State v. Harris

• Decision Date: 07 September 1993
• Docket Number: No. 14415,14415
• Citation: 631 A.2d 309,227 Conn. 751
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Silas HARRIS.

Page 309

631 A.2d 309

227 Conn. 751

STATE of Connecticut v. Silas HARRIS.

No. 14415.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 3, 1993.

Decided Sept. 7, 1993.

Daniel S. Fabricant, Sp. Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

Mary H. Lesser, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were Patricia A. Swords, State's Atty., and Christopher A Ford, Law Student Intern, for appellee (state).

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BORDEN, BERDON and SANTANIELLO, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Associate Justice.

On appeal, the defendant, Silas Harris, raises the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him. He also raises two other issues arising from the trial court's rulings during the course of his criminal trial. The defendant was charged in a substitute information with two counts of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59(a)(1) and (3), ¹ and one count each of assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60(a)(5), ² rioting at a correctional institution in violation of General Statutes § 53a-179b, ³ and possession of a weapon or dangerous instrument in a correctional institution in violation of General Statutes § 53a-174a. ⁴ He was found guilty by a jury of assault in the second degree, rioting at a correctional institution, and possession of a weapon or dangerous instrument in a correctional institution. He was also convicted of being a persistent serious felony offender in violation of General Statutes § 53a-40(b). He was sentenced as a persistent serious felony offender to a term of imprisonment of ten years on the assault count and twenty-five years on the rioting count to run consecutively, and to a term of twenty-five years on the possession of a weapon count to run concurrently, for a total effective sentence of thirty-five years imprisonment. Thereafter, he appealed from the judgment of conviction to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(b)(3). ⁵ We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The transcript of the defendant's trial reveals the following. On April 19, 1990 at approximately 8:30 p.m., a fight broke out in the east mess hall of the Connecticut Correctional Institution at Somers, involving seventy-five to one hundred inmates who had gathered to share a meal in honor of the Islamic religious feast, Ramadan. Thirty-five correction officers responded in an attempt to restore order. During the incident, the defendant injured correction officer Craig Jacobsen with a sharp instrument. Correction officer Barry Grant, who had checked inmates entering the hall against the list of those authorized to attend, testified that he had seen the defendant in the mess hall on the night in question. Correction officer David Serkosky testified that, upon entering the mess hall in response to Grant's call for help, he had noticed the defendant holding a light colored object resembling a toothbrush handle, an object he said inmates often used to fashion weapons. Serkosky, however, failed to mention the toothbrush handle when he gave a written statement a few hours after the incident. He attributed this failure to the fact that when he had made his statement at approximately 1:45 a.m., after returning from having had his wound sutured at the hospital emergency room, he had been distracted and in pain and had wanted to go home.

Jacobsen testified that he had been standing back from the crowd of inmates trying to restore order when he had been attacked by the defendant. ⁶ Jacobsen stated that he saw a white object come from behind him along the right side of his neck and he had realized he had been cut. He suffered a six inch laceration. After he had been cut, he turned his head and saw the defendant, approximately three feet away, running away from him towards the crowd of inmates, holding what appeared to be a white toothbrush with a razor blade embedded in the handle. Jacobsen stated that he had seen about one half of the defendant's face as he had run off. According to Jacobsen, the entire incident took about six seconds.

Jacobsen had worked at the prison for only about seven months at the time of the incident. Prior to his employment at the prison, he had worked elsewhere as a security guard for eighteen months.

Jacobsen testified that at the time the defendant cut him, the defendant had been wearing a tan shirt and pants and that he had known the defendant from working in D cell block where the defendant was housed. ⁷ Jacobsen had, in fact, had a brief encounter with the defendant earlier that same day. Jacobsen also testified that after returning from the emergency room, he had told Detective Thomas Davoren that his assailant was "Harris" in D-90. Davoren, the officer in charge of the investigation, also testified that Jacobsen had identified the cell as D-90, even though Jacobsen's written statement merely stated that his assailant was "Harris" in D block.

Jacobsen also identified his assailant as the taller and older Harris brother. In fact, the defendant's brother, who also lived in D block, is older than the defendant. Consistent with Jacobsen's description, however, the defendant is four inches taller than his older brother. Jacobsen testified, moreover, that he had always thought that the defendant was the older of the two Harris brothers. Furthermore, Jacobsen picked the defendant's photograph out of an array that also contained a picture of the defendant's brother. Davoren testified that he had decided to apply for a warrant for the defendant's arrest solely on the basis of Jacobsen's identification of the defendant.

At approximately 12:30 a.m. on April 20, an order was issued by Deputy Warden Christopher Dion to transfer the defendant from D block to F block. Prior to the order, Dion had not told anyone about the pending transfer. The defendant's cell was searched and no weapons of any type were found. ⁸

I

The defendant first claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction because the record does not contain proof beyond a reasonable doubt of his identity as Jacobsen's assailant. We disagree.

The standard of review of an insufficiency claim is twofold. " 'We first review the evidence presented at trial, construing it in the light most favorable to sustaining the facts expressly found by the trial court or impliedly found by the jury. We then decide whether, upon the facts thus established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the trial court or the jury could reasonably have concluded that the cumulative effect of the evidence established the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' " State v. Milardo, 224 Conn. 397, 402-403, 618 A.2d 1347 (1993); State v. Jarrett, 218 Conn. 766, 770-71, 591 A.2d 1225 (1991); State v. Weinberg, 215 Conn. 231, 253, 575 A.2d 1003, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967, 111 S.Ct. 430, 112 L.Ed.2d 413 (1990).

The jury must find every element of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty. The basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions, however, need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Crafts, 226 Conn. 237, 243-44, 627 A.2d 877 (1993); State v. Milardo, supra, 224 Conn. at 403, 618 A.2d 1347; State v. Castonguay, 218 Conn. 486, 507, 590 A.2d 901 (1991). " 'If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.' " State v. Milardo, supra; State v. Pinnock, 220 Conn. 765, 771, 601 A.2d 521 (1992); State v. Grant, 219 Conn. 596, 604-605, 594 A.2d 459 (1991).

On the basis of the evidence and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was Jacobsen's assailant. Although he only saw one half of the defendant's face for a few seconds, Jacobsen knew the defendant and he was able to identify him by name and cell number. Further, notwithstanding that Jacobsen's written statement indicated only the defendant's cell block, Davoren testified that Jacobsen had identified the defendant's cell number, as well as his cell block, when he had given his statement. Moreover, although Jacobsen mistakenly indicated that the person who had assaulted him was the older of the two Harris brothers, this misconception does not change the fact that Jacobsen recognized which of the Harris brothers was his assailant. He also correctly identified the defendant as the taller of the brothers and picked the defendant's photograph from an array that included a picture of the defendant's brother. Jacobsen's identification was also corroborated by Serkosky's testimony that he had seen the defendant with the same type of weapon in his hand that Jacobsen had observed. Any inconsistencies in Jacobsen's testimony and his credibility were matters properly left to the jury's determination. State v. Somerville, 214 Conn. 378, 391-92, 572 A.2d 944 (1990).

The defendant contends, however, that the state's evidence did not preclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence because the evidence permitted the conclusion that the defendant's brother, not the defendant, was Jacobsen's assailant. The defendant argues that because both Harris brothers resided in D block at the time of the incident and both were in the mess hall when Jacobsen was assaulted, it is a reasonable hypothesis that the defendant was misidentified. Moreover, Jacobsen identified his assailant as the older Harris brother and conceded that there was a family resemblance between the two brothers. We are unpersuaded.

" 'The rule is that the jury's function is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and...