Com. v. Zakas

• Decision Date: 05 November 1970
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Angelo ZAKAS et al. 1
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 446

263 N.E.2d 446

358 Mass. 265

COMMONWEALTH v. Angelo ZAKAS et al. ¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

Argued Sept. 22, 1970.

Decided Nov. 5, 1970.

Case tried in the Superior Court before Sullivan, J.

Paul Resnick, Beverly, for Angelo Zakas.

John J. Jennings, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

Before SPALDING, KIRK, SPIEGEL, and QUIRICO, JJ.

KIRK, Justice.

The defendant Zaskas and Carney were indicted for conspiracy to steal property of Teremo, Inc., of the value of more than $100, and were found guilty at a trial subject to G.L. c. 278, §§ 33A--33G, inclusive. Both appealed. Only Zakas, however, has perfected and prosecuted his appeal.

Zakas assigns two errors: (1) A juror who sat on the convicting jury had earlier during the same sitting served on a jury which by a directed verdict found Zakas not guilty of larceny by means of false pretences of property of Teremo, Inc. (2) The denial of Zakas's motion for a directed verdict of not guilty on the conspiracy charge.

1. There was no reversible error in the first assignment. It is not disputed that Zakas represented by the same counsel had been put to trial earlier in the sitting of the Superior Court as the sole defendant on a complaint charging him with larceny by means of false pretences. ² When the conspiracy indictment was called the judge and counsel explicitly agreed that the jury would be drawn from the same venire as had the jury for the larceny trial of Zakas. ³

After the jury had been declared indifferent, one juror following a bench conference was excused by the judge. Carney declared himself content and Zakas challenged one juror on the panel. The replacement jurors were declared indifferent; none was challenged; the jury were sworn; the indictment was read and the Commonwealth's opening began. The judge interrupted the opening and advised counsel that one of the jurors (not a replacement) had sat on the earlier Zakas trial. Carney stated that he was not a party to the earlier trial and would object to any juror being excused. Zakas said he objected to the juror remaining on the panel. The colloquy with the judge was beyond the hearing of the jurors. The judge ordered the trial to proceed. Zakas excepted. The exception is without merit.

No one contends that Zakas, by consenting to draw the jury from the entire venire, became bound to accept as a juror one who had sat on his earlier trial. We hold, however, that he was bound to use reasonable diligence to ensure that he had an impartial jury, exercising, if he so desired, the right to exclude members of the earlier jury by peremptory challenges or challenges for cause. Rule 48 of the Superior Court (1954). Indeed, Zakas had exercised a peremptory challenges. He had not exhausted his peremptory challenges when he declared that he was content with the jury. Zakas had the means and ample opportunity to ascertain whether a juror had been on the earlier panel and to determine if for that reason the juror was objectionable. His failure seasonably to object was a waiver of his right to object. Zakas's late objection came only after the codefendant Carney stated his opposition to excusing any sitting juror, and was a reversal of Zakas's earlier position, possibly designed to pose a dilemma for the judge. In a situation quite similar to the one before us, it was held that the right to challenge a particular juror is conclusively waived if no objection is made at the time the jury are empanelled and if the basis of the objection is known or might have been known or discovered by reasonable diligence, or if the party is otherwise chargeable with knowledge of the ground of the objection. Batsell v. United States, 217 F.2d 257, 260 (8th Cir.), generally recognized as a leading case on the point. Leonard v. United States, 378 U.S. 544, 84 S.Ct. 1696, 12 L.Ed.2d 1028, relied upon by Zakas, is distinguishable. In the Leonard case, the prior trial proceeded to a verdict of guilty by a jury, one of whom sat on the subsequent trial of the defendant and joined in another guilty verdict. See cases collected in 6 A.L.R.3d 551.

2. The evidence was sufficient to support verdicts of guilty of the crime charged in the indictment. The indictment was in the form provided by statute. G.L. c. 277, § 79. The indictment did not state, and there is no requirement that it state, the means to be used to effect the larceny. There was no motion for a bill of particulars. In the final sentence of his opening statement, however, the assistant district attorney stated that the evidence would show that the defendants conspired to steal the money 'by reason of false pretenses.'

This statement did not enlarge the indictment or add an element to it. The statement merely informed the jury that the Commonwealth, in support of the indictment charging conspiracy to steal, would produce evidence that the defendants planned to accomplish the theft by a false pretence.

The essence or gist of the alleged offence is that Zakas and Carney agreed or conspired together to steal money by their combined action. It is not essential, as Zakas contends, that on a conspiracy charge the Commonwealth prove that the defendants accomplished all four of the essential elements of the crime of larceny by false pretences as is the case when the substantive crime is charged. See Commonwealth v. Leonard, 352 Mass. 636, 644--645, 227 N.E.2d 721.

It is sufficient if it be shown to the satisfaction of the jury that the defendants combined with the intention to steal. Proof of their intention may be shown by circumstantial evidence. COMMONWEALTH V. SCHNACKENBERG, MASS., 248 N.E.2D 273.^A The means resorted to by the defendants may be strong evidence of the larcenous intent.

We summarize the evidence. In June, 1969, Teremo, Inc. of Beverly (Teremo) a health and social club, applied to the liquor licensing board of Beverly for a license. The clerk of Teremo was John Morgan. During the week following the application Morgan had conversations with the defendant Zakas's sister about the purchase of furniture for the club. Zakas's sister mentioned the application for a liquor license. As a result of these conversations Morgan telephoned to Zakas at his place of business on Monday, June 23. Zakas invited Morgan to come to his office alone. Zakas was in the...