Comm'r of Pub. Safety v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n Tax Assessor of The Town of North Stonington v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n Judicial Branch v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n Afscme, s. 18617

• Decision Date: 28 June 2011
• Docket Number: 18618,18620.,Nos. 18617,18619,s. 18617
• Citation: 21 A.3d 737,301 Conn. 323
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY et al.v.FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.Tax Assessor of the Town of North Stonington et al.v.Freedom of Information Commission et al.Judicial Branchv.Freedom of Information Commission et al.AFSCME, Council 4, Locals 387, 391 and 1565v.Freedom of Information Commission et al.

301 Conn. 323

21 A.3d 737

COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY et al.

v.FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.Tax Assessor of the Town of North Stonington et al.

v.Freedom of Information Commission et al.Judicial Branch

v.Freedom of Information Commission et al.AFSCME, Council 4, Locals 387, 391 and 1565

v.Freedom of Information Commission et al.

Nos. 18617

18618

18619

18620.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 3, 2010.Decided June 28, 2011.

Stephen R. Sarnoski, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, former attorney general, and Terrence O'Neill and John E. Tucker, assistant attorneys general, for the appellants (plaintiff commissioner of public safety et al.).Frank N. Eppinger, Groton, for the appellants (plaintiff tax assessor of the town of North Stonington et al.).Viviana L. Livesay, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Adam P. Mauriello, for the appellant (plaintiff judicial branch).J. William Gagne, Jr., West Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Kimberly A. Cuneo, for the appellant (plaintiff AFSCME, Council 4, Locals 387, 391 and 1565).Lisa Fein Siegel, commission counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Colleen M. Murphy, general counsel, for the appellee (named defendant).ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, McLACHLAN and EVELEIGH, Js.ZARELLA, J.

The sole issue in these appeals is whether General Statutes § 1–217,¹ which prohibits public agencies from disclosing, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (act); General Statutes § 1–200 et seq.; the home addresses of various federal, state and local government officials and employees, is applicable to grand lists of motor vehicles ² and their component data provided to town assessors by the department of motor vehicles (department) pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 14–163.³ The plaintiffs, the commissioner of public safety, the commissioner of children and families, the commissioner of correction (state agencies), the judicial branch, Nicholas Mullane II and Darryl DelGrosso, as first selectman and assessor, respectively, of the town of North Stonington (town), and AFSCME, Council 4, Locals 387, 391 and 1565 (union), each appeal ⁴ from the judgments of the trial court dismissing their administrative appeals from the decision of the named defendant, the freedom of information commission (commission), ordering DelGrosso to provide to the complainant, Peter Sachs, an exact electronic copy of the file that the department had provided to the town pursuant to § 14–163. We conclude that § 1–217 applies to motor vehicle grand lists and their component data provided to the town assessors pursuant to § 14–163. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. On June 16, 2008, the complainant, who is licensed as an attorney and a private investigator, asked DelGrosso to provide him with an exact electronic copy of the file, known electronically as “MVR102.dat,” that the department had provided to DelGrosso pursuant to § 14–163 for use in preparing the town's motor vehicle grand list (electronic file).⁵ The various electronic files provided by the department ⁶ contain complete lists of all motor vehicles and snowmobiles garaged in a particular town, and registration information including each vehicle owner's name, registration address and birth date, as well as the vehicle's year, make, model and vehicle identification number. When DelGrosso creates the town's motor vehicle grand list, he modifies the electronic file prior to publicizing the list by, inter alia, redacting the registration addresses, which generally correspond to the residential addresses, of approximately forty town residents, including judges, state troopers and correction employees, which he identifies as protected from disclosure by § 1–217.⁷ On June 17, 2008, DelGrosso replied to the complainant that the entire electronic file was protected from disclosure pursuant to § 1–217, but offered to provide a version with the redaction of approximately forty names and addresses protected under that statute, if the complainant would compensate the town for DelGrosso's time, payable in advance.

On June 18, 2008, the complainant appealed from DelGrosso's denial of his request to the commission, and the plaintiffs subsequently intervened as parties to those proceedings.⁸ Following a contested case hearing, the commission accepted the report of its commissioner, who was acting as the hearing officer, and issued a decision ⁹ finding that the electronic file is the electronic version of the town's motor vehicle grand list and concluding that, under Davis v. Freedom of Information Commission, 47 Conn.Supp. 309, 790 A.2d 1188 (2001), aff'd, 259 Conn. 45, 787 A.2d 530 (2002) (per curiam), General Statutes § 12–55(a) does not permit redactions or omissions from the grand list that the assessor is required to lodge for public inspection. The commission determined that “the names and addresses of the people whose property comprises the motor vehicle grand list are both necessary and integral to the completeness and accuracy of the list, as well as the reasons why it is publicly available,” and that construing § 1–217 “to permit the [plaintiffs] to redact any names or residential addresses from the motor vehicle grand list would require finding an implicit repeal of § 12–55(a) ... and Connecticut's historical [practice] of making grand lists, including [those limited to] personal property grand lists, available to the public for correction and disputation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sachs v. Freedom of Information Commission, Docket No. FIC 2008–412 (January 14, 2009). The commission further concluded that § 1–217 “applies only to the agency for which a protected employee works,” and “does not exempt from disclosure names and residential addresses when they are part of grand lists.” Id. Accordingly, the commission ordered the town to provide to the complainant an exact electronic copy of the electronic file. Id.

The plaintiffs filed separate administrative appeals from the decision of the commission to the trial court pursuant to General Statutes §§ 4–183 and 1–206. After granting the plaintiffs' unopposed motions for a stay of the commission's decision, the trial court consolidated the five matters for a hearing and decision. Thereafter, the court issued a memorandum of decision concluding that the commission's factual determination that the electronic file was in essence the town's motor vehicle grand list was supported by substantial evidence, and that the plaintiffs' proffered interpretation of § 1–217 “is inconsistent with the long-standing right of the public to inspect the entire grand list.” The trial court noted that, although the court in Davis v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 47 Conn.Supp. at 309, 790 A.2d 1188, “did not consider the applicability of § 1–217 to the assessor's role, [that case recognizes] the well-recognized presumption in favor of openness in the preparation and dissemination of the § 12–55 grand list.” The trial court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that, based on the town's population, “full disclosure of the grand list would mean that the addresses of persons protected by § 1–217 would be easily revealed” because the compilation of names and addresses did “not identify any person as one in the § 1–217 class....” The trial court further concluded that “it would undercut the ‘harmony’ of § 12–55 with § 1–217 to allow or require the assessor to redact either the [electronic file] or the grand list before it becomes publicly available.” ¹⁰ Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgments dismissing the administrative appeals. These appeals followed.¹¹ See footnote 4 of this opinion.

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that § 12–55 is inapplicable to this case because the electronic file is not the motor vehicle grand list; rather, they argue it is raw data that the assessor must check for accuracy, including equalizing assessments, before taking an oath on the list pursuant to § 12–55(b). The plaintiffs further claim that, even if the electronic file is the equivalent of the motor vehicle grand list, the trial court improperly concluded that a grand list made public pursuant to § 12–55(a) is not subject to redaction under § 1–217. Finally, the state agencies claim that the enactment of Public Acts 2010, No. 10–110, § 22 (P.A. 10–110), has rendered these appeals moot by resolving the statutory issue conclusively in their favor.

I

As a threshold matter, we address the state agencies' claim, made in a supplemental authorities letter submitted pursuant to Practice Book § 67–10, that the enactment of P.A. 10–110, § 22, has rendered these appeals moot by resolving the statutory issue conclusively in their favor. In P.A. 10–110, § 22, the legislature amended § 14–163 by, inter alia, adding a new subsection (c) which provides: “No assessor or tax collector shall disclose any information contained in any list provided by the commissioner pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) of this section if the commissioner is not required to provide such information or if such information is protected from disclosure under state or federal law.” See also footnote 3 of this opinion.

“Whether an action is moot implicates a court's subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a question of law over which we exercise plenary review.... A case is considered moot if [the] court cannot grant the appellant any practical relief through its disposition of the merits....” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

[301 Conn. 333 , 21 A.3d 743]

Vincent Metro, LLC v. Yah Realty, LLC, 297 Conn. 489, 495, 1 A.3d 1026 (2010). As a jurisdictional matter, we disagree with the state agencies with respect to the potential effect of P.A. 10–110, § 22. Even if P.A. 10–110, § 22, is directly on point, operates retroactively and,...