Davis v. Freedom of Information Commission

Decision Date15 January 2002
Docket Number(SC 16598)
Citation259 Conn. 45,787 A.2d 530
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesPAMELA DAVIS v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION ET AL.

Borden, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.

John H. Barton, associate city attorney, for the appellant (plaintiff). Victor R. Perpetua, appellate attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Mitchell W. Pearlman, general counsel, for the appellee (named defendant).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff, Pamela Davis, the tax assessor of the city of Bridgeport, from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her appeal from an order of the named defendant, the freedom of information commission (commission).1 The commission had ordered the plaintiff to provide the complainant, Barbara Brennan, with access to the city's motor vehicle grand lists for 1997 and 1998, and to comply strictly with the provisions of General Statutes § 1-210 (a),2 formerly §1-19 (a).

The plaintiff claims that the federal Drivers Privacy Protection Act; 18 U.S.C. § 2721 et seq.;3 and General Statutes §§ 14-10,4 14-50a and 14-163, bar the disclosure of the motor vehicle grand lists in question. The plaintiff also claims that the grand lists are exempt from the public disclosure otherwise mandated by General Statutes § 12-55 (a)5 because "the phrase [in § 12-55 (a)] `except as otherwise specially provided by law' would encompass the enactment of the Federal [Drivers Privacy Protection Act], as well as the subsequent revision to ... § 14-10 creating the Connecticut privacy exemption."

Our examination of the record and briefs and our consideration of the arguments of the parties persuade us that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. The issues were resolved properly in the trial court's concise and well reasoned memorandum of decision. Davis v. Freedom of Information Commission, 47 Conn. Sup. 309, 790 A.2d 1188 (2001). Because that memorandum of decision fully addresses all arguments raised in this appeal, we adopt it as a proper statement of the issues and the applicable law concerning those issues. It would serve no useful purpose for us to repeat the discussion contained therein. See Kaluszka v. East Hartford, 60 Conn. App. 749, 752, 760 A.2d 1269 (2000).

The judgment is affirmed.

1. The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 65-1 and General Statues § 51-199 (c).

2. General Statutes § 1-210 (a) provides: "Except as otherwise provided by any federal law or state statute, all records maintained or kept on file by any public agency, whether or not such records are required by any law or by any rule or regulation, shall be public records and every person shall have the right to inspect such records promptly during regular office or business hours or to receive a copy of such records in accordance with the provisions of section 1-212. Any agency rule or regulation, or part thereof, that conflicts with the provisions of this subsection or diminishes or curtails in any way the rights granted by this subsection shall be void. Each such agency shall keep and maintain all public records in its custody at its regular office or place of business in an accessible place and, if there is no such office or place of business, the public records pertaining to such agency shall be kept in the office of the clerk of the political subdivision in which such public agency is located or of the Secretary of the State, as the case may be. Any certified record hereunder attested as a true copy by the clerk, chief or deputy of such agency or by such other person designated or empowered by law to so act, shall be competent evidence in any court of this state of the facts contained therein. Each such agency shall make, keep and maintain a record of the proceedings of its meetings."

3. Title 18 of the United States Code, § 2721 (1994 & Sup. 1999), provides: "Prohibition on release and use of certain personal information from State motor vehicle records "(a) In General.—Except as provided in subsection (b), a State department of motor vehicles, and any officer, employee, or contractor, thereof, shall not knowingly disclose or otherwise make available to any person or entity personal information about any individual obtained by the department in connection with a motor vehicle record.

"(b) Permissible Uses.—Personal information referred to in subsection (a) shall be disclosed for use in connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver safety and theft, motor vehicle emissions, motor vehicle product alterations, recalls, or advisories, performance monitoring of motor vehicles and dealers by motor vehicle manufacturers, and removal of non-owner records from the original owner records of motor vehicle manufacturers to carry out the purposes of titles I and IV of the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, the Automobile Information Disclosure Act (15 U.S.C. 1231 et seq.), the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.), and chapters 301, 305, and 321-331 of title 49, and may be disclosed as follows:

"(1) For use by any government agency, including any court or law enforcement agency, in carrying out its functions, or any private person or entity acting on behalf of a Federal, State, or local agency in carrying out its functions.

"(2) For use in connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver safety and theft; motor vehicle emissions; motor vehicle product alterations, recalls, or advisories; performance monitoring of motor vehicles, motor vehicle parts and dealers; motor vehicle market research activities, including survey research; and removal of non-owner records from the original owner records of motor vehicle manufacturers.

"(3) For use in the normal course of business by a legitimate business or its agents, employees, or contractors, but only—

"(A) to verify the accuracy of personal information submitted by the individual to the business or its agents, employees, or contractors; and

"(B) if such information as so submitted is not correct or is no longer correct, to obtain the correct information, but only for the purposes of preventing fraud by, pursuing legal remedies against, or recovering on a debt or security interest against, the individual.

"(4) For use in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding in any Federal, State, or local court or agency or before any self-regulatory body, including the service of process, investigation in anticipation of litigation, and the execution or enforcement of judgments and orders, or pursuant to an order of a Federal, State, or local court.

"(5) For use in research activities, and for use in producing statistical reports, so long as the personal information is not published, redisclosed, or used to contact individuals.

"(6) For use by any insurer or insurance support organization, or by a self-insured entity, or its agents, employees, or contractors, in connection with claims investigation activities, antifraud activities, rating or underwriting.

"(7) For use in providing notice to the owners of towed or impounded vehicles.

"(8) For use by any licensed private investigative agency or licensed security service for any purpose permitted under this subsection.

"(9) For use by an employer or its agent or insurer to obtain or verify information relating to a holder of a commercial driver's license that is required under chapter 313 of title 49.

"(10) For use in connection with the operation of private toll transportation facilities.

"(11) For any other use in response to requests for individual motor vehicle records if the State has obtained the express consent of the person to whom such personal information pertains.

"(12) For bulk distribution for surveys, marketing or solicitations if the State has obtained the express consent of the person to whom such personal information pertains.

"(13) For use by any requester, if the requester demonstrates it has obtained the written consent of the individual to whom the information pertains.

"(14) For any other use specifically authorized under the law of the State that holds the record, if such use is related to the operation of a motor vehicle or public safety.

"(c) Resale or Redisclosure.—An authorized recipient of personal information (except a recipient under subsection [b][11] or [12]) may resell or redisclose the information only for a use permitted under subsection (b) (but not for uses under subsection [b][11] or [12]). An authorized recipient under subsection (b)(11) may resell or redisclose personal information for any purpose. An authorized recipient under subsection (b)(12) may resell or redisclose personal information pursuant to subsection (b)(12). Any authorized recipient (except a recipient under subsection [b][11])that resells or rediscloses personal information covered by this chapter must keep for a period of 5 years records identifying each person or entity that receives information and the permitted purpose for which the information will be used and must make such records available to the motor vehicle department upon request.

"(d) Waiver Procedures.—A State motor vehicle department may establish and carry out procedures under which the department or its agents, upon receiving a request for personal information that does not fall within one of the exceptions in subsection (b), may mail a copy of the request to the individual about whom the information was requested, informing such individual of the request, together with a statement to the effect that the information will not be released unless the individual waives such individual's right to privacy under this section."

Title 18 of the United States Code, § 2722, provides: "Additional unlawful acts

"(a) Procurement for Unlawful Purpose.—It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to obtain or disclose personal information,...

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