Com. v. Travis

Decision Date25 March 1977
Citation361 N.E.2d 394,372 Mass. 238
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Max D. Stern, Boston, for defendant.

James W. Sahakian, Sp. Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and QUIRICO, BRAUCHER, KAPLAN and WILKINS, JJ.

HENNESSEY, Chief Justice.

The respondent, Richard C. Travis, appeals from an order of a Superior Court judge which vacated a prior order of conditional release under G.L. c. 123A, § 9, and ordered his recommitment to the treatment center for sexually dangerous persons at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Bridgewater (Bridgewater). Travis contends that the judge had no constitutional authority under G.L. c. 123A, § 9, to recommit him because he had previously been found not to be a sexually dangerous person, and the judge could not validly vacate that prior finding. We agree, and we therefore reverse.

It is clear that the judge followed in every respect the procedure authorized by statute, but it is also clear to us that the statute violates due process of law.

This case has a long and complicated procedural history, and we summarize the relevant portions. Travis was found to be a sexually dangerous person pursuant to G.L. c. 123A, §§ 4, 5, and was committed to Bridgewater for an indeterminate period of from one day to life. In 1973, he filed a petition for release under G.L. c. 123A, § 9. After a hearing on the petition, a judge of the Superior Court on July 26, 1973, found that Travis was no longer sexually dangerous and ordered his conditional release from Bridgewater. 1

On August 16, 1973, following an incident which led to Travis's indictment for kidnapping, the Commonwealth filed its original motion to recommit him. The indictments were continued without a finding and subsequently dismissed. After a hearing on September 24, 1973, no action was taken on the motion, and pursuant to Travis's request he was committed to Medfield State Hospital for a period of examination not to exceed twenty days. Travis was released on October 12, 1973, and another hearing was held at which time he was placed in the custody of his attorney on representation of counsel that Travis had been accepted for an indefinite period of voluntary in-patient treatment at Medfield State Hospital. The director of that hospital subsequently refused to admit him.

Travis remained in the custody of his attorney until January, 1974. During that time he attempted unsuccessfully to gain admittance to several hospitals. He resumed thereapy with his former Bridgewater therapist who had become associated with the L. B. Cutler Clinic. Travis continued therapy on an approximate weekly basis until June, 1974, and also secured employment which he held until June, 1974 except for a two-month period from January to March, 1974. From January to June, 1974, Travis resumed his probationary status and reported 'fairly regularly' to his probation officer. In March, 1974, Travis was involved in an incident with a male prostitute which bore a superficial resemblance to the incidents which led to his original commitment. No criminal charges arose out of this incident.

Travis was arrested on June 20, 1974, for alleged violation of probation. The Commonwealth once again pressed its motion to recommit. The judge who had conducted the previous proceedings was absent from the Commonwealth at that time, and another judge of the Superior Court conducted three days of hearings on the petition. As a result of these hearings, Travis was ordered returned to Bridgewater for a sixty-day examination as an amendment to his 1973 release conditions. On Travis's motion the matter was reassigned to the original judge; however, the second judge ordered Travis's continued commitment pending final disposition.

The original judge thereupon after argument issued his preliminary conclusions of law in which he ruled, inter alia: (1) that he had the power to vacate his prior finding of July 26, 1973; (2) that he had the power to recommit Travis under G.L. c. 123A, § 9; and (3) that on the basis of the evidence presented at the hearings before the second judge and the psychiatric reports submitted after the sixty-day observation commitment there was clear indication that Travis was sexually dangerous. He therefore ordered another hearing to determine whether or not Travis had broken the conditions of his release and was sexually dangerous at that time. After that hearing, the judge issued his findings, rulings and order on February 20, 1975, which (1) vacated the July 26, 1973, order of conditional release and found that Travis had been a sexually dangerous person at that time; (2) found that Travis had breached the conditions of release and was presently a sexually dangerous person, and (3) ordered Travis recommitted to Bridgewater under the terms of the original commitment of from one day to life. 2 Subsequently, an amended order of recommitment was made on April 29, 1975, which transferred Travis from Bridgewater to the Solomon Carter Fuller Mental Helath Center and authorized hospital personnel to permit gradually increasing release time. By the time briefs were filed in this case, Travis was employed full time and was permitted to spend all except two nights a week at home with his wife.

1. It is clear that the judge was correct in ruling that he had power under the statute to recommit Travis. That portion of G.L. c. 123A, § 9, as appearing in St.1966, c. 608, with which we are concerned in this case provides as follows: '(A)ny person committed to the center . . . shall be entitled to have a hearing for examination and discharge once in every twelve months, upon the filing of a written petition by the committed person, his parents, spouse, issue, next of kin or any friend. . . . Said petition shall be filed in a superior court for the district in which said person was committed, and the court shall set a date for a speedy hearing. . . . Upon a finding by the court that such person is no longer a sexually dangerous person, it shall order such person to be discharged, or conditionally released from the center. He shall be released subject to such conditions, if any, as the court may impose, including any treatment or reporting to any clinic or outpatient department for physical or mental examination, and he shall be subject to being placed under the jurisdiction of a probation officer, or such other agency or authority as is deemed necessary. Any person released conditionally shall be subject to the jurisdiction of said court until discharged and such terms and conditions of release may be revised, altered, amended, revoked by the court at anytime, and such discharge shall not result until after due notice to the treatment center and the district attorney in the county where the commitment first originated from and the district attorney in the county where the person resides, or will reside, at the time of the hearing and discharge.'

The first argument presented by Travis is that G.L. c. 123A, § 9, does not expressly authorize a court to recommit an individual who has been conditionally released. The Commonwealth argues that such recommitment power was precisely the intent of the Legislature. We briefly review the legislative history of G.L. c. 123A, § 9.

The section was added by St.1958, c. 646, § 1, and originally provided in relevant part that '(u)pon a finding by the court that such person is no longer a sexually dangerous person, the court shall order such person to be discharged from the center and he shall be released subject to such conditions, if any, as the court may impose, including the condition that such person receive outpatient treatment.' This section was amended by St.1966, c. 608, which substituted the present language authorizing the conditional release. The concerns which precipitated the change are clearly expressed in the report of the legislative committee which drafted the 1966 amendment to § 9: 'Release is effected from the Center under the law by a finding of the Superior Court that the person is no longer considered to be 'Sexually Dangerous', or through parole action. The Committee has studied one particular case in great detail--conducting field investigations and hearings--in which a patient at the Center was released by order of the Superior Court with the provision that this patient should receive out-patient treatment at a State Hospital. This was not done and the Court was without authority to enforce the treatment, its main function under the present law simply being to decide whether the patient was--or was not--a sexually dangerous person. The released individual did not receive--and could not be forced to undergo--such treatment. . . . It is the view of this Committee that because psychiatrists differ in their opinions, it is unfair to ask the Courts to decide simply whether or not one is sexually dangerous person, and to assume the responsibility for releasing such persons by the use of such uncertain tools. This places a tremendous obligation on the Courts and to the public no resultant protection is afforded. After study, the Committee is of the opinion that the Superior Court should be authorized to grant a conditional release to the patient subject to such conditions and supervisions as the Court deems will aid the public safety and help to adjust the patient back into the community. The conditions should include the following: '1. Any treatment or reporting to any clinic, or out-patient department for physical or mental examination. 2. And, he shall be subject to being placed under the jurisdiction of a Probation Officer, or such other agency or authority as is deemed necessary. 3. Any person released conditionally shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the releasing Court--and the Court may revise, alter, amend or revoke the stated conditions at any time. 4. ...

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    ...Commitment under G. L. c. 123A "is civil and rehabilitative in nature rather than criminal and punitive." Commonwealth v. Travis, 372 Mass. 238, 248, 361 N.E.2d 394 (1977). See Commonwealth v. Bruno, 432 Mass. 489, 500-501, 735 N.E.2d 1222 (2000) (Legislature intended to establish remedial ......
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