Com. v. Sohmer

• Decision Date: 10 August 1988
• Citation: 546 A.2d 601,519 Pa. 200
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. David L. SOHMER, Appellant. . Re
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 601

546 A.2d 601

519 Pa. 200

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. David L. SOHMER, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Reargued April 15, 1988.

Decided Aug. 10, 1988.

George E. Lepley, Jr., W. David Marcello, Williamsport, for appellant.

Leonard N. Sonnov, John W. Packel, Philadelphia, for amicus curiae P.D. of Philadelphia.

Brett O. Feese, Kenneth A. Osokow, Williamsport, for appellee.

Robert A. Graci, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Harrisburg, for amicus curiae Atty. Gen. of Pennsylvania.

George S. Leone, Asst. Dist. Atty., Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Deputy Dist. Atty., Ronald Eisenberg, Chief, Appeals Div., Philadelphia, for amicus curiae D.A. of Philadelphia.

Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, ZAPPALA PAPADAKOS and STOUT, JJ.

OPINION

NIX, Chief Justice.

The issues raised in this appeal require us to determine, under subsection 314(a) of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 314(a), whether there must be an assignment of the burden of proof, and if such an assignment is required, who possesses that burden of proving the offender was mentally ill at the time of the offense. We are also called upon to determine the measure of proof required to sustain such a finding. Because of the importance of these questions, we granted review. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the conviction of guilt but remand the matter to the trial court for reassessment of the evidence presented on the question of appellant's mental illness at the time of the commission of these offenses. ¹

Appellant was charged with murder, robbery, theft, carrying a firearm without a license, and the possession of instruments of crime in the shooting death of a convenience store clerk during a robbery. At trial, he contended insanity or, in the alternative, mental illness. The court below, sitting without a jury, after hearing all of the evidence, concluded that the Commonwealth had established beyond a reasonable doubt appellant's legal sanity at the time of the offense, and that appellant failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he met the definition of mentally ill at the time the offense occurred. The trial court found appellant guilty of all of the charges. After the disposition of post-trial motions the court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment with a consecutive sentence of ten to twenty years for the conviction of robbery. On appeal to the Superior Court, three-judge panel affirmed the judgment of sentence by memorandum opinion and a per curiam order, 356 Pa.Super. 591, 512 A.2d 54 (1986).

On July 5, 1982, the Williamsport police were called to a convenience store where a clerk had been killed in the course of a robbery. The police obtained a description of a suspect from an eyewitness and began a search of the area. Thirty-five minutes after the shooting, the police stopped appellant and questioned him about the incident. The witness could not identify appellant, and he was released. Appellant then returned to the hotel where he maintained temporary lodging, obtained his bags, and checked out of the hotel. A cab dispatcher who was suspicious as a result of a conversation with appellant when the dispatcher inquired as to his destination, contacted police who intercepted appellant exiting the hotel. Appellant once again provided coherent responses to police questioning. In a satchel that appellant had in his possession the second time he was taken into custody was found the murder weapon, a money bag taken from the convenience store which was an object of the robbery, and other incriminating pieces of evidence.

Appellant presented the testimony of two mental health experts at trial. The first, a psychiatrist, diagnosed appellant soon after the incident as suffering from mental disease, paranoid schizophrenia. That witness expressed no opinion as to whether the illness existed at the time of the incident or whether appellant met the M'Naghten's Rule. The second expert, a clinical psychologist, also diagnosed appellant as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, having examined him following commencement of the trial. In his opinion, appellant met the definition of mental illness, having acted under an uncontrollable, compulsive drive in carrying out the killing. The Commonwealth, in turn, presented expert testimony on appellant's sanity. The expert, a psychiatrist specializing in forensic psychology, stated that appellant did not meet either the insanity or mental illness criteria of the respective statutes. To the contrary, the witness found appellant's behavior typical of organized, planned, goal-oriented, criminal behavior, and not the product of delusion.

The court accepted the Commonwealth's expert testimony and the other evidence from which an inference of sanity could be drawn, and found appellant able to form the legal mens rea to commit the crimes charged. The court in its opinion stated that it placed the burden of proof upon the defense to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant was mentally ill as defined in subsection 314(c)(1). As previously mentioned the Superior Court affirmed the action of the trial court.

The pertinent statutory provisions bearing upon the issues raised in this appeal provide:

§ 314. Guilty but mentally ill

(a) General rule.--A person who timely offers a defense of insanity in accordance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure may be found "guilty but mentally ill" at trial if the trier of facts finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person is guilty of an offense, was mentally ill at the time of the commission of the offense and was not legally insane at the time of the commission of the offense.

(b) Plea of guilty but mentally ill.--A person who waives his right to trial may plead guilty but mentally ill. No plea of guilty but mentally ill may be accepted by the trial judge until he has examined all reports prepared pursuant to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, has held a hearing on the sole issue of the defendant's mental illness at which either party may present evidence and is satisfied that the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense to which the plea is entered. If the trial judge refuses to accept a plea of guilty but mentally ill, the defendant shall be permitted to withdraw his plea. A defendant whose plea is not accepted by the court shall be entitled to a jury trial, except that if a defendant subsequently waives his right to a jury trial, the judge who presided at the hearing on mental illness shall not preside at the trial.

(c) Definitions.--For the purposes of this section and 42 Pa.C.S. § 9727 (relating to disposition of persons found guilty but mentally ill):

(1) "Mentally ill." One who as a result of mental disease or defect, lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.

(2) "Legal insanity." At the time of the commission of the act, the defendant was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.

(d) Common law M'Naghten's Rule preserved.--Nothing in this section shall be deemed to repeal or otherwise abrogate the common law defense of insanity (M'Naghten's Rule) in effect in this Commonwealth on the effective date of this section.

1982, Dec. 15, P.L. 1262, No. 286, § 1, effective in 90 days.

§ 315. Insanity

(a) General rule.--The mental soundness of an actor engaged in conduct charged to constitute an offense shall only be a defense to the charged offense when the actor proves by a preponderance of evidence that the actor was legally insane at the time of the commission of the offense.

(b) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the phrase "legally insane" means that, at the time of the commission of the offense, the actor was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing or, if the actor did know the quality of the act, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.

1982, Dec. 15, P.L. 1262, No. 286, § 1, effective in 90 days.

At the outset, we note that sections 314 and 315 were not intended to alter the prior law of this Commonwealth relating to the defense of insanity. This intent is expressly articulated in subsection 314(d) and our Rules of Statutory Construction require that we accept that clearly stated intent of the General Assembly. See, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b); In the Matter of Glancey, --- Pa. ----, ----, 542 A.2d 1350, 1354 (1988); In re Fox's Estate, 494 Pa. 584, 431 A.2d 1008 (1981); Hellertown Mfg. Co. v. Commonwealth, 480 Pa. 358, 365, 390 A.2d 732, 735 (1978). Moreover, the parties do not question this conclusion and accept the fact that the traditional rules relating to the defense of insanity and its definition remain in place. Thus, the burden is upon the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time of the commission of the offense, he was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act, or the alternative that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong. Commonwealth v. Metzler, 499 Pa. 122, 451 A.2d 1352 (1982); Commonwealth v. Oblek, 496 Pa. 519, 437 A.2d 1162 (1981); Commonwealth v. Scarborough, 491 Pa. 300, 421 A.2d 147 (1980); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 483 Pa. 305, 396 A.2d 1183 (1979); Commonwealth v. Bruno, 466 Pa. 245, 352 A.2d 40 (1976); Commonwealth v. Demmitt, 456 Pa. 475, 321 A.2d 627 (1974); Commonwealth v. Melton, 406 Pa. 343, 178 A.2d 728 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 851, 83 S.Ct. 93, 9 L.Ed.2d 87; Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 164 A.2d 98 (1960); Commonwealth v. Neill, 362 Pa. 507, 67 A.2d 276 (1949); Commonwealth v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264 (1849).

Appellant argues that the burden should be upon the...