Com. v. Stukes

• Decision Date: 09 October 1969
• Citation: 435 Pa. 535,257 A.2d 828
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. James A. STUKES, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 828

257 A.2d 828

435 Pa. 535

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. James A. STUKES, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Oct. 9, 1969.

James E. Beasley, Kip D. Denega, Jr., Philadelphia, for appellant

Arlen Specter, Dist. Atty., James D. Crawford, Asst. Dist. Atty., Benjamin H. Levintow, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before BELL, C.J., and JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, and POMEROY, JJ.

OPINION

EAGEN, Justice.

The appellant, James A. Stukes, was convicted by a jury in Philadelphia County of murder in the first degree, and the punishment was fixed at life imprisonment. Motions in arrest of judgment and/or a new trial were denied and sentence was imposed as the jury directed. From the judgment of sentence, this appeal was filed. We affirm.

MOTION IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT

Stukes challenges the sufficiency of the trial evidence to sustain his conviction. In evaluating the correctness of this position, all of the evidence must be read in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth and it is entitled to all of the reasonable inferences arising therefrom. Commonwealth v. Tabb, 417 Pa. 13, 207 A.2d 884 (1965), and Commonwealth v. De Moss, 401 Pa. 395, 165 A.2d 14 (1960). Read in this light, the record amply supports the guilty verdict.

From the evidence the jury could find the following:

During the early morning hours of April 3, 1966, John Burgess, Ronald J. Dessus and Stukes unlawfully entered a home in Southwest Philadelphia occupied by Lena Alexandroff, 78 years of age; her daughter, Natalie Tuchar, 44 years of age; and Mrs. Tuchar's daughter, Paula, 14 years of age; all three females were brutally beaten and robbed of personal belongings by the intruders. All three were also raped. From the injuries received, Mrs. Alexandroff died nineteen days later.

While the evidence does not establish that Stukes directly participated in the robbing, beating or sexual assault of Mrs. Alexandroff, ¹ it was sufficient to prove that he raped Mrs. Tuchar and also sufficient to justify the conclusion that he was part and parcel of the entire unlawful occurrence, i.e., that the entire occurrence was a concerted act. The jury could, therefore, properly resolve that Stukes was at least guilty of aiding and abetting in the rape and killing of Mrs. Alexandroff and was equally guilty with those who actually inflicted the injuries which caused her death. See Commonwealth v. Coyle, 415 Pa. 379, 203 A.2d 782 (1964), and Commonwealth v. Lowry, 374 Pa. 594, 98 A.2d 733 (1953).

MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

Several alleged errors during the proceedings in the court below are asserted in support of the argument that a new trial should be ordered. We have carefully examined each assignment of error in connection with the record and find no error which would warrant a retrial.

For instance, Stukes argues that he was denied the representation of counsel at a critical stage in the proceedings in violation of his rights under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The pertinent record facts are as follows:

Stukes was arrested on April 3, 1966. Able counsel was appointed to represent him on April 28th. His trial, i.e., the voir dire examination and the selection of jurors, began on June 6, 1967.

Pursuant to an order entered on May 5, 1967, by the Honorable Vincent A. Carroll, President Judge of the Philadelphia Courts, Stukes was examined on May 19th by two psychiatrists and a psychologist to determine if he was competent to stand trial. Such an examination was requested by Edward A. Guy, M.D., Director of the Division of Psychiatry of the Philadelphia prisons. Neither the district attorney nor defense counsel were notified of the petition or of the court's order and neither were present during the examination. ² During the examination, no questions were asked pertaining to the alleged offense and Stukes was cautioned not to volunteer any such information. As a result of the examination, the examining physicians concluded that Stukes was 'able to cooperate with counsel and to understand the nature of the proceedings against him.'

The question of Stukes' competency to stand trial first arose in Dr. Guy's mind following an examination that he made of him on April 24, 1967, during which the Doctor found Stukes 'acutely agitated and fearful.' He prescribed that Stukes be given thorazine, a major tranquilizer which affects the central nervous system. The use of this drug was discontinued on April 28th, upon which date Stukes was given one dose of cogentin to combat drowsiness, one of the side effects of thorazine. From April 28th until June 13th, Stukes was given three 10-milligram doses of librium each day and thereafter the dosage was reduced to a simple 10-milli-gram dosage was reduced to a simple 10-milligram prior to bedtime.

It cannot be questioned that Stukes was entitled to the assistance of counsel during the psychiatric examination conducted on May 19, 1967, if such constituted a 'critical stage' in the criminal proceedings Pending against him. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 S.Ct. 1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961); Commonwealth v. Philips, 208 Pa.Super. 415 Pa. 515, 204 A.2d 439 (1964); and Commonwealth v. Philips, 208 Pa.Super. 121, 220 A.2d 345 (1966), aff'd 424 Pa. 641, 226 A.2d 863 (1967), cert. denied 387 U.S. 946, 87 S.Ct. 2084, 18 L.Ed.2d 1336 (1967). However, in our view, the psychiatric examination was definitely not a 'critical stage' in the criminal proceedings mandating the presence and assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

A 'critical stage' in criminal proceedings exists in situations where legal rights may be preserved or lost, or where some factual or legal disadvantage may be suffered by the accused. See Commonwealth ex rel. O'Lock v. Rundle, supra; Commonwealth ex rel. Butler v. Rundle, 416 Pa. 321, 206 A.2d 283 (1965); and Commonwealth v. Phillips, supra. The examination here involved was not such a situation.

Stukes' examination was conducted as a precautionary measure to insure due process. The findings emanating from the examination were not brought to the attention of the trial jury nor were they ever intended for trial use. The prosecution had no part in the conduct of the examination or in its initiation; indeed, neither the prosecutor nor the defense were apprized of it until June 14, 1967. Moreover, and most significantly, Stukes had nothing to lose as a result of the examination but everything to gain. It was mainly for his protection and to insure a fair trial. In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), wherein the Court ruled that 'systemized or scientific analyzing of the accused's fingerprints, blood sample, clothing, hair, and the like' were not 'critical stages at which the accused has the right to the presence of his counsel', the Court further said: 'Knowledge of the techniques of science and technology is sufficiently available, and the variables in techniques few enough, that the accused has the opportunity for a meaningful confrontation of the Government's case at trial through the ordinary processes of cross-examination of the Government's expert witnesses and the presentation of evidence of his own experts. The denial of a right to have his counsel present at such analyses does not therefore violate the Sixth Amendment; they are not critical stages since there is minimal risk that his counsel's absence at such stages might derogate from his right to a fair trial.' ³

In connection with the foregoing, Stukes also argues that there was a purposeful disregard of Rules 304, 305, 306 and 307 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, 19 P.S. Appendix by the court in that notice of the court order authorizing Stukes' psychiatric examination was never given to his counsel. It must, however, be remembered that it was not the district attorney who applied to the court for Stukes' psychiatric examination. Rather it was Dr. Guy, the prison psychiatrist, who made the application. In our view, the Rules of Criminal Procedure cited by Stukes have no bearing under these circumstances.

Stukes also complains that his constitutional rights were violated at the hearing before the trial court on June 14th with regard to the tests and treatment given him during his confinement, in that the court precluded his counsel from pursuing detailed cross-examination into the qualifications of the examining psychiatrists, and restricted his counsel's examination of the medical file to those portions of it which related to the question of Stukes' competency to stand trial. The expert witnesses were permitted to give their basic qualifications, however. Inasmuch as Stukes has not shown how the court's restrictions have prejudiced him, we find no merit in these arguments.

Stukes further argues that he was not mentally present at his trial because he was forced to stand trial while under the influence of drugs. If that were the case, there is no question but that a new trial would be required. Alexander v. United States, 290 F.2d 252 (5 Cir. 1961); Pledger v. United States, 272 F.2d 69 (4 Cir. 1959); State v. Murphy, 56 Wash.2d 761, 355 P.2d 323, 83 A.L.R.2d 1061 (1960). However, there is no evidence in the record that Stukes was at all influenced by drugs at his trial. Major tranquilizers were given to Stukes for the span of three days, from April 26th to April 28, 1967. Thereafter librium, a minor tranquilizer which has no general depressing effect on the mind, but merely relieves anxiety, was given to Stukes in 10-milligram doses three times daily until June 13th. At that time, as noted before, the quantity of librium given to Stukes was reduced to one 10-milligram dose per day before bedtime. The jury was not sworn until June 20th. Dr. Guy testified that the effects of librium continue for four or five hours. It is...