Combs v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana

• Decision Date: 08 April 1933
• Citation: 59 S.W.2d 525,166 Tenn. 88
• Parties: COMBS v. STANDARD OIL CO. OF LOUISIANA.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

59 S.W.2d 525

166 Tenn. 88

COMBS v. STANDARD OIL CO. OF LOUISIANA.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

April 8, 1933

Appeal from Circuit Court, Davidson County; E. F. Langford, Judge.

Action by C. E. Combs against the Standard Oil Company of Louisiana. To review a judgment dismissing the suit, plaintiff brings error.

Affirmed.

Shriver Travis & Shriver, of Nashville, for plaintiff in error.

Anderson Aust, McGugin & Evans, of Nashville, for defendant in error.

MCKINNEY Justice.

This is a suit to recover damages for the alleged breach of a contract of employment. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the declaration and dismissed the suit. Plaintiff has appealed, and insists that the trial court was in error in dismissing his suit.

The declaration alleges that plaintiff was employed by defendant on November 12, 1929, to operate its filling station on the Murfreesboro roAD, near Nashville, and in violation of the written contract of employment the defendant wrongfully discharged him on September 26, 1931.

At the time of said employment, defendant was operating said filling station under a five-year lease, which expired in October 1934, and plaintiff insists that his employment was coterminous with said lease. But the lease contract provides for its termination upon thirty days' notice to the lessor, and the lessee was also given an option to purchase the property any time during the lease for $6,000. The lease was therefore of uncertain duration, but plaintiff insists that so long as said lease was in effect he was to operate this filling station.

On the other hand, defendant insists that plaintiff was not employed for any definite time, and hence the contract could be terminated at will.

In section 1 of the agreement it is provided: "Said employment shall continue so long as said second party complies with the terms and conditions herein set forth."

The general rule governing employments of this character is thus stated in 39 Corpus Juris, 71, 72:

"A contract of employment for an indefinite term may, in the United States, be terminated at the will of either party. A contract for permanent employment where the consideration is paid wholly or partly in ADvance, as by the relinquishment of a claim for personal injuries, or which is supported by a consideration other than the promise to render services, is not such an indefinite contract as to come within the rule. But a contract for permanent employment, so long as it is satisfactorily performed, which is not supported by any consideration other than the obligation of service to be performed on the one hand and wages to be paid on the other, is terminable at the pleasure of either party."

To illustrate, in the following cases it was held that the employment was at will:

Willcox & Gibbs Sewing Machine Co. v. Ewing, 141 U.S. 627, 12 S.Ct. 94, 97, 35 L.Ed. 882: "Violation of the spirit of the agreement 'shall be sufficient cause for its abrogation."'

Clarke v. Atlantic Stevedoring Co. (C. C.) 163 F. 423: "I have work immediately for 200 colored longshoremen, and can guarantee the above number continuous work, providing they are good men. *** We propose to keep colored men at work as long as they fulfill their part of the program."

Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Offutt, 99 Ky. 427, 36 S.W. 181, 182, 59 Am. St. Rep. 467: "That said regular work would continue so long as this plaintiff did faithful and honest work for the defendant."

St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Matthews, 64 Ark. 398, 42 S.W. 902, 904, 39 L. R. A. 467: "Appellant agreed *** not to discharge him without just cause, to promote him according to certain grADes of service, and, when it saw fit to reduce the number of its engineers, to discharge them in the order of their juniority."

Rape v. Mobile & O. R. Co., 136 Miss. 38, 100 So. 585, 35 A. L. R. 1424: "Your job is permanent if your work is satisfactory."

In Arentz v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 249 N.Y. 439, 164 N.E. 342, 344, 62 A. L. R. 231, 234, the court said:

"Wherever these words 'permanent employment,' have been used in contracts which have been mADe between employer and employee, under circumstances as they appear in this case, they have been held to mean a steADy employment, a steADy job, a position of some permanence, as contrasted with a temporary job or a temporary employment. Standing alone and by themselves, they do not mean life employment. Sullivan v. Detroit, Y. & A. A. R. Co., 135 Mich. 661, page 671, 64 L. R. A. 673, 106 Am. St. Rep. 403, 98 N.W. 756. An agreement to give a person permanent employment means nothing more than that the employment is to continue indefinitely and until one or the other of the parties wishes for some good reason to sever the relation. Lord v. Goldberg, 81 Cal. 596, 15 Am. St. Rep. 82, 22 P. 1126; Rape v. Mobile & O. R. Co., 136 Miss. 38, 35 A. L. R. 1422, 100 So. 585; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Marshall, 136 U.S. 393, 34 L.Ed. 385, 10 S.Ct. 846; Perry v. Wheeler, 12 Bush (75 Ky.) 541."

Nothing further appearing, upon the authorities cited, the employment of plaintiff was at will, and this conclusion is not seriously controverted; but it is insisted that section 11 of the contract shows an intent that the employment was to continue so long as the lease, referred to above, was in effect. Said provision is as follows:

"It is understood that first party holds the premises above described under a lease and that this contract shall terminate and end with the termination of

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