Com. v. Woodward
| Decision Date | 03 January 1893 |
| Citation | 32 N.E. 939,157 Mass. 516 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. WOODWARD. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
C.N. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.
Cummings & Higginson and L.E. White, for defendant.
The plea in abatement raises the question whether an indictment is to be held bad because one of the grand jurors by whom it was found, being otherwise competent and qualified to serve had, before the meeting of the grand jury, made a personal investigation into the guilt of the accused, and had secreted himself in a room with an officer for the purpose of listening to declarations and admissions made by the accused concerning the crime, and has heard such declarations and admissions, and had listened to statements of officers to the effect that the accused was guilty, and had thereupon formed an opinion, and believed him to be guilty before and at the time of the investigation of the case by the grand jury. We are of opinion that these facts constitute no legal objection to the validity of the indictment. This opinion is in accordance with what appears to us to be the clear weight of judicial decision elsewhere, though in some instances views to the contrary have been held. It is, however, to be borne in mind that, in examining the decisions of different tribunals in reference to the position, functions, and proper methods of discharging the duties of grand jurors, it is necessary to know the statutory law under which those decisions have been rendered, in order rightly to understand them. For example, as we understand it, in New York a grand jury can receive but legal evidence, (Code Crim.Proc. §§ 255-257,) while in Connecticut it is the duty of each grand juror, before the grand jury come together, to make a personal investigation of all offenses that come to his knowledge, (Gen.St.Conn., Revision 1887, c. 12; Watson v Hall, 46 Conn. 204.) In Massachusetts there is no statute defining the duties of grand jurors, except so far as the same may be gathered from their oath of office. This oath is as follows: Pub.St. c. 213, § 5. This is substantially the form of the oath which has long been administered in England; and there, as here, the grand jury is deemed to be an informing and accusing body, rather than a judicial tribunal. 4 Bl.Comm. 298, 300; Justice FIELD'S charge, 2 Sawy. 667. There are evils no doubt which would arise if a general practice were to spring up of importuning grand jurors privately in favor of or against the finding of indictments. If this were done on one side, it might also be done on the other; if with one grand juror, then with all; if by one person, then by many persons; if in one case, then in all cases. The evil or apprehension of evil from this source has been so great elsewhere as sometimes to lead to legislation for preventing or punishing it. People v. Sellick, 4 N.Y.Crim.Rep. 329. No such legislation has yet been deemed necessary in this commonwealth, and the question of the criminality of such importuning, if it should arise, would have to be determined on general principles of law. In the present case no corruption is charged upon the grand juror, or upon the officers who made statements to him. The most that can be said is that there was an excess of zeal. It is always considered that, in finding indictments, grand jurors may act upon their own knowledge, or upon the knowledge of one or more of their number. It is accordingly held in most jurisdictions that it is no objection to the validity of an indictment that one or more of the grand jurors, who was otherwise qualified, had formed or expressed an opinion of the guilt of the accused, (Tucker's Case, 8 Mass. 286; State v. Hamlin, 47 Conn. 95, 114; State v. Chairs, 9 Baxt. 196; Musick v. People, 40 Ill. 268; Lee v. Georgia, 69 Ga. 705; U.S. v. Williams, 1...
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