Com. v. Wilson

Decision Date04 April 2008
Docket NumberNo. 88 EDA 2006.,88 EDA 2006.
Citation2008 PA Super 64,946 A.2d 767
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Earl WILSON, Appellee.
CourtPennsylvania Superior Court

Joan Weiner, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Com., appellant.

Lori Mach, Philadelphia, for appellee.

BEFORE: JOYCE,* KLEIN and BOWES, JJ.

OPINION BY KLEIN, J.:

¶ 1 Earl Wilson pled guilty1 to two counts of robbery (F-1), two counts of burglary (F-1), and one count of possession of an instrument of crime (PIC) after he accosted two separate victims with a brick,2 injuring one so badly that she lost almost all of her teeth and required staples in her head to close a gaping wound, and causing his other victim to suffer a black eye. The trial judge sentenced Wilson to concurrent terms of 11½ — 23 months imprisonment, plus 7 years reporting probation on each of the robbery charges.3 Wilson was immediately paroled to a drug program after having served only 7 months time. The Commonwealth appealed, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion and that the sentence imposed was unreasonable because it was too lenient. Initially, this Court agreed with the Commonwealth and found the sentence unreasonably low.

¶ 2 On October 24, 2007, in a summary disposition, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania vacated our Court's prior decision and remanded the instant case to be considered in light of Commonwealth v. Walls, 592 Pa. 557, 926 A.2d 957 (2007). After a thorough analysis of Walls and a reconsideration of the record, we still find that under the standards set forth in Walls, the sentence was unreasonable in that the court focused only on the defendant and did not take into consideration the seriousness of the crimes.

The rationale of Walls

¶ 3 In reviewing the holding of Walls, the following principles were articulated:

¶ 4 1. The imposition of sentence is vested in the discretion of the trial court, and should not be disturbed on appeal for a mere error of judgment but only for an abuse of discretion and a showing that a sentence was manifestly unreasonable. 926 A.2d at 961.

¶ 5 2. Sentencing guidelines, while an aid in imposing sentencing, are advisory and nonbinding, and do not replace the key determination by the sentencing judge as to whether or not a sentence was reasonable. 926 A.2d at 962, 964.

¶ 6 3. The sentencing court must consider the sentencing guidelines, and the consideration must be more than mere fluff. Moreover, when imposing a sentence outside the guidelines, the trial judge must provide a written statement of the reasons for the deviation. 926 A.2d at 962-63, 964.

¶ 7 4. The concept of unreasonableness is a "fluid one," and "lacks precise boundaries." 926 A.2d at 963, 964. As noted in Justice Baer's concurrence, this creates a concern that sentencing may be entirely in the sentencing judge's discretion.4 The Majority opinion affirms significant discretion in the trial courts. However, we do not believe that the Majority in Walls effectively does away with the power of an appellate court to determine "unreasonableness." The appellate courts have the benefit of reviewing sentences in many cases throughout the Commonwealth to enable them to analyze what is and what is not "unreasonable." 926 A.2d at 965.

¶ 8 5. Although "fluid" and "imprecise," the determination of unreasonableness by the appellate court must consider the statutory provisions of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d). Those provisions require a consideration of (1) the nature of the crime and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the trial judge's observation of the defendant and the contents of a presentence report; (3) the findings upon which the sentence was based; and (4) the sentencing guidelines.

The specific holding of Walls

¶ 9 The Supreme Court in Walls did not state that this Court erred in reversing Walls' sentence. Instead, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the Superior Court "... for a re-examination of the judgment of sentence in light of our decision today." 926 A.2d at 967. In other words, the Supreme Court did not say that the Superior Court erred in finding Walls' sentence unreasonable, just that it used an improper standard.

¶ 10 After setting forth the general principles above, the Walls Court stated, "With clarification of the proper standard of review, which includes the standard of unreasonableness under the Sentencing Code, we turn to the specific arguments raised by the parties concerning the Superior Court's vacatur of Walls' sentence." 926 A.2d at 964.

¶ 11 The errors found by the Supreme Court in Walls were the following:

¶ 12 1. The Superior Court erred in its determination that a trial judge is bound by the sentencing guidelines, rather than treating them only as valuable advisory guidelines that must be respected and considered and may provide an essential starting point. 926 A.2d at 965.

¶ 13 2. The Superior Court may have erred in suggesting that a sentence must still be the "minimum possible confinement," as that standard was replaced by the 1978 amendment of the Sentencing Code. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). 926 A.2d at 965.

¶ 14 3. The Superior Court erred in finding that the sentencing court in Walls had a policy of imposing the maximum sentence regardless of the individual circumstances of the case. 926 A.2d at 966.

¶ 15 4. The Superior Court erred in reweighing the sentencing court's factors, including the age of the victim, the position of trust and responsibility Walls had to his granddaughter, the fact that the victim of the sexual assault was his granddaughter, and the fact that Walls characterized the sexual assaults as "accidents." Thus, the Superior Court erred in concluding that these factors were not "uncommon" in crimes of this kind. 926 A.2d at 966, 967.

¶ 16 5. While departing from the guidelines, the Supreme Court rejected the Superior Court's conclusion that the sentencing court disregarded the guidelines. Instead, the Supreme Court held that the sentencing court did consider the guidelines and "departed therefrom for reasons that were not foreclosed by the law," and did consider the general standards for sentencing of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). 926 A.2d at 967.

The Application of Walls to the specific facts of this case.

¶ 17 Under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(3), it is our obligation to determine whether Wilson's sentence, which is outside the sentencing guidelines, is unreasonable. After considering the facts of the instant case, and applying the Supreme Court's decision in Walls, we conclude that the sentence was unreasonable.

¶ 18 In light of the unusually brutal nature of the robberies, which are classified as first-degree felonies, the fact that Wilson poses a continuing threat to the public, Wilson's past aggressive conduct, the admitted emotional and physical injuries suffered by the victims,5 and the applicable guideline ranges, our determination is that the sentence was unreasonably low. We are, therefore, compelled to vacate and remand for resentencing.

¶ 19 The nature and circumstances of the events that transpired during the robberies committed by Wilson, the trial court's findings, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d)(1), and the unequal weight that the sentencing court gave to the general factors under section 9721(d), compel us to conclude that the sentencing court's exercise of judgment was unreasonable. Specifically, the sentencing court focused almost exclusively on the fact that Wilson's actions were the result of his drug addiction and that Wilson acknowledged his problem and wanted to be treated for it.6 As a result, the court went out of its way to impose a less-than-mitigated-range sentence so that it retained the authority to immediately parole Wilson to a drug program.

Facts of the Instant Case

¶ 20 Wilson accosted his first victim as she was entering her apartment. He pushed her inside the vestibule, demanded money, hit her repeatedly in the face with a brick and took her purse. She suffered severe lacerations to her skull (requiring staples in her head to close the gash) and lost most of her teeth as a result of the incident. Wilson followed his second victim into his apartment where he demanded money while threatening him with a brick.7 Wilson was arrested the following day; both the brick and the first victim's cell phone were in his possession. Both victims positively identified the defendant.

¶ 21 During the guilty plea hearing, the D.A. read from his notes an interview the police had had with Wilson immediately following his arrest for the robberies. During that interview, Wilson explained that he attacked his victims in order to get money to feed his crack cocaine habit. He also stated that he badly wanted help for his drug problem and that he was very sorry and did not mean to hurt anyone. N.T. Guilty Plea Hearing, 8/16/2005, at 14. Wilson also indicated during this interview that he found the brick he used to attack his first victim "lying outside on the ground down the street from her house" and that he thought he "hit her in the head and face" with the brick "two or three" times. Id. Moreover, after running up to his female victim and not being satisfied with her answer that she did not have any money, he then took the "brick and start[ed] swinging at her." Id. at 12. When she started screaming louder, he "swung the brick a couple more times" until she fell on the floor in the hallway of her apartment building. Id. at 13.

Discussion

¶ 22 A. "Unreasonableness" Inquiry under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b)

1. Nature and Circumstances of Offense/History and Characteristics of Wilson

¶ 23 The circumstances surrounding the robberies Wilson committed on his victims were brutal. Specifically, Wilson repeatedly bashed his first victim in the face with a brick. Even after she indicated that she did not have any money, he continued to brutalize her by hitting her with the brick in the head and face two or three more times. He only ceased his assault when she finally fell...

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    • United States
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