Comm'r of Pub. Health v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n
| Decision Date | 25 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | SC 19046 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HEALTH v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION ET AL. |
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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald and Vertefeuille, Js.
Rosemary M. McGovern, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, attorney general, for the appellant-appellee (plaintiff).
Jonathan R. Donnellan, pro hac vice, with whom were Stephen H. Yuhan, pro hac vice, and, on the brief, Cameron Stracher, for the appellee-appellant (defendant Greenwich Time).
Lisa Fein Siegel, commission counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Colleen M. Murphy, general counsel, for the appellee (named defendant).
David B. Fein, United States attorney, John B. Hughes, assistant United States attorney, Michael S. Raab, pro hac vice, and H. Thomas Byron III, pro hac vice, filed a brief for the United States of America as amicus curiae.
McDONALD, J. Congress created the National Practitioner Data Bank (Practitioner Data Bank) and the Healthcare Integrity and Protection Data Bank (Healthcare Data Bank) as national clearinghouses for, inter alia, information from health care entities and licensing boards regarding adverse actions taken against physicians and other licensed health care practitioners. The question we must answer in the present case is whether records received from these federal data banks by a state agency authorized to request this confidential information can be subject to disclosure under our Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq.
The named defendant, the Freedom of Information Commission (commission), concluded that federal law permits disclosure of Practitioner Data Bank records if they are subject to disclosure under state law such as the act, but does not permit disclosure of Healthcare Data Bank records. The trial court dismissed the appeal of the plaintiff, the Commissioner of Public Health (department),1 from the commission's decision ordering the department to disclose Practitioner Data Bank records to a local newspaper, the defendant Greenwich Time (newspaper). The trial court also dismissed the newspaper's appeal from the commission's decision insofar as it had denied the newspaper's request for an order to disclose the Healthcare Data Bank records. The department appealed and the newspaper cross appealed from the trial court's judgment. We conclude that a public agency may not disclose to an unauthorized person or entity any records received from either the Practitioner Data Bank or the Healthcare Data Bank, although the agency may disclose to a member of the public information originating from the agency's own files if disclosure is otherwise required under the act. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment in part.
The record reveals the following undisputed facts. In August, 2005, a married couple, proceeding as Jane Smith and John Smith, filed an action against Ben Ramaley, a Greenwich obstetrician/gynecologist from whom the couple had obtained an intrauterine insemination procedure. They alleged that DNA tests of the twin girls born as a result of that procedure proved that Ramaley had inseminated Jane Smith with the sperm of someone other than her husband. The complaint further alleged, upon information and belief, that Ramaley intentionally inseminated Jane Smith with his own sperm. Before discovery was completed, the case was settled and the records were sealed.
In January, 2007, the department, which had issued Ramaley's license to practice as a physician and surgeon in Connecticut, received notification from the Prac-titioner Data Bank of the settlement of a malpractice action against Ramaley. See 42 U.S.C. § 11134 (c) (1) (2006). The department initiated an investigation and brought in a consultant from the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Robert J. Gfeller, to review Ramaley's conduct in connection with the case. In October, 2007, Gfeller issued a report finding gross violations of the standard of care by Ramaley, but no such violation with respect to the specific allegation that Ramaley had used his own sperm in the insemination procedure due to the absence of a DNA test that would give credible, positive evidence of that fact. Thereafter, the department and Ramaley entered into a consent order, designated as a public document, under which Ramaley did not contest the department's allegation that he had inseminated a patient with the wrong man's sperm, but also did not admit any wrongdoing or guilt. The order indicated that Ramaley no longer performed intrauterine insemination and that he had agreed to a reprimand on his license and a civil penalty of $10,000.
The newspaper learned of the department's response to the allegations against Ramaley, and in November, 2009, it sent a letter to the department making a request under the act for all records reviewed by Gfeller in connection with his report, including exhibit A, identified in the report as "National Practitioner Data Bank." After the department complied with the request in part but failed to produce, inter alia, exhibit A, the newspaper filed a complaint with the commission.2 At a hearing before the commission, the department argued that exhibit A contained both Practitioner Data Bank and Healthcare Data Bank records and that federal law provided a basis to withhold these records. The commission concluded that federal regulations barred disclosure of records received from the Healthcare Data Bank, but that other regulations pertaining to the Practitioner Data Bank did not bar disclosure of records received from that data bank.
The department and the newspaper both appealed from the commission's decision to the Superior Court, which thereafter affirmed the decision and rendered judgment dismissing the appeals. The trial court determined that the department was required to disclose records that it had received from the Practitioner Data Bank under this court's decision in Director of Health Affairs Policy Planning v. Freedom of Information Commission, 293 Conn. 164, 180 n.13, 977 A.2d 148 (2009), but that different regulatory language addressing Healthcare Data Bank records that was not considered in that case precluded disclosure of those records. Appeals by both parties followed.3 Thereafter, we granted permission to the United States of America to participate as amicus curiae.
On appeal, the department and the newspaper agree that the federal regulations governing confidentialityof Practitioner Data Bank and Healthcare Data Bank records should be construed to have the same effect, despite certain textual differences, but disagree as to the proper construction. The commission, which had taken the position in its decision that these textual differences compelled different treatment, represented at oral argument before this court that its position has changed in light of a recent amendment to the governing regulations brought to its attention by the amicus curiae that makes clear that records from both data banks are not subject to disclosure. The commission further contends that this amendment is clarifying and, therefore, should be applied as the governing interpretation in the present case. The amicus contends in its brief that the statutes and implementing regulations of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (federal agency) always have precluded disclosure of records received from both data banks, and that the recent amendments merely clarify the regulations at issue. We conclude that any ambiguities in the regulatory scheme have been dispelled by the clarifying amendment, under which the records are not subject to public disclosure under the act.
Because the present case requires interpretation of federal statutes and regulations, we must interpret this scheme in accordance with federal law.4 See Commissioner of Correction v. Freedom of Information Commission, 307 Conn. 53, 65-66, 52 A.3d 636 (2012); Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 253 Conn. 453, 470-71, 754 A.2d 128 (2000). Under federal law, ...
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