Comeaux v. Comeaux, 09
| Decision Date | 13 March 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 09,09 |
| Citation | 767 S.W.2d 500 |
| Parties | Jessie COMEAUX, Appellant, v. Barbara Ann COMEAUX, Appellee. 88 042 CV. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Proceeding arising out of a prior divorce suit. The instant legal action is to enforce child support. Barbara Comeaux admitted that she had personally signed and approved the necessary papers when Steven Comeaux, a child of the marriage, had dropped out of Westbrook Senior High School on March 11, 1986. Under cross-examination, Mrs. Comeaux stated that she was seeking an additional $19,000 as a result of what she referred to as "this contract". Mrs. Comeaux was referring to an agreement incident to the prior divorce suit.
In February, 1985, Steven moved into the home of Mr. Jessie Comeaux and stayed with him for some time thereafter. At one point in time, for contempt purposes only, the child support was reduced by the court to $115.00 per week. Mrs. Comeaux conceded that Mr. Comeaux had never been in arrearage after that modification. Mrs. Comeaux contended that the payments were stopped when Steven went to live with his father in February, 1985, but the legal proceeding to change formally the court-ordered conservatorship did not take place until the following August. During those intervening months, Mr. Comeaux was placing a certain amount of the child support money into an account in Steven's name.
The agreement incident to divorce concerning child support was to the effect that Mrs. Comeaux was to receive support for Steven, the youngest son, until he reached eighteen years of age. She further conceded the child support was for the benefit of the child. Mrs. Comeaux testified that Steven moved out of her home in February of 1985. The parties had agreed that $200.25 per week would be the child support in the divorce agreement.
Mr. Comeaux testified that, when the custody of Steven was formally changed, Barbara did not show up for the hearing. Barbara took the position that she was only trying to enforce the agreement through the date that Steven dropped out of high school in March, 1986. At that time Steven was living at his father's house. Steven was twenty at the time of the hearing.
The agreement incident to the divorce provides that Jessie is to pay Barbara "child support in the amount of $200.25 per week", payable to the Jefferson County Child Support Office, and to make a like payment each week until the youngest child, Steven, reaches the age of eighteen years. There were other provisions for the support of the child, Jessie agreeing to pay certain medical, dental, hospital and doctor expenses.
Other separate parts of the said agreement provide clearly for the disposition of all property in considerable detail. In the agreement, the parties requested the divorce court to approve the agreement and to include the settlement agreement in the divorce decree. The agreement was approved by the trial judge who, apparently, treated the matter as a property settlement and also as a separate child support agreement. As we construe the agreement incident to the divorce, the property settlement was separate, distinct and independent of the child support provisions. Clearly, the child support provisions were not a part of the property settlement. In other words, the child support was not in lieu of, or a part of, the property settlement. The document clearly demonstrates that Barbara was not to look to or to obtain the child support payments as a part of her property settlement.
There was a prior court order entered decreeing that the child support arrearage was not modified and that the Movant Jessie, was not relieved from the payment of the same; but that Jessie was not in contempt of court. Jessie was to continue to pay the arrearage at the rate of $50.00 per week.
The record reflects that, on August 20, 1985, the court changed the managing conservatorship of Steven from Barbara Ann Comeaux to Jessie Comeaux. The court further stated, in its Judgment, that Jessie was to have paid $115.00 per week from February 20, 1983 through February 10, 1985, when Steven, the only minor child in question in this proceeding, moved in with Jessie. The court ruled that Jessie was current on all child support, under its orders, through February 10, 1985.
After August 20, 1985, there was no further court-ordered child support payable to the Jefferson County Child Support Office for the use of Steven.
In July, 1987, Barbara Comeaux filed a motion to enforce the child support agreement incident to the divorce. Following a trial, on December 1, 1987, the trial court awarded judgment to the Appellee in the sum of $19,244.50 covering the period from August 8, 1979, through March 11, 1986. Findings of Fact and a separate Conclusions of Law were made. The appeal has been duly perfected by Jessie, who complains of the award of a money judgment.
The issue, looking at the reality of the surrounding circumstances, we conclude, is whether the court ordered change of conservatorship, concerning Steven, ends the child support obligation from Jessie to Barbara. We hold, under this record, that it does.
Barbara, by the property settlement, we conclude, was fully and amply protected in all her property rights. The child support payments in question here were, in reality, for the sole benefit of Steven. As stated above, Steven went to live and reside with his father in February of 1985, but the court did not change the conservatorship rights until August of 1985. We conclude that it is sound policy that, after a child of the age of Steven actually moved in with his father and several months later the court changed the conservatorship to the father, there is no further valid reason to require the father to continue the purely child support payments which were for the sole benefit of Steven. Since the child support payments are decreed so that the non-custodial parent may, or must, provide support for the child; then, when the custody changes from one parent to the other by court order, the child support agreement has no further efficacy.
There is, indeed, under this record a most material change in circumstances, since the beneficiary of the agreement; that is to say, Steven, is no longer benefitted by Jessie paying support to Barbara. The child support agreement, then, insofar as Jessie's payments to Barbara, should come to an end. In the realities of modern life, this is a paramount condition subsequent that would supercede the previous child support...
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