Com. v. Wilson
| Decision Date | 17 December 1992 |
| Citation | 602 A.2d 1290,529 Pa. 268 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Jerry Paul WILSON, Appellee. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Wayne O'Brien AULTMAN, Appellee. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Susan J. Cherner, Kathleen A. Farrell, Media, Patricia V. Pierce, Philadelphia, Dennis C. McAndrews, Asst. Dist. Atty., Media, Ann Lee Begler, Pittsburgh, and Michael Handler, Indiana, for Amicus--Penna. Coalition Against Rape.
Ronald Eisenberg, Chief, Appeals Div. and George S. Leone, Philadelphia, for amicus, Pennsylvania Dist. Atty. Ass'n.
William J. Martin, Dist. Atty., Robert S. Bell, and Dennis C. McAndrews, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Com Mark S. Guralnick, Broomall, and Dennis C. McAndrews, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Wayne Aultman.
Helen A. Marino, Asst. Defender, for amicus, Public Defender Ass'n of Pennsylvania and Defender Ass'n of Philadelphia.
Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS and CAPPY, JJ.
The instant matter presents us with an opportunity to consider and assess, for the first time, the scope and constitutionality of the privilege found at 42 Pa.C.S. § 5945.1. For the following reasons, we reverse the orders of the Superior Court and reinstate the orders of the trial court. The following facts are pertinent to our determination.
Appellee, Wayne O'Brien Aultman, and a co-defendant, James Thistlewood, were charged with rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, criminal conspiracy, and related offenses in connection with the rape of Thistlewood's wife, Donna. 1 Prior to trial, Aultman sought a subpoena to obtain records maintained by the Delaware County Women Against Rape Crisis Center in the preparation of his defense to the instant charges. The trial judge granted the Center's motion to quash the subpoena on the grounds that the subpoena would violate the statutory privilege protecting communications between a sexual assault counselor and the victim of such an assault.
Appellee, Jerry Paul Wilson, was charged with and convicted of the rape and indecent assault of Barbara Marie Hager. Prior to trial, appellee issued a subpoena duces tecum on Alice Paul House, an Indiana County rape crisis center, requesting the production of the Center's entire file on Barbara Hager. Counsel for Alice Paul House filed a motion to quash the subpoena which was granted on the basis of the privilege purportedly provided by 42 Pa.C.S. § 5945.1.
In both of these cases the defendants, appellees herein, appealed. The Superior Court reversed, basing its determinations in these cases on the decision of this Court in In the Matter of Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, ("PAAR "), 494 Pa. 15, 428 A.2d 126 (1981). In PAAR, we were faced with a factual situation substantially similar to that of the instant case. In PAAR the defendant sought access to statements made by the victim which were contained in a written report kept on file by PAAR. The defendant's purpose in requesting these reports was to ascertain the existence of any prior inconsistent statements made by the victim which would support defense counsel's theory that the victim had consented. The PAAR Court, noting that no statute existed to support PAAR 's assertion of absolute privilege regarding counselor-victim communications, declined to create such a privilege. Instead the court created a limited privilege by which defense counsel would be permitted to inspect "notes that are verbatim accounts of the complainant's declarations and notes that the complainant has approved as accurately reflecting what she said." Id. at 28, 428 A.2d at 132. However, any information solely relating to the counseling service provided and having no bearing whatsoever on the facts of the alleged offense would be withheld from inspection. The Court in PAAR attempted to balance the public interest in helping the victim to cope with the trauma that inevitably results from a sexual assault against the right of the accused to discover what the complainant has said. Id. at 24, 428 A.2d at 130, 132. The Court concluded that despite the compelling interest in the victim's well-being, the accused could not be denied the rights to confrontation and to have the benefit of exculpatory evidence. Accordingly, the defendant was permitted to infringe upon the victim's privacy to inspect
only those statements of the complainant contained in the file which bear on the facts of the alleged offense. The court, however, must not permit defense inspection of statements of the complainant having no bearing on the facts of the alleged offense and relating instead only to the counseling services PAAR provides. The trial court shall not permit defense review of any other aspect of the file.
Id. at 19, 428 A.2d at 127-28.
The Superior Court concluded that the PAAR rationale was applicable in the Aultman and Wilson cases and rejected the applicability of section 5945.1 because appellees had sought not to question the counselors themselves but to examine only the record developed through consultation. Commonwealth v. Aultman, 387 Pa.Super. 113, 563 A.2d 1210 (1989); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 375 Pa.Super. 580, 544 A.2d 1381 (1988). The Commonwealth appealed in both cases, requiring us to consider the effect of the legislative enactment upon our decision in PAAR and upon defendants' constitutional rights.
The statutory privilege provides, in pertinent part:
A sexual assault counselor has a privilege not to be examined as a witness in any civil or criminal proceeding without the prior written consent of the victim being counseled by the counselor as to any confidential communication made by the victim to the counselor or as to any advice, report or working paper given or made in the course of the consultation.
42 Pa.C.S. § 5945.1(b). 2
Confidential communications are defined as
Information transmitted between a victim of sexual assault and a sexual assault counselor in the course of that relationship and in confidence by a means which, so far as the victim is aware, does not disclose the information to a third person other than those who are present to further the interests of the victim in consultation or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or an accomplishment of the purposes for which the sexual assault counselor is consulted. The term includes all information received by the sexual assault counselor in the course of that relationship.
42 Pa.C.S. § 5945.1. 3
The Commonwealth argues that by enacting section 5945.1 the General Assembly plainly intended to create a broad privilege and overturn our decision in PAAR. The Commonwealth contends that the Superior Court's decision effectively abrogates the statute by permitting a defendant to circumvent its provisions through the use of a subpoena duces tecum. It is submitted that the legislative history indicates the General Assembly's intent to provide complete confidentiality for rape victims and their counselors, rather than just to prohibit the oral testimony of a sexual assault counselor, because even the production of documents has a testimonial component that is prohibited by the statute.
The defendants argue that the explicit language of the statute prohibits only the subpoena of a sexual assault counselor as a witness in a proceeding, and that PAAR established the procedure governing pretrial inspection of counselling records. Defendants submit that this procedure is a fair balancing of the competing interests presented by the situation.
Section 5945.1 was enacted in December of 1981, subsequent to the PAAR decision of January, 1981. The issue we must consider in this case concerns the effect of Section 5945.1 on our decision in PAAR. We must decide whether the statutory mandate can be reconciled with the PAAR procedure or must be interpreted to override the PAAR decision. As appellees note, the language of the statute explicitly prohibits the subpoena of a sexual assault counselor as a witness regarding confidential communications by a victim or any records developed during the course of treatment. However, since appellees sought to subpoena only the records in these cases, we must determine whether the statutory language was intended to prohibit the production of documents as well.
In conducting this inquiry we must first ascertain the legislative intent supporting the enactment. We find that the legislative history clearly demonstrates that this statute was response to our decision in PAAR and was intended to remedy what the legislature perceived as a grave injustice committed against those who, because of lesser economic means, were forced to seek counseling from a public center rather than a private therapist. A statement recorded at the time of the statute's enactments 4 reveals the intent to provide for the rape crisis center client the same confidentiality that would exist if that victim were to seek private psychotherapeutic treatment. 5 Statement of Representative Alden, 1981 Pa.Legislative Journal--House, pp. 1738-39 (October 14, 1981). It was also noted that the court's decision in PAAR had severely undermined the effectiveness of rape counseling centers. 6 Thus, we can infer that the legislature, in enacting Section 5945.1, intended to reverse the effect of our decision in PAAR, see 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c), by preventing the acquisition of all confidential communications by the victim whether in the form of live testimony or through the production of records or other documents. 7
This interpretation of the legislative intent is essential if any privilege is to exist between the sexual assault counselor and the victim, and the need for such a privilege cannot be disputed. It is without question that the privilege would exist if the victims had sought private...
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