Com. v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 21 June 1890
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. WILSON et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

152 Mass. 12

25 N.E. 16

COMMONWEALTH v. WILSON et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

June 21, 1890

COUNSEL

Andrew

J. Waterman, Atty. Gen., and H.A. Wyman, Asst. Atty Gen., for the Commonwealth.

J.E Bates, for defendant.

OPINION

FIELD J.

The only exceptions argued are the exception to the instructions given by the court upon the effect of the evidence of the defendants' reputation for honesty so far as they are inconsistent with the twelfth instruction requested, and the exception to the refusal of the court to give the sixth instruction requested. The court instructed the jury that they "ought properly to consider, in connection with other evidence for the defendant, such testimony relative to his character for honesty as has been introduced." The court had previously instructed them that "the burden of proof in this case, as in all criminal cases, was upon the commonwealth to satisfy them beyond a reasonable doubt of all the material allegations of the indictment." These instructions taken together are in substance equivalent to the twelfth instruction requested. The jury were in effect told that they were to give to the evidence concerning the defendant's reputation for honesty such weight as they thought it was entitled to, and if, after giving it such weight, they were not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, they must acquit him. This is a correct statement of the law. Com. v. Leonard, 140 Mass. 473, 4 N.E. 96.

The sixth instruction requested is as follows: "The testimony of an accomplice in the supposed crime cannot be corroborated by that of another accomplice, whether their respective testimonies relate to the same or to separate and independent facts." The effect of our decisions upon this subject seems to be as follows: An accomplice is a competent witness for the prosecution in a criminal case, and a jury may find a defendant guilty upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. It is, however, a general rule of practice to advise a jury not to convict upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, but it is not a rule of law, and it is not error in law, for the presiding justice to refuse so to advise the jury. The practice of advising a jury that it is generally unsafe to convict upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, but of leaving it for them to determine in any particular case the weight to which such testimony is entitled, is not regarded as a violation of Pub.St. c. 153, § 5. See chapter 214, § 17. If under this rule of practice, evidence is admitted for the purpose of corroborating the testimony of an accomplice which does not legally have that effect, it is a subject of exception. Com. v. Chase, 147 Mass. 597, 18 N.E. 565; Com. v. Holmes, 127 Mass. 424; Com. v. Larrabee, 99 Mass. 413-416; Harrington v. Harrington, 107...