Com. v. Strunk

• Decision Date: 03 December 1990
• Citation: 400 Pa.Super. 25,582 A.2d 1326
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, v. Troy STRUNK, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 1326

582 A.2d 1326

400 Pa.Super. 25

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, v. Troy STRUNK, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued June 13, 1990.

Filed Dec. 3, 1990.

Mark S. Love, Mt. Pocono, for appellant.

Gregory D. Anthony, Asst. Dist. Atty., Warren, for Com., appellee.

Timothy P. Wile, Asst. Counsel, Harold H. Cramer, Asst. Chief Counsel, John L. Heaton, Chief Counsel, Harrisburg, for Department of Transportation, amicus curiae.

Before BECK, POPOVICH and HESTER, JJ.

BECK, Judge:

On appeal we consider whether a state imposing a 90-day driver's license suspension based upon an underaged defendant's conviction of merely possessing an alcoholic beverage, violates the defendant's substantive due process rights or the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, where the violation was not connected to the possession or operation of a motor vehicle. We conclude that the imposition of the 90-day license suspension did not violate either the defendant's substantive due process rights or his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.

On July 21, 1989, a police officer observed appellant, Troy Strunk, then 19 years old, standing outside, at the top of a stairwell at a residential property in Stroudsburg, with a 12-ounce bottle of beer in his hand. At that time the officer issued Strunk a citation for the underage possession, consumption, transportation and purchase of an alcoholic beverage. 18 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 6308 (Purdon 1983). Strunk pled guilty before a district justice to the section 6308 violation. He subsequently filed a timely appeal with the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County.

Judge Ronald E. Vican conducted a de novo trial and found the defendant guilty of possessing and consuming alcoholic beverages in violation of section 6308. Thereafter, the defendant filed timely post-verdict motions which the trial court denied. The trial court suspended the defendant's operating privileges for a period of 90 days, pursuant to 18 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 6310.4 (Purdon Supp.1990), ¹ and ordered Strunk to pay $100.00 and prosecution costs. The defendant appeals this sentence.

On appeal, the appellant challenges the constitutionality of section 6310.4 on both substantive due process and cruel and unusual punishment grounds. After careful consideration and extensive research we reject both of these claims.

Appellant's first contention is that the 90-day license suspension based upon his conviction of merely possessing and consuming alcoholic beverages, unconnected with his operation or possession of a motor vehicle, violates his substantive due process rights under both the Pennsylvania ² and United States Constitutions. ³ Specifically, appellant claims that because his violation of section 6308 was not in any way connected to the operation or possession of a motor vehicle, the 90-day license suspension bore no rational relationship to promoting the state's interest in the safe operation of motor vehicles and, therefore, violates his right to due process.

Initially, we must determine the appropriate standard to utilize in evaluating the constitutionality of the challenged statute. Appellant suggests that an individual's right to retain his or her driver's license is fundamental in nature and, therefore, that we should analyze the constitutionality of the statute under the "strict scrutiny" standard. However, while an individual's right to possess a driver's license is considered a "privilege" in the constitutional sense, the right to do so is not fundamental. Therefore, it would be improper to elevate the suspension of a driver's license to a level requiring strict scrutiny. See Mays v. Scranton City Police Dept., 503 F.Supp. 1255, 1261 (M.D.Pa.1980); see also Commonwealth v. Gassoway, 199 Pa.Super. 479, 481, 185 A.2d 671, 672 (1962) (license to operate motor vehicle on public highways is a privilege; Commonwealth possesses authority to limit privilege to those who are able to exercise the privilege with a reasonable degree of safety). In deciding cases relating to this privilege, Pennsylvania courts have uniformly evaluated driver's license suspensions or revocations under the "reasonable basis" standard, under which the privilege of possessing a driver's license can be granted, denied or limited by our legislature based upon any reasonable basis. Appeal of Deems, 39 Pa.Commw. 138, 395 A.2d 616 (1978); Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Lemon, 31 Pa.Commw. 133, 375 A.2d 857 (1977); Sheehy Motor Vehicle Operator License Case, 196 Pa.Super. 122, 173 A.2d 752 (1961). See Sharon v. Larson, 650 F.Supp. 1396 (E.D.Pa.1986); Sheakley v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp., 99 Pa.Commw. 328, 513 A.2d 551 (1986), allocatur denied, 515 Pa. 586, 527 A.2d 546 (1987). We, therefore, must utilize the "reasonable basis" test as our analytical tool in evaluating the instant constitutional challenge.

At the outset, we note that legislative enactments enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality. United States v. Geller, 560 F.Supp. 1309 (E.D.Pa.1983), aff'd, 745 F.2d 49 (3d Cir.1984); James v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 505 Pa. 137, 477 A.2d 1302 (1984). See 1 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 1922(3) (Purdon Supp.1990). The party challenging a statute's constitutionality bears the burden of establishing that no rational relationship exists between a statute and a legitimate state interest. Morris v. Commonwealth, Public School Employes' Retirement Sys., 114 Pa.Commw. 369, 538 A.2d 1385 (1988), appeal denied, 521 Pa. 615, 557 A.2d 345 (1989); Commonwealth v. Finnegan, 280 Pa.Super. 584, 421 A.2d 1086 (1980). An enactment of the legislature will be deemed to be constitutional unless the challenging party advances evidence that the statute clearly, palpably and plainly violates the Constitution. Consumer Party of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 510 Pa. 158, 507 A.2d 323 (1986); O'Donnell v. Casey, 45 Pa.Commw. 394, 405 A.2d 1006 (1979). Any doubts regarding the constitutionality of a challenged statute are to be resolved in favor of the statute's constitutionality. Geller, 560 F.Supp. 1309. We now apply these principles in evaluating the challenged statute under the rational relationship test.

The rational relationship test evaluates whether a particular statute is "rationally related to furthering a legitimate state purpose." Meier v. Anderson, 692 F.Supp. 546, 552 (E.D.Pa.1988), aff'd, 869 F.2d 590 (3d Cir.1989). ⁴ "It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it." Id. (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 488, 75 S.Ct. 461, 464-65, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955)). Thus, the rational relationship test mandates a two-step analysis. The first step is to consider whether the challenged statute seeks to promote any legitimate state interest or public value. Meier, 692 F.Supp. at 552; Mays, 503 F.Supp. at 1261 (quoting Malmed v. Thornburgh, 621 F.2d 565 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 955, 101 S.Ct. 361, 66 L.Ed.2d 219 (1980)). The second prong of the analysis mandates an evaluation of whether the statute is reasonably related to accomplishing the articulated state interest or interests. Meier, 692 F.Supp. at 552. See, e.g., Maurer v. Boardman, 336 Pa. 17, 20-23, 7 A.2d 466, 471 (1939), aff'd sub nom. Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 60 S.Ct. 726, 84 L.Ed. 969 (1940) (as long as legislature acts neither arbitrarily nor capriciously, it may enact any regulation it believes is necessary to protect life, limb or property on the Commonwealth's roadways). We turn now to the arguments appellant asserted in his brief to establish his contention that the statute is arbitrary and irrational.

Appellant contends that section 6310.4 is unconstitutional because it bears no rational relationship to a conviction for the possession or consumption of alcoholic beverages which did not involve the operation or possession of a motor vehicle. Initially, we note that appellant mischaracterizes the focus of our inquiry. Under a substantive due process analysis regarding the constitutionality of section 6310.4, we are not concerned with whether section 6310.4 is rationally related to section 6308. Rather, our inquiry is limited to whether section 6310.4 is reasonably related to achieving a legitimate state interest. Under this analysis, clearly we need not evaluate whether a nexus exists between the challenged section (section 6310.4) and an unchallenged section (section 6308). Thus, while appellant contends that a license suspension may only result from a violation that is directly related to the operation or possession of a motor vehicle, no per se rule exists to support this bold proposition. ⁵ Rather, as noted above, a legislative enactment will be sustained where: 1) any legitimate state interest exists, and 2) it is reasonable to conclude that the subject legislation provides a rational way to promote that state interest. Meier, supra.

First, we consider whether the punishment contained in section 6310.4 promotes any legitimate state interest. In this case appellant asserts that the state interest is the promotion of public safety on the roadways. Appellant contends that there is no rational relationship between the challenged statute and public safety. While this may or may not be a valid assertion, public safety is just one of many state interests the legislature may have sought to promote when it enacted section 6310.4.

Indeed it is quite plausible and even probable that the legislature may have intended section 6310.4 to promote the goals of deterrence and punishment, i.e. to discourage the possession and consumption of alcohol by underaged individuals. It is undisputed that underage drinking and driving results in a high number of fatalities in the United States each year. See Rosenthal, The Minimum Drinking Age for Young People: An Observation, 92...