Com. v. Soltis

• Decision Date: 23 December 1996
• Citation: 687 A.2d 1139,455 Pa.Super. 218
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Justin John SOLTIS, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 1139

687 A.2d 1139

455 Pa.Super. 218

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Justin John SOLTIS, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Oct. 2, 1996.

Filed Dec. 23, 1996.

M. Scot Curran, Washington, for appellant.

Paul M. Petro, Assistant District Attorney, Donora, for the Commonwealth, appellee.

Before KELLY, JOHNSON and OLSZEWSKI, JJ.

JOHNSON, Judge:

Justin John Soltis appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his conviction for third-degree murder and theft by unlawful taking or disposition. We affirm.

During the early morning of May 27, 1994, 15-year-old Justin Soltis summoned the state police to his grandfather's home in Washington County. Soltis, who lived with his grandfather, Michael Soltis, claimed that intruders had broken into the home, beaten and killed his 78-year-old grandfather and also inflicted physical injuries upon Soltis. The police arrived at the home and found the grandfather dead, lying in a pool of blood at the bottom of a staircase.

After questioning Soltis for several hours, the police became suspicious because of inconsistencies in his story. Soltis became a suspect and eventually he gave the following confession:

I was there alone with him and I just wanted to take his guns and bullets and kill some one [sic]. We were at the top of the stairs and I pushed him down the steps. After he got to the bottom of the steps I hit him around the head.... I just wanted to make sure that he was dead.... I then called myfriend [sic] Nick Louk and told him about everything and I wanted him to come and help me. I told my friend that I was going to do it a couple of weeks before.

Brief of Appellant at 7.

Soltis admitted that he and Louk engaged in a scheme to cover up Soltis's involvement in the killing. Soltis fabricated the story about intruders breaking into the home. At Soltis's request, Louk punched his face to create the appearance that Soltis had been involved in an altercation. Soltis also took his grandfather's car and guns, in order to create the appearance that a robbery had occurred.

After he confessed, Soltis was charged with criminal homicide, conspiracy to commit homicide and theft by unlawful taking or disposition. The trial court denied his petition to transfer the case to juvenile court. At the close of the prosecution's case, the trial court dismissed the conspiracy charge. At the close of his trial, Soltis was convicted of third-degree murder and the theft of the car and guns. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Soltis raises several arguments, all relating to his murder conviction. Soltis first argues that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the offenses of involuntary and voluntary manslaughter. Under Pennsylvania law, a homicide defendant is entitled to a charge on involuntary or voluntary manslaughter only if the evidence adduced at trial would reasonably support a verdict on such a charge. Commonwealth v. Browdie, 543 Pa. 337, 671 A.2d 668 (1996) (applying this rule to heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter); Commonwealth v. Carter, 502 Pa. 433, 466 A.2d 1328 (1983) (applying this rule to unreasonable belief voluntary manslaughter); Commonwealth v. White, 490 Pa. 179, 415 A.2d 399 (1980) (applying this rule to involuntary manslaughter). In other words, a trial court can give a manslaughter instruction only when there is evidence tending to show that the defendant is not guilty of the crime of murder but is guilty of the lesser crime of manslaughter. See White, supra, at 183-84, 415 A.2d at 401. In determining whether the evidence would support a manslaughter charge, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant. Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 441 Pa.Super. 116, 121-22 n. 1, 656 A.2d 1369, 1372 n. 1 appeal disallowed, 542 Pa. 662, 668 A.2d 1126 (1995).

To be entitled to an involuntary manslaughter charge, Soltis must point to some evidence that tends to show that he acted recklessly or with gross negligence in causing his grandfather's death. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2504(a) (mental state required for involuntary manslaughter is either recklessness or gross negligence). Absent some evidence in the record showing that the grandfather's death was an accident caused by Soltis's extreme carelessness, he is not entitled to an involuntary manslaughter instruction.

Soltis argues that the testimony of his expert witness, psychologist Michael Moran, tends to support an instruction for involuntary manslaughter. Specifically, Moran testified that, in his expert opinion, Soltis acted without either malice or the intent to kill his grandfather. N.T., November 14-19, 1994, at 237-38. While this evidence tends to negate the mens rea element of the crime of murder, Moran's testimony does not tend to show that Soltis acted recklessly or with gross negligence and thus does not support an involuntary manslaughter charge. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2504(a); Commonwealth v. Long, 397 Pa.Super. 140, 146, 579 A.2d 970, 973-74 (1990).

Soltis also argues that the testimony of forensic pathologist Dr. Abdulrezak Shakir supports an involuntary manslaughter charge because Shakir testified that the blunt force trauma injuries on the grandfather's face were consistent with blows struck by a fist. N.T., supra, at 65. Soltis claims that because malice is only one permissible inference when fists are used in an assault, Commonwealth v. Rementer, 410 Pa.Super. 9, 27, 598 A.2d 1300, 1309 (1991), this testimony supports an involuntary manslaughter charge. This argument is entirely without merit. Even if we accepted Soltis's premise that Shakir's testimony tended to negate the inference that Soltis acted with malice, this evidence does not tend to establish that he acted with recklessness or gross negligence. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2504(a). Thus, this evidence--even when viewed in the light most favorable to Soltis--does not establish that he was entitled to an involuntary manslaughter charge.

Soltis next argues that he was entitled to a charge of voluntary manslaughter. Under Pennsylvania law, two different mental states can support a charge of voluntary manslaughter. A person is guilty of "heat of passion" voluntary manslaughter if he acts "under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by ... the individual killed." 18 Pa.C.S. § 2503(a)(1). A person is guilty of "unreasonable belief" voluntary manslaughter if he intentionally kills another while acting under the unreasonable belief that he is in danger of serious bodily harm. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2503(b).

Soltis again points to Moran's testimony regarding his belief that Soltis acted without malice or intent. As we discussed above, this evidence tends to negate the mens rea element for murder, but does not establish the elements of voluntary manslaughter. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2503. Soltis has not pointed to any evidence tending to show provocation on the part of his grandfather that led Soltis to kill him. Nor has Soltis shown us evidence tending to establish that he acted with an unreasonable belief that his grandfather was going to inflict upon him serious bodily harm. See Browdie, supra, at 349-50, 671 A.2d at 674; accord White, supra, at 183-84, 415 A.2d at 401. Because Soltis has shown us no evidence that would support a conviction for either "unreasonable belief" or "heat of passion" voluntary manslaughter, we conclude that he was not entitled to a voluntary manslaughter instruction.

Next, Soltis argues that the trial court erred by denying his petition to transfer this case to juvenile court. Under Pennsylvania law, a juvenile murder defendant does not have an automatic right to have his case tried in juvenile court. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6322; Commonwealth v. Austin, 444 Pa.Super. 601, 603-04, 664 A.2d 597, 599 (1995), appeal disallowed, 544 Pa. 622, 675 A.2d 1241 (1996). Rather, according to the statute that was in effect at the time of the grandfather's death, the defendant requesting the transfer was required to prove to the trial court that he was amenable to rehabilitation as a juvenile, based upon the following factors: age; mental capacity; maturity; the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the defendant; the defendant's previous involvement with the juvenile system, including the success or failure of any previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the defendant; whether the defendant can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court jurisdiction; the nature and circumstances of the act for which the transfer is sought; and any other relevant factors. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6355(a)(4)(iii)(A); see Commonwealth v. Morningwake, 407 Pa.Super. 129, 135, 595...