Comer v. State

• Citation: 29 S.E. 501,103 Ga. 69
• Parties: COMER v. STATE.
• Decision Date: 26 November 1897
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

29 S.E. 501

103 Ga. 69

COMER v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia

November 26, 1897

Syllabus by the Court.

1. For the purpose of construing and ascertaining the meaning of an act passed by the general assembly, and after the date of its enactment incorporated in the present Code of this state, it is legitimate and proper to examine and consider the original act and its title; and, whatever result would follow where the terms of a Code section vary materially from those of the act from which it was codified, if such a section is in substantially the same words as those used in the act from which it was taken, the language employed in such section should receive the same construction as would be given thereto upon a construction of the act itself.

2. Applying the rule above laid down to the act of December 20 1893, "for the protection of union labels, trademarks and form of advertisement, and providing penalties for counterfeiting the same," that act was designed exclusively for the protection of labels, trade-marks, and forms of advertisement adopted by associations or unions of workingmen; and consequently the provisions of sections 252, 253, and 254 of the Penal Code have no application to any other labels, trade-marks, or forms of advertisement.

Error from criminal court of Atlanta; J. D. Berry, Judge.

Action by the state against D. B. Comer for counterfeiting certain labels, and using the same for the sale of goods. Defendant's demurrer to the accusation was overruled, and he brings error. Reversed.

Glenn & Rountree, for plaintiff in error.

Jas. F O'Neill and Rosser & Carter, for the State.

LUMPKIN P.J.

On December 20, 1893, the general assembly passed "An act for the protection of union labels, trademarks and form of advertisement, and providing penalties for counterfeiting the same." Acts 1893, p. 134. The provisions of sections 1, 2, and 5 of this statute, in so far as they render certain acts indictable, are incorporated almost literally in sections 252, 253, and 254 of the present Penal Code. It is certain that, in codifying these sections of the act, no material change in their terms was made. In other words, the language employed in the Code sections is substantially the same as that employed in the statute, and it is clear that no change of meaning can have resulted from the process of codification. The title to the act does not appear in the Code. Dealing with the Code sections as they now stand, this court is called upon to determine whether or not they have any application to labels, trademarks, or forms of advertisement other than those adopted by associations or unions of workingmen. The question thus presented arose in the following manner: An accusation against D. B. Comer tried in the criminal branch of the city court of Atlanta, in several counts charged him with certain violations of the above-mentioned sections of the Code, in that he made counterfeits of a genuine label of the Carter Medicine Company, and used the same for the purpose of selling certain bottles of pills to which the counterfeit labels were attached, and also used a counterfeit of the genuine label of this medicine company, knowing the same to be a counterfeit. It was not alleged in the indictment that the Carter Medicine Company was an association or union of workingmen, or that any person connected with this company had any connection with any such union or association. The accused demurred to the accusation, on the ground that it contained no sufficient charge of any violation of the criminal laws of this state; the demurrer being predicated upon the proposition that the Code sections referred to, and upon which the accusation was unquestionably founded, were not intended to prohibit "the use of counterfeits or limitations of the labels, trade-marks, or forms of advertisement of any person, association, or union rather than a person, association, or union representing, connected with, or comprising a labor union." The demurrer was overruled, and the accused excepted.

The ruling of the trial judge was manifestly made upon the idea that the doing of the several acts alleged against Comer constituted indictable offenses, though the Carter Medicine Company was not a labor association or union of any kind. The court below necessarily held that these sections of the Code protected any kind of a company using labels, etc., in its business. We have, after careful deliberation, reached a contrary conclusion. As we understand it, the duty devolves upon us of ascertaining and announcing the true intent and meaning of these Code sections with reference to the question above indicated. We wish to state distinctly that we are not now undertaking to deal with the question which would be presented if the terms of these sections varied materially from those used in the act from which they were codified that is to say, we are not now endeavoring to construe that portion of the act of December 16, 1895, which declares that the Code of laws prepared under the authority of the general assembly by the codifiers therein named "is hereby adopted and made of force as the Code of Georgia," or determine what result would follow if in any instance it should hereafter be shown that the codifiers have used language manifestly having a different meaning from that contained in a statute which they were seeking to incorporate into the Code. We wish also to explicitly state in this connection that we are not now attempting to pass upon the question whether or not legislative provisions unconstitutional, because embraced in the body of an act, and not referred to in its title, would, after insertion in the Code, become constitutional because of its adoption in the manner above stated. The questions just referred to are important and far-reaching; and as the...