Comingore v. Shenandoah Artificial Ice, Power, Heat & Light Co.
| Decision Date | 24 June 1929 |
| Docket Number | 39225 |
| Parties | MRS. FLOYD COMINGORE (now Mrs. Verna Griffin), Appellant, v. SHENANDOAH ARTIFICIAL ICE, POWER, HEAT & LIGHT COMPANY et al., Appellees |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Page District Court.--EARL PETERS, Judge.
This case involved an application made under the Workmen's Compensation Act to the industrial commissioner for a hearing over a disagreement concerning the period during which compensation payments were payable, and asking that, upon such hearing, an order be entered terminating compensation payments as of the date of the remarriage of the surviving spouse, and requiring restitution of any payments made after such remarriage, and granting appellees such further, other and different relief as may be equitable and just in the premises. The defense pleaded was a settlement and estoppel a prior award, want of jurisdiction on the part of the commissioner, that the applicant could not maintain the action, and that the statute was unconstitutional. The commissioner granted the relief prayed. An appeal was taken to the district court, where the decision of the commissioner was affirmed. The claimant appeals.--Modified and affirmed.
Modified and affirmed.
Ferguson & Ferguson and C. R. Barnes, for appellant.
Stipp Perry, Bannister & Starzinger and Wilson, Keenan & Millhone, for appellees.
DE GRAFF, J.
This is a compensation case, and the matter in issue finds its origin in a dispute between the parties in interest. This dispute has to do with the meaning of a memorandum of settlement approved by the industrial commissioner. The insurance carrier, Globe Indemnity Company, on account of said dispute with the appellant, Mrs. Floyd Comingore, widow of the deceased employee, but later Mrs. Verna Griffin, by fact of her remarriage, filed an application on February 15, 1924, alleging that, although the form of memorandum of settlement recites "amount of compensation agreed upon $ 4,500," it was the intention and understanding of the parties that compensation was to be paid at the rate of $ 15 per week during the compensable period (300 weeks), as provided and prescribed by the Workmen's Compensation Act, and that, in the approval of said memorandum of settlement, the industrial commissioner contemplated that there would be no remarriage of the widow or any other event which would terminate the compensation period under the terms and the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, but that, notwithstanding the remarriage of the workman's widow and the termination of her right to compensation under the terms and provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, said claimant is still making a claim that she is entitled to the full compensation ($ 4,500), regardless of her remarriage. The application contained a prayer that the said matter be set down for hearing, that notice be given to the claimant, and that, upon a hearing, an order be entered herein, terminating said compensation as of the date of said remarriage, and requiring a restitution of any payments made after said remarriage. Claimant filed an answer and an amendment to the answer to said application, alleging divers matters, inter alia alleging that the industrial commissioner had no authority to make any modification or change as to the terms of said memorandum of settlement, for the reason that it was a binding, effective, and valid contract of settlement between the parties. This was the primary issue submitted to the industrial commissioner for decision.
We now turn to the salient facts, which are not disputed in the record before us. Floyd Comingore was an employee of the Shenandoah Artificial Ice, Power, Heat & Light Company. On September 18, 1920, he was injured while engaged in his employment, and as a result of said injury died, September 19, 1920. He was survived by his widow, the appellant herein, but left no children or other dependents. The wage of the employee was $ 116 per month. The medical and hospital expenses were paid, in the sum of $ 100. It is conceded by all parties that an agreement, or memorandum of settlement, was made with the dependent widow. It is also agreed that the employee's average wages were such that a weekly payment of $ 15 per week was to be the compensation, which amount was the maximum per week allowed by the Workmen's Compensation Act. It was agreed that Verna Comingore (the widow) was the surviving spouse of the deceased employee, and entitled to the compensation, as provided by the terms, conditions, and provisions of the act. It is undisputed that the appellant remarried on September 17, 1922. Appellee did not learn of the remarriage until in January, 1923, when the payments to the appellant were stopped. Subsequently, appellant commenced an action in the district court of Page County, to recover the payment of a lump sum which it was claimed by her had been agreed upon between her and the employer as the amount of compensation. With this matter we are not concerned. Upon the hearing before the industrial commissioner on the application in question, an order was entered, as prayed. An appeal was taken to the district court of Page County, and the order of the industrial commissioner was affirmed. It is from this decree from the Page County district court that this appeal is taken.
The instant record discloses further the concession of the parties hereto that the employer, Shenandoah Artificial Ice, Power, Heat & Light Company, had accepted the liability provided by this law, and was thereupon bound by the terms thereof. The parties also concede that there was a contract of hire between them, and that both parties thereunder elected to take compensation in accordance with the terms, conditions, and provisions of the law. It is further conceded by the parties that the death of the employee, Floyd Comingore, occurred while the contract of hire aforesaid was in full force and effect, and that the deceased left a surviving spouse, but no other dependents, within the terms as defined in the law.
We first turn to some of the provisions of the Compensation Act. This act expressly provides that the employer and the employee (or, when the employee is dead, the dependents, as defined) may enter into a memorandum agreement which shall be filed with the Iowa industrial commissioner by the employer or employee or dependent, and unless the commissioner shall, within 20 days, notify the employer and employee of his disapproval of the agreement, it shall stand approved, "and be enforceable for all purposes under the provisions of this act." Section 2477-m25, Code Supplement, 1913. The statute provides that the agreement must be in regard to the weekly compensation to become due, and not for any specified period or stated number of weeks, unless, under the provisions of the act, a specified period or number of weeks is distinctly set out in the schedule as applicable to a particular case. It is quite obvious that the provision that a memorandum of agreement so made shall be filed with the industrial commissioner is salutary, and was intended to bring the agreement of the parties with regard to compensation matters under the paternal care of the industrial commissioner. The act provides:
"Such agreement shall be approved by said commissioner only when the terms conform to the provisions of this act." Section 2477-m25.
The Workmen's Compensation Act is in derogation of the common law, and is to be construed according to its terms, and "as it reads." Wilcox v. Clarage Foundry & Mfg. Co., 199 Mich. 79 (165 N.W. 925). The industrial commissioner possesses such powers as are expressly granted, together with those arising from implications because necessary to the full exercise of the granted powers. Levangie's Case, 228 Mass. 213 (117 N.E. 200).
The case at bar does not involve a mistake of law, and the dispute between the parties has reference to the meaning to be given the memorandum agreement approved by the commissioner. The claimant alleges that it means one thing,--to wit, a contract involving a final settlement. This claim has no legal basis whatsoever. The insurance carrier claims that it means just what the Compensation Act intended, and that it is within the power of the commissioner to explain the approved memorandum and thereby end the controversy. This is the true viewpoint. This is not a certiorari proceeding, wherein the only question that could be involved is whether the inferior tribunal had jurisdiction to perform the act complained of.
The Iowa Compensation Act contemplates an appeal from any order or decree entered by the industrial commissioner, and this procedure was strictly followed in the instant case. The claimant did make answer to the application filed before the commissioner, and a hearing was had before said officer; and there can be no question, under the circumstances, that jurisdiction of the person and of the subject-matter did exist when the hearing on said application was had and the order of the commissioner filed from which an appeal was taken to the district court of Page County, Iowa, as provided by law. We cannot lightly cast aside the action of the commissioner, under the circumstances. We are not dealing with a contract, or the rescission of a contract, but simply with the meaning to be given to the language of a memorandum of settlement. Although the memorandum is technically correct, the claimant puts a construction thereon that is contrary to the provisions of the Compensation Act. Clearly the commissioner did not act without jurisdiction in making a finality of the dispute. The Compensation Act contemplates that relief shall be had, not through ...
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