Comitz v. Rife
| Decision Date | 11 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 21 CV 50385 |
| Citation | 597 F.Supp.3d 1235 |
| Parties | Sarah COMITZ, Plaintiff, v. Charles N. RIFE d/b/a Steel Appeal, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Anthony W. Peska, Timothy Sean Mahoney, Mahoney & Mahoney, LLC, Freeport, IL, for Plaintiff.
Andrew James Vella, Vella, Sparkman, Wheeler & Lund, Rockford, IL, for Defendant.
Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and (3). Dkt. 10. For the following reasons, the Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant and as such, Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.1
Plaintiff, an Illinois resident, alleges that she went to Steel Appeal, Defendant's tattoo and piercing business located in Iowa, for a piercing procedure in May 2020. An individual employed by Steel Appeal performed two piercings on Plaintiff as she requested. However, the individual utilized unsterilized and/or dirty needles, clamps, and other equipment necessary for performing piercings. Additionally, when the piercings were completed, the individual provided no explanation or aftercare instructions for the new piercings. About 7-10 days following the piercing procedure, Plaintiff began to have "uncontrollable pain." Pl.’s Compl., Dkt. 1. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's actions constituted willful and wanton conduct, negligent hiring, negligent retention, negligent supervision and professional negligence. Id.
In January 2022, Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) and improper venue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3). Def.’s Mot., Dkt. 10. In support, Defendant filed an affidavit in which he states that he is the owner of Steel Appeal, a tattoo and piercing business, which he operates solely in Iowa. Defendant also states that he currently resides in Iowa and did so at the time of the incident alleged in the complaint. The affidavit states further that Defendant does not solicit business in Illinois and has not made any attempts to market to citizens of Illinois. Finally, the affidavit states that all of Defendant and Steel Appeal's interactions with Plaintiff occurred in Iowa. Ex. 1, Dkt. 10-1.
Plaintiff responded to Defendant's motion and filed a counter-affidavit in which she states that Ex. 1, Dkt. 19-1.
Thereafter, as part of his reply, Defendant filed another affidavit. He states that, while he advertises on his business's Facebook page, he does not direct his advertisement toward Illinois, nor does he advertise in such a way as to try to entice residents of states with more restrictive COVID protocols to come to his shop in Iowa. The affidavit further states that Defendant's advertising consists of posts on his business page that anyone can "like" or follow, and that he is unaware of what Facebook does to show his posts to anyone who does not come to his page. Defendant states that he posted on his business Facebook page in March of 2020 that he was closing due to COVID protocols in Iowa and subsequently posted in May of 2020 that he was reopening for business, but that he "in no way inferred that he was encouraging citizens of any other state to come to his shop based on any Covid protocols." Ex. 1, Dkt. 20-1. Finally, Defendant states that Plaintiff contacted him about getting piercings via Facebook messenger and that they had no conversation as to her location or if she was from a different state. Along with the second affidavit, Defendant attached the above-referenced Facebook posts. The first post dated March 22, 2020, states that "per Governor Reynolds announcement today" Steel Appeal had to shut down. Id. A second post, dated May 13, 2020, announces that they "will be open at noon on the 15th" and lists the COVID protocols that will be followed at the shop. Id. Finally, Defendant attached a screenshot of a message thread between him and Plaintiff that shows her initiating a conversation by asking, "Are y'all taking appointments for piercings?" Id. The screenshot indicates that Defendant responded with the days and times he was "in," and Plaintiff thereafter stated that she would be coming in Saturday afternoon. Id.
Although a complaint need not include facts alleging personal jurisdiction, once a defendant moves to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of jurisdiction. Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc. , 751 F.3d 796, 799 (7th Cir. 2014). Since the Court is basing its determination solely on written materials and not an evidentiary hearing, Plaintiff must only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over Defendant to survive his motion to dismiss. Purdue Rsch. Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A. , 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003). Where, as here, Defendant has submitted evidence opposing the exercise of personal jurisdiction, Plaintiff must similarly submit affirmative evidence supporting the Court's exercise of jurisdiction. Matlin v. Spin Master Corp. , 921 F.3d 701, 705 (7th Cir. 2019). The Court will accept as true any facts contained in Defendant's affidavits that remain unrefuted by Plaintiff. See GCIU-Emp'r Ret. Fund v. Goldfarb Corp. , 565 F.3d 1018, 1020 n.1 (7th Cir. 2009) ; Joy v. Hay Grp., Inc. , No. 02 C 4989, 2003 WL 22118930, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2003) (). However, the Court will resolve disputes in the affidavits or evidence in favor of Plaintiff. See Leong v. SAP Am., Inc. , 901 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1062 (N.D. Ill. 2012) ().
A court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant "must be authorized by the terms of the forum state's personal-jurisdiction statute and also must comport with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." Felland v. Clifton, 682 F.3d 665, 672 (7th Cir. 2012) ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). The relevant Illinois statute states that a court may exercise jurisdiction on any basis permitted by the Illinois Constitution and the Constitution of the United States. 735 ILCS 5/2–209(c). "Thus, the separate questions regarding whether jurisdiction is proper under Illinois's long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause merge, and jurisdiction will be appropriate provided the federal constitutional requirements are satisfied." Tile Unlimited, Inc. v. Blanke Corp. , 47 F. Supp. 3d 750, 756 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (emphasis in original). "The Due Process Clause protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (citation omitted). It follows that a court "may subject a defendant to judgment only when the defendant has sufficient contacts with the sovereign such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ " J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro , 564 U.S. 873, 880, 131 S.Ct. 2780, 180 L.Ed.2d 765 (2011) (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement , 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) ).
There are two types of personal jurisdiction: general and specific. General jurisdiction exists only when the defendant's affiliations with the forum state "are so constant and pervasive as to render it essentially at home." Daimler AG v. Bauman , 571 U.S. 117, 122, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014) (citation omitted). Specific jurisdiction is "case-specific" and exists where the plaintiff's claim is "linked to the activities or contacts" of the defendant with Illinois. Kipp v. Ski Enterprise Corp. of Wisconsin, Inc. , 783 F.3d 695, 697-698 (7th Cir. 2015). In this case, Plaintiff does not specify whether she relies on general or specific personal jurisdiction but puts forth arguments for both. Defendant argues that neither type of personal jurisdiction properly lies here.
Specific jurisdiction exists where a defendant's suit-related conduct creates a substantial connection with the forum state. Walden v. Fiore , 571 U.S. 277, 284, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014) ; see Advanced Tactical , 751 F.3d at 801 () (emphasis in original). Such conduct is sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction only where the "defendant himself " creates contact with the forum state; the relevant factor is the "defendant's contacts with the forum itself, not with persons residing there." Walden , 571 U.S. at 277, 134 S.Ct. 1115. There are three essential requirements for a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant: (1) the defendant must have purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state or purposefully directed his activities at the state, (2) the plaintiff's alleged injury must have arisen out of the defendant's forum-related activities, and (3) the exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Curry v. Revolution Laboratories, LLC , 949 F.3d 385, 398 (7th Cir. 202...
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