Com. v. Valcourt

• Decision Date: 09 March 1956
• Citation: 333 Mass. 706,133 N.E.2d 217
• Parties: (five cases). COMMONWEALTH v. Edward A. REYNOLDS (five cases). COMMONWEALTH v. William E. VALCOURT and Edward A. Reynolds (two cases). Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 217

133 N.E.2d 217

333 Mass. 706

COMMONWEALTH v. William E. VALCOURT (five cases).

COMMONWEALTH v. Edward A. REYNOLDS (five cases).

COMMONWEALTH v. William E. VALCOURT and Edward A. Reynolds (two cases).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Oct. 5, 1955.

Decided March 9, 1956.

William P. Blake, Jr., Boston, for defendant Valcourt.

James D. St. Clair, Boston, for defendant Reynolds.

Edward M. Sullivan, Asst. Dist. Atty., Boston, Donald P. Brennan, Boston, for Commonwealth.

Before QUA, C. J., and RONAN, WILKINS, SPALDING and COUNIHAN, JJ.

SPALDING, Justice.

Early in the morning of June 24, 1953, a fire destroyed an apartment house at 40 Isabella Street, Boston, causing the death of three of the tenants, Camille Quinette, Albertine Gauchet, and Delia O'Connor. Subsequently the defendant William E. Valcourt and Edward A. Reynolds were indicted for various offences arising out of the fire. The defendant Valcourt was charged with (1) murder in the second degree, (2) wilfully and maliciously burning a dwelling house, and (3) wilfully burning a building with intent to injure the insurers. The defendant Reynolds was charged with being an accessory before the fact (1) to murder in the second degree, (2) to wilfully and maliciously burning a dwelling house, and (3) to wilfully burning a building with intent to injure the insurers. Both defendants were charged in two indictments with conspiring wilfully to burn a building with intent to injure the insurers and with conspiring wilfully and maliciously to burn a dwelling house. All of the indictments were tried together and a verdict of guilty was returned on each and sentences were imposed. The felony indictments were tried pursuant to G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 278, §§ 33A-33G, and come here on appeals. The conspiracy indictments, which charge misdemeanors, could not, as the statute then read, be tried under sections 33A-33G. (See now St.1955, c. 352.) The questions of law arising out of these indictments are before us on bills of exceptions by the defendant Reynolds.

Facts common to all of the cases which could have been found are these. On June 24, 1953, the day of the fire, legal title to 40 Isabella Street was in the defendant Valcourt. A first mortgage on the property in the amount of $12,000 was held by the South Boston Savings Bank, and the defendant Reynolds, with the estate of Fred H. Buckley, held a second mortgage on the property for $11,500. It is admitted that Valcourt held the legal title to the property as a straw for Reynolds and the estate of Buckley. Reynolds was both a real estate operator and a licensed insurance agent. Valcourt had been in Reynolds' employ for about ten years as a handy man and janitor on properties owned or supervised by Reynolds. At the time of the fire Valcourt lived in an apartment house at 1865 Columbus Avenue which was owned by Reynolds. Prior to the fall of 1952, when he was incapacitated by an accident, Valcourt had been the janitor there.

Early in the afternoon of June 25 (the day after the fire) Valcourt was taken to police headquarters and was interrogated with respect to the fire. The questions and answers were recorded by a stenographer in the police department. During the course of the questioning Valcourt confessed to having set the fire. He further stated that Reynolds had told him that he was about to increase the insurance on the property and would pay him (Valcourt) $100 if he would set the fire. Early in the evening of the same day Valcourt was taken to the scene of the fire where he demonstrated to the police officers how he had set the fire.

In the evening of June 25 Reynolds was taken to police headquarters where he was questioned with respect to the fire. After half an hour, the interrogation was suspended and Reynolds and four police officers went to his office to obtain some records pertaining to his property. After the records were obtained Reynolds was brought back to police headquarters and the questioning was resumed. During this period Reynolds was confronted by Valcourt, who repeated his statements implicating Reynolds. Valcourt's accusation and Reynolds' reaction to it will be discussed in greater detail when we come to discuss the appeals and exceptions of Reynolds.

Valcourt's Appeals.

Valcourt's second assignment of error presents the question whether the judge erred in ruling, after the voir dire hearing, that Valcourts' confession was admissible. Evidence pertinent to the matter of the confession is as follows. Shortly after he was indicted Valcourt was committed to the State hospital at Bridgewater for an examination, presumably under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 123, § 100A, the so-called Briggs law. There was medical testimony from one of the examining physicians to the effect that Valcourt is of low intelligence, possessing an I. Q. of about 76, and that he is suggestible and easily led. The witness stated nevertheless that in his opinion Valcourt was capable of testifying and that he would understand questions 'pertaining to his indictment or predicament.'

The Commonwealth's version of the events leading up to the confession is this. Captain Wilson of the homicide squad testified that Valcourt was brought to the police station for questioning at 3:55 p. m. on June 25, 1953; that he began questioning Valcourt at approximately 4 o'clock; and that this interrogation lasted until 5 p. m., at which time he sent for a police stenographer. The stenographer testified that he began taking down Valcourt's statement at 6:38 p. m., and that it was finished by 7:23 p. m. There was testimony that at the conclusion of the interrogation Valcourt stated that the confession was made without any threats, promises, or inducements of any sort.

The defendant testified on the voir dire that he was questioned for three or four hours before the stenographer was brought in, and the during this period he was told that he would be sent away for life and was threatened with physical violence, but none was applied.

Whether Valcourt's confession was voluntary was for the judge to determine in the first instance on the evidence adduced on the voir dire. The judge was not obliged to believe Valcourt's version of what happened. And on the Commonwealth's version the judge could find that the confession was not obtained by improper means. In short, on conflicting evidence the question was one of fact for the trial judge. The confession having been admitted, the judge, in accordance with the practice in this Commonwealth, permitted the jury under appropriate instructions to pass on the question. Commonwealth v. Preece, 140 Mass. 276, 5 N.E. 494; Commonwealth v. Sherman, 294 Mass. 379, 394, 2 N.E.2d 477; Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 313 Mass. 590, 604, 48 N.E.2d 630. There was no error.

In his fourth assignment of error Valcourt contends that the trial judge erred in excluding a question put to the police stenographer on cross-examination as to whether Valcourt, prior to his interrogation at police headquarters on June 25, was warned of his rights. The law in this Commonwealth is that a confession does not become inadmissible solely because the defendant was not warned. Commonwealth v. Buck, 285 Mass. 41, 47, 188 N.E. 613; Commonwealth v. Mabey, 299 Mass. 96, 98, 12 N.E.2d 61. But, because a failure to warn does not vitiate a confession otherwise admissible, it does not follow that a defendant should be precluded from inquiring whether a warning was given. Many factors are relevant in determining whether a confession is voluntary and the fact of a warning or its absence is one of them. It has been said that 'the fact of * * * warning is nevertheless important evidence to show the confession was voluntary.' Commonwealth v. Szczepanek, 235 Mass. 411, 414, 126 N.E. 847, 848. And it would seem to follow that proof of lack of warning is relevant in determining whether the confession was involuntary even though, standing alone, it would not render a confession inadmissible. We are of opinion, therefore, that the question was proper, but that its exclusion in the circumstances here obtaining did not harm the defendant. The excluded question was asked on the voir dire, but during the trial it was asked and answered by Captain Wilson who conducted the interrogation of Valcourt. ¹ Thus the jury, who had ultimately to determine whether the confession was voluntary, had this information.

Assignments of error 1 and 5 to 29, inclusive, all allege substantially the same error and will be considered together. At the trial both defendants admitted the fact of the fire and the jury took a view of the scene of it. Nevertheless the Commonwealth was permitted, subject to the exceptions of Valcourt, to put in evidence numerous fragments of the burned building and several photographs depicting the burned interior and exterior of the structure. Neither the accuracy of the photographs nor the authenticity of the portions of the building is challenged. Valcourt contends, however, that, in view of his admission, this evidence had no legitimate place in the trial and that its only purpose was to inflame the minds of the jury against him.

The photographs of the burned building were plainly admissible to aid the jury in understanding the nature of the fire, even though they had viewed the premises. While it is difficult to see what evidentiary value the portions of the burned building had, we cannot say that their admission in evidence was erroneous. The fact of the fire and the extent of it were not in dispute, and the introduction of some of the charred portions of it gave the jury no information that they did not already possess. Despite the admissions of the defendants with respect to the fire, the Commonwealth was entitled to prove its case. Commonwealth v. Miller, 3 Cush. 243, 251; Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 119 Mass. 354, 355.

The thirtieth assignment of error is based on an exception to the admission of medical...