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

James M. Shannon, Atty. Gen., Madelyn Wessel, Judith Saltzman, Tung Huynh, Asst. Attys. Gen., and Stanley E. Adelman, Boston, for the Secretary of Public Safety, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, LIACOS, NOLAN, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

HENNESSEY, Chief Justice.

The defendant, Thomas J. Shields, was stopped at a State police "sobriety checkpoint" (roadblock) at approximately 1:15 A.M. on September 13, 1986. After performing several field sobriety tests, Shields was arrested and charged with operating his vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of G.L. c. 90, § 24 (1986 ed.).

Shields moved to suppress the evidence obtained following his stop at the roadblock, contending that it was the fruit of an unlawful seizure. In support of this motion, Shields argued that the Commonwealth must prove that no less intrusive alternative would be as effective as roadblocks in enforcing c. 90, § 24, before the roadblock seizure could be found to be constitutionally permissible and the evidence obtained at the roadblock admitted. The Commonwealth acknowledged that it must prove that the roadblock was conducted in accordance with the procedures outlined in Commonwealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81, 483 N.E.2d 1102 (1985), and Commonwealth v. Mc 389 Mass. 137, 449 N.E.2d 349 (1983), but denied that it must disprove the existence of equally effective yet less intrusive alternatives to enforcing c. 90, § 24, before the evidence obtained at the roadblock could be admitted.

The judge noted that resolution of the dispute was likely to be dispositive of Shield's case, that the issue was likely to arise in similar proceedings, and that an improper determination in the trial court that the Commonwealth must disprove the existence of equally effective, less intrusive alternatives to roadblocks would result in unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources at trial. Accordingly, the judge properly reported the following two questions to the Appeals Court under Mass.R.Crim.P. 34, 378 Mass. 905 (1979): "1. Whether, as a precondition to the admission of evidence obtained as a result of a sobriety checkpoint or roadblock operated by law enforcement personnel, the Commonwealth is required to prove that there was no less intrusive alternative to the checkpoint or roadblock which would have been effective to accomplish the legitimate public safety goals of the Commonwealth. 2. Whether, assuming that the preceding question is answered in the affirmative, the standard of proof by which the Commonwealth must bear its burden is beyond reasonable doubt, by clear and convincing evidence or by a preponderance of the evidence." We granted the parties' application for direct appellate review of these questions.

The defendant grounds his argument in both the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and art. 14 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution. ¹ We conclude that neither of these provisions requires the Commonwealth to prove that there are no equally effective yet less intrusive alternatives for enforcing G.L. c. 90, § 24, than roadblocks. We therefore answer question one in the negative, and need not address question two.

The stop of Shield's motor vehicle was a seizure. Commonwealth v. Trumble, supra 396 Mass. at 86, 483 N.E.2d 1102. This seizure violates the Fourth Amendment and art. 14 only if it was unreasonable. See, e.g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 1762, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984); Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 394 Mass. 381, 391, 476 N.E.2d 541 (1985). Decisions of this court and of the Supreme Court establish that there is "no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails." Commonwealth v. Silva, 366 Mass. 402, 405, 318 N.E.2d 895 (1974), quoting Camara v. Municipal Court of the City & County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 536-537, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1734, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (administrative search). See Trumble, supra (to determine reasonableness of seizure court balances "the public interest against 'the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers' "), quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2579, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975).

Because Shields was seized without a warrant, the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving that the seizure was reasonable. Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 57, 315 N.E.2d 530 (1974). To carry its burden of proving that the roadblock seizure was reasonable the Commonwealth must show, at least, that the roadblock was conducted in accordance with the guidelines established in Trumble, supra, and Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 449 N.E.2d 349 (1983). See Commonwealth v. Amaral, 398 Mass. 98, 101, 495 N.E.2d 276 (1986). Adherence to these guidelines, the content of which need not be recited here, assures that a roadblock seizure is the result of a "plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers." Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2640, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). Conducting roadblocks in accordance with such neutral criteria minimizes the risk "that the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy [will be] 'subject to the discretion of the official in the field.' " Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 655, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1397, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), quoting Camara, supra 387 U.S. at 532, 87 S.Ct. at 1732. Adherence to the guidelines' requirements also assures that the surprise, fear, and inconvenience to--and therefore the intrusion on--the motoring public is minimized. See McGeoghegan, supra 389 Mass. at 143-144, 449 N.E.2d 349. In sum, leaving aside the question of less intrusive alternatives, where the Commonwealth shows that a roadblock employed to enforce c. 90, § 24, was operated in accordance with the established guidelines, the accompanying seizures, although not conducted on the basis of individualized suspicion, are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and art. 14. Trumble, supra 396 Mass. at 89-90, 483 N.E.2d 1102. ²

Shields, of course, does not leave aside the question of less intrusive alternatives. He argues that, in order for the Commonwealth to meet its burden of showing that the roadblock seizure at issue here was reasonable, it must prove that there was no equally effective yet less intrusive alternative to enforcing c. 90, § 24. We disagree.

Less intrusive alternative analysis traditionally has not been employed in determining the constitutional reasonableness of searches and seizures. Indeed, in one case involving a vehicle search we declined to employ less intrusive alternative analysis and observed that "[t]he fact that, in the abstract, less intrusive means might have been used does not, by itself, render the search unreasonable." Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 376 Mass. 349, 357, 380 N.E.2d 669 (1978), citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2531, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). Accord United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 687, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1576, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) ("The question is not simply whether some other alternative was available, but whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or to pursue it"); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 591-592 n. 5, 103 S.Ct. 2573, 2581 n. 5, 77 L.Ed.2d 22 (1983); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-557 n. 12, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3082 n. 12, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976). The defendant does not address the language quoted from Ortiz, supra, nor does he indicate why the principle of that language is inapplicable in this case.

Article 14 and the Fourth Amendment proscribe only unreasonable law enforcement conduct. As such, these provisions evince a policy of accommodating the legitimate State interest in law enforcement while preventing arbitrary searches and seizures. It would be inconsistent with that policy to rule that, in order to prove that a search or seizure is lawful, the Commonwealth must prove that each of a multiplicity of proffered hypothetical courses of conduct if used would be either less effective or more intrusive. Where the defendant merely conjectures that equally effective yet less intrusive means of enforcing c. 90, § 24, exist, "[t]he [Commonwealth] is entitled in the interest of public safety to bring all available resources to bear, without having to spell out the exact efficiency coefficient of each component and of the separate effects of any particular component." People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 528-529, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649, 473 N.E.2d 1 (1984). The focus of the inquiry is on the conduct which in fact occurred. The Commonwealth's burden is to prove that the intrusion generated by that conduct is outweighed by the need to search or seize. Commonwealth v. Silva, supra 366 Mass. at 405, 318 N.E.2d 895. We reject the defendant's argument that the result we reach opens the door for suspicionless searches and seizures in other contexts. Police will not be allowed, for example, to cordon off "high crime areas" and search all the people on the street. Intrusions of this level, even for a limited search, require some degree of articulable individualized suspicion. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Roadblock seizures for enforcing c. 90, § 24, are virtually sui generis in this regard. ³ Their constitutionality is based in large measure on the lower expectation of privacy traditionally accorded to the motoring public....