Com. v. Tharp
Decision Date | 18 July 2000 |
Citation | 754 A.2d 1251,562 Pa. 231 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Michelle Sue THARP, Appellant. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Douglas Bittinger, Appellant. |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
David J. DiCarlo, Washington, for appellant, Douglas Bittinger.
Gerald C. Grimaud, Tunkhannock, for amicus, Grimaud, Bergdoll, Battersby.
Glenn Alterio, for appellant, Michelle Sue Tharp.
John C. Pettit, Washington, Paul M. Petro, Donora, Michael J. Fagella, Washington, for appellee, Com.
Michael D. Fisher, Atty. Gen., Amy Zapp, Harrisburg, for amicus Atty. Gen.
Jonathan F. Bloom, C. Clark Hodgson, Jr., Philadelphia, for amicus, Representative Ryan and Senator Jubelirer.
Hugh J. Burns, Jr., Philadelphia, for amicus, Pa. D.A. Assoc.
Before FLAHERTY, C.J., ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR, JJ.
At issue in this appeal is whether the November 3, 1998 amendment to Article I, Section 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which essentially provides the Commonwealth with the same right to a trial by jury as the defendant, is constitutional. For the reasons discussed below, we find that the amendment is constitutional and therefore, affirm.
Appellants Michelle Sue Tharp and Douglas Bittinger allegedly starved Tharp's seven year-old daughter to death, dumped the child's body in a garbage bin, and reported her missing to the police. On June 30, 1998, both Appellants were charged with criminal homicide, endangering the welfare of a child, and abuse of corpse. Bittinger was also charged with aggravated assault. At their arraignment on August 27, 1998, Appellants entered a plea of not guilty.
On November 3, 1998, the electorate supported a constitutional amendment to Article I, Section 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution (Article I, Section 6), with a majority of the electorate voting yes to the following ballot question:
Shall the Pennsylvania Constitution be amended to provide that the Commonwealth shall have the same right to a trial by jury in criminal cases as does the accused?1
Governor Thomas Ridge issued a proclamation certifying the election results on December 3, 1998. On April 16, 1999, this Court ordered that Rules 1101, 1102 and 1103 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules 1101, 1102, and 1103), which govern the procedure for waiver of jury trials, be amended to reflect the constitutional amendment to Article I, Section 6. The rule changes were to take effect on July 1, 1999.
On April 21, 1999, the trial court scheduled jury selection in Tharp's case for June 14, 1999.2 However, approximately one week before jury selection was to begin in Tharp's case, both Appellants announced their wish for a non-jury trial and on June 8, 1999, Appellants filed requests to waive their right to a jury trial. In response, the Commonwealth asserted its right to a jury trial pursuant to the 1998 amendment to Article I, Section 6.
The trial court initially granted Appellants' requests to waive a trial by jury, finding that the Commonwealth's right to a jury trial did not become effective until July 1, 1999, when this Court's amendments to Rules 1101, 1102 and 1103 were to take effect. On reconsideration, however, the trial court ruled that the Commonwealth's right to a jury trial actually became effective on December 3, 1998, the date of the Governor's proclamation certifying the election results. Accordingly, the trial court granted the Commonwealth's request for a jury trial and ordered that Appellants be tried by jury. Appellants filed a petition for permission to appeal to the Superior Court, which the Superior Court denied. Appellants then appealed to this Court and we granted review in order to determine the constitutionality of the November 3,1998 amendment to Article I, Section 6.3
Appellants first argue that the amendment granting the Commonwealth the right to a jury trial unconstitutionally deprives defendants of their indefeasible right to a trial by jury, which, according to Appellants, includes a constitutionally protected right to waive that right. As the Commonwealth observes in its brief, however, this Court has explicitly held that while defendants clearly possess the constitutional right to a trial by jury, they do not, by implication, possess the same right to be tried non-jury. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Puksar, 559 Pa. 358, 373, 740 A.2d 219, 228 (1999)
( ); Commonwealth v. Miller, 541 Pa. 531, 664 A.2d 1310 (1995) ( ). See also Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36, 85 S.Ct. 783, 790, 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965) ( ). Although defendants have no constitutionally protected right to be tried without a jury, our rules of criminal procedure do grant defendants a legal right to waive a jury trial. See Commonwealth v. Wallace, 522 Pa. 297, 312, 561 A.2d 719, 726-27 (1989). However, by requiring defendants to obtain court approval before a jury waiver will be accepted, these rules of criminal procedure further negate Appellants' argument that defendants have an absolute and inviolate right to waive their right to a jury trial. See Pa. R.Crim. Pro 1101.
In short, Appellants, like all defendants, have a constitutional right to trial by jury but such a right simply does not include any corresponding constitutional right to be tried non-jury. Thus, contrary to Appellants' argument, providing the Commonwealth with the right to trial by jury does not violate any constitutional right held by defendants. In fact, granting the Commonwealth such a right does nothing but ensure the defendant that, should the Commonwealth invoke this right, "the result is simply that the defendant is subject to an impartial trial by jury—the very thing that the Constitution guarantees him." Singer, 380 U.S. at 36, 85 S.Ct. at 790 ( ).
Appellants also appear to assert that our state constitution vests the right to a jury trial only in individual defendants and therefore, the electorate lacked the power to amend the constitution to bestow such a right on the Commonwealth. Such an argument completely disregards the fact that the people of the Commonwealth have the authority to amend their state constitution as they deem fit, so long as they do not violate some other provision of the Pennsylvania or the United States constitutions.4,5See Stander v. Kelley, 433 Pa. 406, 412-13, 250 A.2d 474, 477 (1969). As this Court stated in Gondelman v. Commonwealth:
It is absurd to suggest that the rights enumerated in Article I were intended to restrain the power of the people. Such a proposition loses sight of the basic overriding principle of American government—that all power is in the people.
Gondelman, 520 Pa. 451, 467, 554 A.2d 896, 904 (1989). See also Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 534 Pa. 97, 120-21, 626 A.2d 537, 549 (1993)
(. )6
Thus, we reject Appellants' arguments regarding the constitutionality of the amendment to Article I, Section 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and instead find such amendment to be constitutionally sound.
Appellants argue that even if the amendment is found to be constitutional, the amendment did not become effective until July 1, 1999, the day this Court's revised versions of Rules 1101, 1102 and 1103 were scheduled to take effect. Therefore, according to Appellants, the constitutional amendment to Article I, Section 6 cannot "retroactively" be applied to their cases since they were initiated by criminal complaint before July 1, 1999. This claim fails.
In support of their argument, Appellants cite to several cases that stand for the proposition that a statute will not be construed to be retroactive unless that intent is clearly expressed by the General Assembly. Of course, as Appellants concede, the instant case does not involve legislation, but rather, an amendment to the constitution. A constitutional amendment becomes effective upon approval by the electorate, unless some other date is fixed by the constitution or the amendment itself, and is "self-executing when it can be given effect without the aid of legislation and when the language does not indicate an intent to require legislation." In re Larsen, 655 A.2d 239 (Pa.Ct.Jud.Disc.1994) (quoting R. Woodside, Pennsylvania Constitutional Law (1985) at 71). See also Derry Township Supervisors v. Borough of Hummelstown, 458 Pa. 396, 326 A.2d 342 (1974) ( ); Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General v. Griest, 196 Pa. 396, 410, 46 A. 505, 508 (1900) ( ).
Here, Appellants make no argument that the amendment cannot be given effect without the aid of legislation or more specifically, the revised rules of criminal procedure at issue in the instant case. Moreover, the plain language of amended Article I, Section 6 contains no provision conditioning its effective date upon the passage of any court rules or legislation. Thus,...
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