Comer v. Jesco, Inc., Civil Action No. 1:96cv173-D-D (N.D. Miss. 9/__/1997)
| Decision Date | 01 September 1997 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:96cv173-D-D. |
| Parties | PAULA COMER, PLAINTIFF, v. JESCO, INC., DEFENDANT. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
Presently before the court is the motion of the Defendant, Jesco, Inc. ("Jesco"), for the entry of summary judgment on its behalf as against all of the Plaintiff's claims. Finding that the motion is well taken, the court shall grant it and dismiss the Plaintiff's claims.
The Defendant Jesco, Inc. ("Jesco"), first employed the Plaintiff Paula Comer on June 27, 1983, as a material handler. She remained employed in several positions with Jesco until 1993, when she volunteered to take part in a reduction in force. Jesco hired the Plaintiff again in December of 1994 as an electrician. During the summer of 1995, Jesco hired Michael Williams as a foreman at Jesco's Cooper Tire project, and declined to promote the Plaintiff to that position.
The Plaintiff has filed the present action claiming that the Defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1965 by discriminating against her because of her gender in failing to promote her to the position of foreman that was ultimately filled by Michael Williams. Further, the Plaintiff charges that Jesco violated the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d), et seq., by not paying her a wage equivalent to that of male electricians at Jesco. Finally, the Plaintiff charges that the Defendant's actions constitute the state law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Defendant has moved for summary judgment as against all of the Plaintiff's claims.
Summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The burden rests upon the party seeking summary judgment to show to the district court that an absence of evidence exists in the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see Jackson v. Widnall, 99 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir.1996); Hirras v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 95 F.3d 396, 399 (5th Cir.1996). Once such a showing is presented by the moving party, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate, by specific facts, that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Texas Manufactured Housing Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir.1996); Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452, 455 (5th Cir.1994). Substantive law will determine what is considered material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 40 (5th Cir.1996). Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see City of Nederland, 101 F.3d at 1099; Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir.1995). Further, "[w]here the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see City of Nederland, 101 F.3d at 1099.
Finally, all facts are considered in favor of the non-moving party, including all reasonable inferences therefrom. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254; Banc One Capital Partners Corp. v. Kneipper, 67 F.3d 1187, 1198 (5th Cir.1995); Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 455 (5th Cir.1994); Matagorda County v. Russell Law, 19 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir.1994). However, this is so only when there is "an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994); Guillory v. Domtar Industries Inc., 95 F.3d 1320, 1326 (5th Cir.1996); Richter v. Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 83 F.3d 96, 97 (5th Cir.1996). In the absence of proof, the court does not "assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (emphasis omitted); see Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed. 695 (1990).
Under the Equal Pay Act, an employer is prohibited from discriminating "between employees on the basis of sex . . . for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); see Ussery v. Louisiana, 962 F. Supp. 922, 930 (W.D. La. 1997) (citing Timmer v. Michigan Dept. of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833, 843 (6th Cir. 1997)). To establish a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act, Plaintiff must demonstrate that:
(1) her employer is subject to the Act;
(2) she performed work in a position requiring equal skill, effort and responsibility under similar working conditions; and
(3) she was paid less than members of the opposite sex providing the basis for comparison. Chance v. Rice Univ., 984 F.2d 151, 153 (5th Cir.1993); Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 722-23 (5th Cir.1986). A showing of "equal work" requires only that the Plaintiff prove that the "skill, effort and responsibility" required in the performance of the compared jobs is "substantially equal." Peters v. City of Shreveport, 818 F.2d 1148, 1153 (5th Cir.1987); Jones, 793 F.2d at 723; Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041, 1049 (5th Cir. 1973). Unlike a claim arising under Title VII, however, the plaintiff asserting a claim under the Equal Pay Act need not demonstrate discriminatory intent. Peters, 818 F.2d at 1153. If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burdens of production and of persuasion1 shift to the employer to demonstrate as an affirmative defense that the difference in wages is justified by one of the exceptions specified under the Equal Pay Act. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 2229, 41 L.Ed.2d 1, 11 (1974); Jones, 793 F.2d at 722; Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1136 (5th Cir. 1983). The Act provides exceptions for disparate wage payments made pursuant to:
1) a seniority system;
) a merit system;
) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality; or
) a differential based upon any other factor other than sex.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); see Peters, 818 F.2d at 1153; Tarango v. Johnson & Johnson Medical, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 1285, 1289 (W.D. Tex. 1996).
It does not appear in dispute that the Defendant is an "employer" under the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (); Welch v. Laney, 57 F.3d 1004, 1010 (11th Cir. 1995); Wirtz v. Lone Star Steel Co., 405 F.2d 668, 669-70 (5th Cir.1968) (). Jesco does, however, dispute that the Plaintiff is capable of establishing the remaining factors of her Equal Pay Act prima facie case.
With regard to the second factor — that she performed work in a position requiring equal skill, effort and responsibility under similar working conditions — this court is of the opinion that genuine issues of material fact exist which preclude a definitive ruling at the summary judgment stage. The Defendant charges that Williams, Prescott, and Sparks (i.e., the electricians paid more than the Plaintiff), all had different job functions2 from those of the Plaintiff during the relevant time period. Particularly, Jesco argues that Williams, Prescott and Sparks were delegated computer programming duties not performed by the Plaintiff. The importance of these computer skills, Jesco urges, are of paramount importance to the Defendant. Questions of fact nevertheless remain by which a reasonable factfinder could determine that the Plaintiff could establish this factor. It must be remembered that the Plaintiff need not show that the comparable jobs were identical, but need only show that the job functions were "substantially equal." This court is not informed, for example, of the percentage of work time that Williams, Prescott and Sparks actually spend performing programming functions. If only a minimal portion of their work day is spent in this fashion, then this distinction alone would be insufficient to take their job functions outside the realm of being "substantially equal" to that of the Plaintiff. Genuine issues of material fact remain in this regard, and the Defendant is not entitled to the entry of a judgment as a matter of law on this element of the Plaintiff's prima facie case.
When looking to the final element of her prima facie case, however, the court finds that the Plaintiff is incapable of demonstrating that she "was paid less than members of the opposite sex providing the basis for comparison." While there is evidence before the court that at least three Jesco male electricians were paid higher wages than the Plaintiff, the proof also demonstrates that at least three other male electricians were paid wages lower than that of the Plaintiff.3 Ms. Comer has failed to demonstrate, or even argue to this court, that the electricians named by the Defendant who were paid less than the Plaintiff are somehow not employed in comparable positions to that of the Plaintiff within the meaning of the Equal Pay Act. The existence of male employees who are paid less than the Plaintiff does not automatically preclude an action under the Equal Pay Act, but the Plaintiff must at least demonstrate facts which justify the inference of discrimination. In this case, there appear to be just as many male electricians at Jesco paid less than the...
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