Com. v. Yates
| Decision Date | 16 September 1992 |
| Citation | 613 A.2d 542,531 Pa. 373 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Leo YATES, Jr., Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Shelley Stark, Chief-Appellate Div., Office of the Public Defender, Pittsburgh, for appellant.
Robert E. Colville, Dist. Atty., Kemal A. Mericli, Sandra Preuhs, Asst. Dist. Atty., Pittsburgh, for appellee.
Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS and CAPPY, JJ.
In 1989, in a trial by jury in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, the appellant, Leo Yates, Jr., was convicted of two violations of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, to wit, possession with intent to deliver, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), and possession, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16). Appellant was sentenced to a three to six year term of imprisonment, and a fine of fifteen thousand dollars was imposed. An appeal was taken to the Superior Court. In a memorandum decision, the judgment of sentence was affirmed 411 Pa.Super. 671, 593 A.2d 916. The present appeal, by allowance, ensued. We reverse.
The factual background of this case is as follows. On September 12, 1988, a police officer in the City of Pittsburgh received a phone call from a confidential informant. The informant told the officer that a black male in his early 20's, 6' 4"' tall, weighing 270 lbs., and wearing a black and red Adidas sweatshirt and pants and white tennis shoes was selling drugs in the 600 block of Brushton Avenue. The 600 block of Brushton Avenue is known to be a concentrated drug trafficking area. The officer quickly notified undercover officers in the vicinity of Brushton Avenue and made arrangements for himself and three other officers to immediately converge upon the scene. Upon arriving there, they noticed a black male who met the exact description given by the informant. The suspect was carrying a brown paper bag and began to run when he saw an unmarked police car arrive at the scene.
The suspect, to wit, appellant, was stopped and searched. Inside the brown paper bag that appellant had been carrying were seventy-four packets of white powder containing cocaine and $105.00 in cash. An additional fourteen packets of this substance and $86.00 in cash were in appellant's pocket. The total weight of all of the packets containing cocaine was 13.7 grams. Accordingly, upon his subsequent conviction, appellant was sentenced under the mandatory sentencing provision, 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508(a)(3)(ii), which applies to cases where the amount of the substance seized was at least 10 grams. See Commonwealth v. Corporan, --- Pa. ----, 613 A.2d 530 (1992).
Appellant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting certain hearsay statements at trial. We agree.
The hearsay statements were contained in testimony given by two police officers, who, in the course of explaining the reason that they converged upon the 600 block of Brushton Avenue, stated that an informant had notified them that a large black male, i.e., appellant, was "dealing drugs" at that location. The trial court upheld the admission of this testimony on the basis that it was necessary to explain the course of police conduct, reasoning that without the testimony the jury would have had no means of knowing why the police went to the 600 block of Brushton Avenue. The court gave a cautionary instruction to the jury, however, stating that appellant was not charged with dealing drugs and that the testimony about drug dealing was admitted only to explain why the police went to Brushton Avenue.
In Commonwealth v. Palsa, 521 Pa. 113, 117, 555 A.2d 808, 810 (1989), we addressed the extent to which out-of-court statements may be admitted to explain a course of police conduct, stating,
It is, of course, well established that certain out-of-court statements offered to explain a course of police conduct are admissible. Such statements do not constitute hearsay since they are not offered for the truth of the matters asserted; rather, they are offered merely to show the information upon which...
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