Com. v. Troy

Decision Date28 June 1989
Citation405 Mass. 253,540 N.E.2d 162
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. Ronald TROY.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Thomas J. Barrett, Salem, for defendant.

Dyanne Klein Polatin, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Com.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and ABRAMS, NOLAN, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

NOLAN, Justice.

The defendant, Ronald Troy, appeals from convictions of the first degree murder and aggravated rape of a seventy-nine year old woman. 1 We affirm the defendant's convictions.

At approximately 8:40 A.M. on August 20, 1986, the victim's body was found in her Gloucester home by her niece. The victim was lying face down in her bed with a sheet covering her body. The niece observed blood around her aunt's mouth and her bare shoulder felt cold to the touch. The niece also noted that the bottom half of one window, along with its screen, was opened.

Dr. Sidney Wedmore, an assistant medical examiner for eastern Essex County, arrived at the victim's residence at about 11:15 A.M. The doctor observed that there was a cord around the victim's neck and some dried blood on her face coming from her ear. The doctor pulled down the sheet which was partially covering the body and noted that the victim's nightgown along with her bed clothes and underwear, were lying under the sheet at her feet. He reported that there were dried feces on the victim's lower back and also between her shoulder blades, feces around the rectal area and feces on the sheet that had covered her.

An autopsy performed by Dr. Robert E. Belliveau later that day revealed extensive internal pelvic bleeding and two vaginal lacerations which, the doctor testified, indicated that there had been forceful penetration of the vagina by a blunt instrument. Dr. Belliveau testified that the autopsy revealed that the penetration occurred prior to the victim's death. The cause of death was asphyxiation by strangulation.

State and local police officers were called to the scene. Sergeant George D. MacDougall of the State police, an expert in fingerprint analysis, "processed" the inside of the window sill of the opened window and discovered six latent impressions on the left-hand side. He testified that he believed the prints were consistent with someone reaching inside the window from the outside of the house.

The defendant's fingerprint cards, on file with the Gloucester police department, were retrieved and MacDougall compared them with the latent prints found on the sill. He testified that as to each of the six prints, he found between fourteen and fifty-one points of comparison, with eight points of comparison being required for a positive identification.

An arrest warrant for the defendant issued as did two search warrants, one for the defendant's residence and one for his person to obtain hair and saliva samples. The defendant was arrested at approximately 7 P.M. on August 20. He was handcuffed, placed in the back of the police car, and informed of his Miranda rights. The defendant indicated that he would remain silent. He then asked "what was this all about" and the police officer responded that everything would be explained to him when they arrived at the police station. The officers did not note any odor of alcohol nor did the defendant manifest difficulty in speaking or understanding what was said to him.

Once at the police station he was taken into the library area. He was again read his Miranda rights. The defendant read the rights himself and signed the Miranda form, noting the date and time. He was then informed that he was under arrest for murder, and also informed of the victim's name and address.

First, the defendant declared that he had been out that night with a woman named Diane from Maine. The defendant then stated that he knew all the people on the victim's street and that he had never been in that house before. The police informed the defendant that his fingerprints had been found inside the house and the defendant then admitted that he had broken into the house. He claimed that he had been drinking but that he had not taken any drugs. Moreover, he stated that he had not taken phenobarbital, an anti-seizure drug that had been prescribed for him.

At this point one of the police officers asked the defendant to relate his activities after 5 P.M. on the night of August 19. The defendant stated that he had visited a number of bars in Gloucester and that he had been drinking. After leaving a bar at about 9 P.M., he passed by the victim's house and decided to break into "the old lady's house." He recounted that he moved around the house from window to window until he located one that opened. He entered the house and proceeded to the victim's bedroom and began looking through her bureau drawers. Initially, the defendant maintained that he saw the victim lying on the bed with what he believed to be blood on her back. The defendant claimed he left immediately for home.

Upon arriving home, the defendant stated that he watched television until approximately 10:45 P.M. when he left to keep his prearranged date with Diane on Eastern Avenue. The defendant claimed that Diane picked him up at 11 P.M., that they were alone together until about 2:30 A.M. on August 20, and that he then returned home. At this point, one of the officers mentioned that, if the defendant had called Diane in Maine to make the date then her telephone number would appear on his telephone bill. The defendant then became remorseful and stated that he could not face his mother. Moreover, he stated that he hoped he had not killed the victim and then asked, if found guilty, would he go to jail for the rest of his life.

The defendant explained to the police that he had been in a motorcycle accident five years earlier and, to prevent seizures, had been prescribed phenobarbital. He mentioned that he had not taken the medication and he could have had a seizure, during which he may have killed the victim. 2 The defendant agreed to tell the police what actually happened that night.

The defendant admitted that, as he had stated earlier, he had been drinking but that he did not leave the bars until about 1:00 A.M. He started walking home and decided to break into the victim's house and did so in the manner that he had described earlier. While he was in the victim's bedroom rummaging through the bureau drawers, the defendant stated, the victim woke up and began yelling. He put his hand over her mouth and began to choke her. He then removed a cord from her nightgown, placed it around her neck and choked her until she stopped struggling. He felt for a pulse and found none. He said that he realized that he had feces on his hands and wiped them on the victim's back. He stated that he did not remember raping the woman. He returned home where he was met by his mother who told him that he had better be up in the morning for work. When he did get up at 7:00 A.M., that morning he still had feces on his hands. He met that morning with his employer, who testified that the defendant was coherent and manifested no signs of intoxication.

The officer read the notes back to the defendant and asked if anything should be changed. The defendant indicated no changes. The officer then handed the notes to the defendant so that he could read them. The defendant asked questions about certain abbreviations. He initialed each page and signed the notes at the end. The police stated that the defendant had no difficulty comprehending what was said to him or in speaking to them.

The defendant's hands were tested by a State chemist for the presence of "occult" blood. The chemist defined occult blood as that which cannot be seen by the naked eye but can be detected chemically. The test results indicated the presence of blood on the defendant's hands.

When asked if he would like to see his father, the defendant replied: "[N]o, I don't want to speak to him. I can't face him. I don't want to face anybody. I'm ashamed of what happened." Prior to the defendant's arraignment on August 21, he was taken to Addison Gilbert Hospital in Gloucester for wipings of his genital area. The officers who accompanied him stated that the defendant did not have difficulty walking, speaking, or understanding what was happening at that time.

Prior to arraignment, Dr. David Swenson, a court psychiatrist, examined the defendant regarding his competency. The doctor took the defendant's medical history and the defendant related that he had taken four white pills, alleged to be amphetamines. The defendant stated that they made him "very sleepy." The defendant indicated to the doctor that he wanted to kill himself. Accordingly, Dr. Swenson concluded that there was doubt as to the defendant's competency and the arraignment judge ordered that the defendant be sent to Bridgewater State Hospital for the statutory observation period. G.L. c. 123, § 15(b ) (1986 ed.).

Counsel was appointed at the arraignment on August 21, 1986. Counsel for the defendant moved that blood samples be taken for "blood screening." The judge allowed the motion and the defendant was taken to the emergency room at Addison Gilbert Hospital where four vials of the defendant's blood were drawn. The blood was then taken by a police officer to the State chemistry laboratory for testing.

The blood was received at the laboratory and placed in a refrigerator. The court order had evidently become detached from the blood samples by this time and it appears that no laboratory employee was sure what tests to run on the blood. Nor did laboratory employees realize that the blood was the defendant's evidence and not the Commonwealth's. At some point a swatch of the blood was frozen and, because a rape was involved, the blood was tested to see whether the defendant was a secretor or not. No other tests were performed on the blood. In early October, a chemist in the laboratory came across the vials in the refrigerator. Acting according to laboratory...

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23 cases
  • Com. v. Olszewski
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • December 30, 1993
    ...supra, 400 Mass. at 432, 510 N.E.2d 258. See Commonwealth v. Phoenix, supra, 409 Mass. at 412, 567 N.E.2d 193; Commonwealth v. Troy, 405 Mass. 253, 261, 540 N.E.2d 162 (1989). Measured by this standard, Strong's testimony was properly admitted. Strong's first statement was material and excu......
  • Com. v. Fredette, 00-P-989.
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • October 11, 2002
    ...for a dismissal to the extent it was grounded on the lost records. See id. at 434, 510 N.E.2d 258. See also Commonwealth v. Troy, 405 Mass. 253, 261-262, 540 N.E.2d 162 (1989); Commonwealth v. Olszewski, 416 Mass. 707, 716-717, 625 N.E.2d 529 (1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 835, 115 S.Ct. 11......
  • Com. v. Scott
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • December 17, 1990
    ...substitutes the intent to commit the underlying felony for the malice aforethought required for murder. Commonwealth v. Troy, 405 Mass. 253, 262, 540 N.E.2d 162 (1989). Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 649, 442 N.E.2d 399 (1982). In order to benefit from the principle of constructive m......
  • Com. v. Blache
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • February 8, 2008
    ...unable to present the same type of evidence on the question of his or her own intent to have intercourse. See Commonwealth v. Troy, 405 Mass. 253, 262-263, 540 N.E.2d 162 (1989) (intoxication has no mitigating effect on general intent to have intercourse or other elements of rape charge). W......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Just say no excuse: the rise and fall of the intoxication defense.
    • United States
    • Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Vol. 87 No. 2, January 1997
    • January 1, 1997
    ...Stat. Ann. [Sections] 14:15(2) (West 1986). (266) See Hook v. State, 553 A.2d 233, 235-36 (Md. 1989). (267) See Commonwealth v. Troy, 540 N.E.2d 162, 166-67 (Mass. 1989). (268) See People v. Langworthy, 331 N.W.2d 171, 177 (Mich. 1982). (269) See State v. Kjeldahl, 278 N.W.2d 58, 61 (Minn. ......

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