Combs v. Cook
| Decision Date | 18 June 1958 |
| Docket Number | No. 29638,29638 |
| Parties | Roy T. COMBS, as Auditor of the State of Indiana, Adolph L. Fossler, as Treasurer of the State of Indiana, George C. Bond, as Auditor of Allen County, Indiana, Harland Pressler, as Treasurer of Allen County, Indiana, Joda G. Newsom, as a member of the State Board of Tax Commissioners of the State of Indiana, David R. Davis, as a member of the State Board of Tax Commissioners of the State of Indiana, Peter A. Beczkiewicz, as a member of the State Board of Tax Commissioners of the State of Indiana, Appellants, v. Elmer M. COOK, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Edwin K. Steers, Atty. Gen., Harriette Bailey Conn, Deputy Atty. Gen., J. R. Arnold, Fort Wayne, for appellants.
W. O. Hughes, Dan C. Flanagan, Fort Wayne, for appellee.
This appeal arises out of an action for a declaratory judgment to determine the salary of appellee as County Assessor of Allen County for the calendar year 1958. The justiciable issue is furnished by certain provisions of Ch. 319 of the Acts of 1957.
Chapter 27 of the Acts of 1955 created a County Officers Salary Study Commission to make a survey of the compensation received by several county officials in Indiana, and report its findings and recommendations to the 1957 session of the Indiana General Assembly, together with suggested legislation in bill form prescribing and fixing compensation for all county officials in the State.
In accordance with the mandate of such Ch. 27, supra, the Commission, after a thorough study, made its report as provided in the Act, and caused to be prepared and introduced Senate Bill No. 41 to put into effect its recommendations. This bill, with certain amendments which are the subject of this action, became Chapter 319 of the Acts of 1957.
As a part of the plan of adjustment of the compensation paid county officials, Senate Bill No. 37 was introduced and enacted as Chapter 318 of the Acts of 1957. This Act amended the Inheritance Tax Act of 1931, as amended, 1 and provides that certain fees formerly payable to the county assessors shall, after the effective date of the Act, be paid into the general fund of the county. Chapter 318 also includes the amount of inheritance tax fees to be charged, authorizes the court to fix fees for appraisers other than county assessors, provides for a reappraisal and makes other changes in the inheritance tax laws which we need not here mention. This Act makes no reference whatever to the compensation of county assessors.
Both Chapters 318 and 319, supra, as reported by the Senate Committee, would have become effective January 1, 1959, 2 but the effective date of each was changed by amendment on the floor of the Senate to January 1, 1958. 3
Section 3 of Ch. 319, supra, provides as follows:
Section 16 of Ch. 319, supra, provides as follows:
Both Sections 3 and 16, supra, were enacted in the exact form in which they were introduced in the Senate.
Chapter 319 was amended on the floor of the House by inserting Section 17 as it appears in the enrolled Act, 4 as follows:
The Senate concurred in the House amendment. Under these circumstances it seems clear that the intent of the Legislature, by the adoption of this amendment, was to prevent the reduction of the compensation of certain county officials during the term of office for which they were elected. This is a reasonable provision when it is considered that these certain officials knew the amount of compensation of the office when they became candidates therefor, and they had the right to expect that the Legislature would not reduce it during their term.
Appellants assert that 'as now prescribed by law' as used in § 17, supra, refers to the time of the taking effect of the Act (Ch. 319, supra), and since Ch. 318, supra, became effective on the same date as Ch. 319, supra, the fees and emoluments referred to in § 17, supra, are no longer available as compensation for county assessors since, by the provisions of Ch. 318, supra, all inheritance tax fees must be paid into the County Treasury. Such a construction would make the provisions of § 17, supra, inoperative as they apply to county assessors in classes 1 and 2.
It is not to be presumed that any part of an Act is meaningless and without a definite purpose. If possible, effect must be given to every word and clause used in the Act. Olszewski v. Stodola, 1948, 226 Ind. 639, 643, 82 N.E.2d 256; Garvin v. Chadwick Realty Corp., 1937, 212 Ind. 499, 506, 9 N.E.2d 268.
Our duty here is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature as shown by the entire Act, each section being considered with reference to all the other sections, and the apparent motive for the addition of § 17, supra, on the floor of the House, may be considered in determining such intent. State ex rel. Rogers v. Davis, 1952, 230 Ind. 479, 482, 104 N.E.2d 382; J. Wooley Coal Co. v. Tevault, 1918, 187 Ind. 171, 182, 118 N.E. 921, 119 N.E. 485; McKee v. Hasler, 1951, 229 Ind. 437, 449, 98 N.E.2d 657; Walgreen Co. v. Gross Income Tax Div., 1947, 225 Ind. 418, 421, 75 N.E.2d 784, 1 A.L.R.2d 1014.
The legislative intent as ascertained from the Act as a whole will prevail over the strict literal meaning of any word or term used therein. Brown v. Grzeskowiak, 1951, 230 Ind. 110, 129, 101 N.E.2d 639, 102 N.E.2d 372; City of Indianapolis v. Evans, 1940, 216 Ind. 555, 567, 24 N.E.2d 776; Zoercher v. Indiana Associated Telephone Corp., 1937, 211 Ind. 447, 454, 7 N.E.2d 282.
With the foregoing rules as our guide, we now proceed to determine the ultimate effect of the provisions of § 17, supra, when considered with the provisions of other sections of Ch. 319, supra, and the effect, if any, of Ch. 318, supra.
The purpose of Ch. 319, supra, is to fix a definite compensation for all county officers named therein. Chapter 318, supra, as we have already indicated, has nothing whatever to do with the fixing of salaries. Hence, we find no conflict between the two Acts on the measure of compensation to be paid county officials, nor is there necessarily any conflict in the disposition of inheritance tax fees in Allen County for the calendar year of 1958, as will presently appear. However, if, as appellant asserts, there is an apparent conflict between the two statutes, it is our duty, if possible, to so construe them as to give full force and effect to both. Ross v. Chambers, 1938, 214 Ind. 223, 226, 14 N.E.2d 1012.
Laws passed at the same session of the Legislature relating to the same subjectmatter must be construed in pari materia. Starr v. City of Gary, 1934, 206 Ind. 196, 200, 188 N.E. 775; Olszewski v. Stodola, supra, 1948, 226 Ind. 639, 643, 82 N.E.2d 256.
Section 17 of Ch. 319, supra, is a limitation upon, and provides certain exceptions to Section 18 of Ch. 319, supra, which provides that the Act shall be in full force and effect on and after January 1, 1958.
The first sentence of § 17, supra, provides that where any provision of the Act increases the salary of any county official in a county in classes 1 and 2, it shall become operative on the effective date of the Act. However, the next sentence specifically provides that no provision of the Act shall apply to any county official in classes 1 and 2, during his present term of office, if it decreases the aggregate sum now received by such official, unless he should elect to come under the new salary schedule as provided in the Act. Allen County is in class 2, and appellee has not elected to come under the new salary schedule.
The provision for the salary of the county assessor in class 2 counties, as it appears in § 8 of the Act, is less than the aggregate sum that appellee received in each of the first three years of his term of office and is less than he would receive in 1958, the last year of his present term of office, if his aggregate compensation is measured by the provisions of § 13, ch. 246 of the Acts of 1949, being § 49-1041, Burns' 1951 Replacement, and Ch. 285, § 1 of the Acts of 1937, and Ch. 230, § 1 of the Acts of 1949, being §§ 7-2407 and 7-2408, Burns' 1953 Replacem...
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