Com. v. Turner

• Decision Date: 09 March 2001
• Citation: 772 A.2d 970
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Zebue A. TURNER, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

772 A.2d 970

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Zebue A. TURNER, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued December 15, 2000.

Filed March 9, 2001.

Karl Turner, Public Defender, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Jennifer Slawek, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for the Com.

Before McEWEN, President Judge, DEL SOLE, KELLY, POPOVICH, JOHNSON, JOYCE, MUSMANNO, ORIE MELVIN, and LALLY-GREEN, JJ.

JOHNSON, J.:

¶ 1 In this appeal, we re-examine the meaning of "custodial interrogation" as it relates to an inebriated suspect being placed involuntarily in a police car and subsequently asked incriminating questions without being given Miranda warnings. We conclude that a suspect cannot be questioned under these circumstances without the benefit of having been given Miranda warnings and, therefore, any incriminating statements one makes under these conditions must be suppressed.

¶ 2 Zebue Turner appeals from the trial court's order denying his Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Turner claims that the trial court erred in affirming the Philadelphia Municipal Court's decision not to suppress Turner's statement made in response to police questioning while he was seated in a police car, but not under arrest. Turner contends that his statement resulted from an illegal custodial interrogation in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). After reviewing the facts of this case, we conclude that the combination of uniformed police officers placing a suspect in a police car for an unknown amount of time and subsequently asking him potentially incriminating questions rises to the level of a custodial interrogation and, therefore, the police must provide Miranda warnings before questioning him. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Turner's Petition for Certiorari based on its review of the municipal court's denial of Turner's motion for suppression. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

¶ 3 On October 18, 1998, Police Officer Gabriel Torres responded in uniform to a radio call regarding an automobile accident. Upon arriving at the scene, Torres observed a white vehicle that apparently had struck a parked vehicle. Turner was leaning against the white vehicle, unsteady and barely able to stand. Turner appeared to be falling asleep and failed to respond to Torres's questions. Torres did not smell alcohol on Turner's breath. Torres placed Turner in the back of his police car. In compliance with his police department's policy regarding suspected DUIs, Torres radioed for a supervisor to come to the scene. Sergeant Cassidy arrived on the scene, also in uniform. After discussing the situation with Torres, Cassidy opened the door of Torres's police car, leaned in, and asked Turner if he had taken any narcotics. Cassidy did not apprise Turner of his rights under Miranda. Turner responded that he had taken cough syrup and several pills. Subsequently, the officers arrested Turner. However, Turner refused to consent to a blood test. Thereafter, the Commonwealth charged Turner with Driving Under the Influence. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731. Turner moved to suppress his statement to Cassidy, asserting that his detention and questioning by the officers violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Municipal Court held a hearing on Turner's oral motion, and subsequently denied the motion. After a trial, the Municipal Court convicted Turner of Driving Under the Influence. The court sentenced Turner to not less than 48 hours nor more than one year in county prison, plus fines and costs. Turner filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas denied. Turner filed this appeal.

¶ 4 Turner presents us with the issue of whether the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the conversation between himself and Cassidy as the product of a custodial interrogation. Our standard of review for an appeal from a denial of a motion to suppress is as follows:

In an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress[,] our role is to determine whether the record supports the suppression court's factual findings and the legitimacy of the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from those findings. In making this determination, we may consider only the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses and so much of the defense as, fairly read in the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontradicted. When the [evidence supports the factual findings of the suppression court], we may reverse only if there is an error in the legal conclusions drawn from those factual findings. As a reviewing court, we are therefore not bound by the legal conclusions of the suppression court and must reverse that court's determination if the conclusions are in error or the law is misapplied.

Commonwealth v. Hayward, 756 A.2d 23, 26 (Pa.Super.2000) (citations omitted). After review of the record, we conclude that the facts of this case are not in dispute. Therefore, we will review the court's decision to determine whether the court's legal conclusions are in error.

¶ 5 In the section of the trial court's opinion entitled "UNCONTRADICTED FACTS," the court states that Torres placed Turner in the back of his police car in order to ensure Turner's safety because Turner had dozed off again and almost fell against him. The trial court also found that "[a]t that point, [Turner] was not under arrest, although he was not free to leave." Additionally, the trial court found that, after arriving at the scene, Cassidy opened the door of the police car, leaned in and asked Turner if he had taken any narcotics, upon which Turner replied that he had ingested cough syrup and several pills. Without further explanation, the trial court determined that Turner was not subject to a "custodial interrogation" at the time he made the incriminating statements. Therefore, the court concluded that there was no requirement of Miranda warnings on the facts before it, and consequently, it denied Turner's petition.

¶ 6 Turner argues that the combination of his confinement to the police car by Torres and his subjection to questioning by Cassidy as to whether he had taken any narcotics constituted a custodial interrogation. There are two separate requirements, custody and interrogation, that have to be found in order for Miranda to apply. See Commonwealth v. Whitehead, 427 Pa.Super. 362, 629 A.2d 142, 144 (1993). "[P]olice detentions in Pennsylvania become custodial when, under the totality of the circumstances, the conditions and/or duration of the detention become so coercive as to constitute the functional equivalent of arrest." Commonwealth v. Ellis, 379 Pa.Super. 337, 549 A.2d 1323, 1332 (1988) (citing California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983)). "Interrogation is police conduct calculated to, expected to or likely to evoke admission." Commonwealth v. Johnson, 373 Pa.Super. 312, 541 A.2d 332, 336 (1988) (citation and quotations omitted). The overlying test to determine whether a person is being subjected to a custodial interrogation necessitating Miranda warnings is whether he is physically deprived of his freedom in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted by such interrogation. See Commonwealth v. Chacko, 500 Pa. 571, 459 A.2d 311, 314 (1983). "The standard for determining whether police have initiated a custodial interrogation or an arrest is an objective one, with due consideration given to the reasonable impression conveyed to the person interrogated rather than the strictly subjective view of the troopers or the person being seized." Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 535 Pa. 210, 634 A.2d 1078, 1085-86 (1993). The factors that the court considers to determine whether there has been a custodial interrogation include: the basis for the detention; its length; its location; whether the suspect was transported against his or her will, how far and why; whether restraints were used; whether the law enforcement officer showed, threatened or used force; and the investigative methods employed to confirm or dispel suspicions. See Commonwealth v. Peters, 434 Pa.Super. 268, 642 A.2d 1126, 1130 (1994) (en banc). ¶ 7 Police detentions become custodial when, under the totality of the circumstances, the conditions and/or duration of the detention become so coercive as to become the functional equivalent of an arrest. See Ellis, 549 A.2d at 1332. "Arrest is an act that indicates an intention to take a person into custody or that subjects the person to the will and control of the person making the arrest." Commonwealth v. Gwynn, 555 Pa. 86, 723 A.2d 143, 148 (1998). We will now review the facts of the instant case to determine whether those facts support the trial court's legal conclusion that the events that occurred did not constitute a custodial interrogation.

¶ 8 Torres testified that he "put" Turner into his police car, not that he asked Turner if he wanted to sit in the car or offered the back seat as a place to rest. Turner sat in the car while Torres radioed Cassidy and waited for him to arrive. Torres also testified that Cassidy had to open the car door in order to speak to Turner, which suggests that Torres closed the door after he put Turner inside the car. There is no suggestion in the record that Turner closed the door himself. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Turner was physically deprived of his freedom to a level that was the functional equivalent of being arrested and, therefore, was in custody. After review of the evidence, we are unable to conclude that the facts support the trial court's conclusion that Turner was not in custody at the time of the questioning.

¶ 9 Next, we look at the issue of interrogation. The United States Supreme Court...