Commercial Coin Laundry Systems v. Enneking, 24A01-0109-CV-359.

• Decision Date: 18 April 2002
• Docket Number: No. 24A01-0109-CV-359.,24A01-0109-CV-359.
• Citation: 766 N.E.2d 433
• Parties: COMMERCIAL COIN LAUNDRY SYSTEMS, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Stephen A. ENNEKING and Debbie Enneking, Appellee-Defendant.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

766 N.E.2d 433

COMMERCIAL COIN LAUNDRY SYSTEMS, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Stephen A. ENNEKING and Debbie Enneking, Appellee-Defendant.

No. 24A01-0109-CV-359.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

April 18, 2002.

John H. Watson, Sunman, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Neil R. Comer, Comer, Day & Ertel Law Office, Osgood, IN, Attorney for Appellee.

OPINION

ROBB, Judge.

Commercial Coin Laundry Systems ("Commercial Coin") appeals from the trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment and the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Debbie and Stephen Enneking. Commercial Coin also appeals the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the Ennekings. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Issues

Commercial Coin raises the following restated issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment for the Ennekings by finding that the foreign judgment on which Commercial Coin sued was void for lack of jurisdiction; and 2. Whether the trial court properly granted attorney's fees to the Ennekings.

Facts and Procedural History

In 1981, Robert Currence purchased land in Ripley County, Indiana. An unfinished residential building and a storage building were located on the property. The property was mortgaged to the Batesville State Bank on January 17, 1983. The residential building was apparently turned into apartments and the storage building was leased to Commercial Coin, an Illinois partnership, for operation as a laundry facility. A written lease, dated December 15, 1993, was executed by "Commercial Coin Laundry Systems" as the Lessee and "Debbie Enneking/Agent, Amber Oaks Apartments" as the Lessor. Appellant's App. at 34. Debbie Enneking is Robert Currence's daughter. The lease stated that it was to "be governed by the laws of the State of Illinois, with the courts of Cook County having sole and exclusive jurisdiction." Appellant's App. at 34. Commercial Coin installed its laundry equipment in the storage building and began operation in January of 1994.

Currence died on July 20, 1995. The mortgage on the property at that time was held by National City Bank as the successor to Batesville State Bank. The mortgage was several months in default at the time of Currence's death, and National City Bank was in the process of foreclosing on the property. Commercial Coin was notified by a March 28, 1997, letter from the attorney for Currence's estate advising that Currence had died, that the property was in foreclosure, that no one was maintaining the buildings, and that Commercial Coin might want to protect its equipment by moving it out of the storage building. Appellant's App. at 36. Commercial Coin did in fact remove its equipment, but notified the Estate that by doing so, it was not abandoning the premises or waiving any rights under the lease. Appellant's App. at 37.

On or about August 13, 1997, Commercial Coin filed a complaint against "Deborah Enneking and Steven[¹] Enneking, individually" in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, pursuant to the choice of law provision in the lease. The complaint alleged that the Ennekings were the current owners of the property, having inherited or purchased it from Currence, and that they had failed or refused to restore the premises to its original, operable condition, thereby preventing Commercial Coin from maintaining its laundry operations and breaching the lease. On February 20, 1998, the Illinois court entered a default judgment for Commercial Coin and against the Ennekings in the amount of $23,800, plus an additional $1,677.50 in costs and fees.

In the meantime, National City Bank and Debbie Enneking entered into a joint petition to transfer the encumbered property in lieu of foreclosure. The probate court of Franklin County, Indiana, approved the petition on September 25, 1997 and the property was conveyed on that date by a personal representative's deed from Currence's estate to National City Bank. Ultimately, Debbie Enneking acquired title to the property in her own name and is now the record owner of the property. On March 9, 1999, Commercial Coin filed in the Circuit Court of Ripley County, Indiana, a complaint on foreign judgment, seeking to enforce the Illinois default judgment against the Ennekings. The case was ultimately transferred to Franklin County, Indiana on the basis of venue. Both parties moved for summary judgment on the complaint. Following a hearing, the trial court entered the following order:

... Upon reviewing the materials designated by [Commercial Coin] and the [Ennekings], and hearing argument of counsel, the Court finds:

...

That the foreign judgment rendered in Cook County, Illinois, against the [Ennekings], upon which this cause is based, is void for lack of jurisdiction;

That [Commercial Coin's] Motion For Summary Judgment should be denied;

That [the Ennekings'] Cross-Motion[s] For Summary Judgment ... should be granted,

That a hearing should be scheduled to determine [the Ennekings'] request for an award of attorney fees and costs.

Appellant's Appendix at 12. Following a further hearing on the issue of attorney's fees, the trial court entered an order awarding $8,800 in attorney's fees to the Ennekings. Commercial Coin then instituted this appeal. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

I. Summary Judgment

All parties filed motions for summary judgment in this case. The trial court denied Commercial Coin's motion and granted the Ennekings' cross-motions.

A. Standard of Review

Our standard of review of a summary judgment order is well-settled: summary judgment is appropriate if the "designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). Relying on specifically designated evidence, the moving party bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I/N Tek v. Hitachi Ltd., 734 N.E.2d 584, 586 (Ind. Ct.App.2000), trans. denied. If the moving party meets these two requirements, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to set forth specifically designated facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. A genuine issue of material fact exists where facts concerning an issue which would dispose of the litigation are in dispute or where the undisputed material facts are capable of supporting conflicting inferences on such an issue. Gilman v. Hohman, 725 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000), trans. denied. Even if the facts are undisputed, summary judgment is inappropriate where the record reveals an incorrect application of the law to the facts. Id.

The party that lost in the trial court has the burden to persuade the appellate court that the trial court erred. Estate of Hofgesang v. Hansford, 714 N.E.2d 1213, 1216 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). On appeal, we are bound by the same standard as the trial court, and we consider only those matters which were designated at the summary judgment stage. Interstate Cold Storage v. General Motors Corp., 720 N.E.2d 727, 730 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999),trans. denied. We do not reweigh the evidence, but we liberally construe all designated evidentiary material in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Estate of Hofgesang, 714 N.E.2d at 1216. A grant of summary judgment may be affirmed upon any theory supported by the designated materials. Id.

The fact that the parties make cross-motions for summary judgment does not alter our standard of review. Instead, we must consider each motion separately to determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Metal Working Lubricants Co. v. Indianapolis Water Co., 746 N.E.2d 352, 355 (Ind.Ct.App.2001)

B. Validity of Foreign Judgment

1. Collateral Attack on Foreign Judgment

A judgment of a foreign court is open to collateral attack for want of personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction. American Mgmt., Inc. v. Riverside Nat'l Bank, 725 N.E.2d 930, 933 (Ind. Ct.App.2000). Thus, before an Indiana court is bound by a foreign judgment, it may inquire into the jurisdictional basis for that judgment; if the first court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter or relevant parties, full faith and credit need not be given. Lucas v. Estate of Stavos, 609 N.E.2d 1114, 1120 (Ind.Ct.App. 1993), trans. denied. A foreign judgment which is regular and complete on its face is presumed valid. Id. The party attacking the judgment of a sister state has the burden of rebutting the presumption of validity and of showing that the sister state lacked jurisdiction. Id. at 1117. In assessing a collateral attack of a foreign judgment, we apply the law of the state where the judgment was rendered. Id. at 1116-17. A judgment which is void in the state where it was entered is also void in Indiana. Jenkins v. Futch, 640 N.E.2d 379, 381 (Ind.Ct.App.1994).

2. Illinois Court's Jurisdiction Over the Ennekings

Commercial Coin filed a complaint in Cook County, Illinois, against "Deborah Enneking and Steven [sic] Enneking, individually." Appellant's App. at 28. The Illinois court granted a default judgment to Commercial Coin on its complaint. The Ennekings contended on summary judgment that the Illinois court did not have jurisdiction over either of them such that the default judgment entered against them was void. The trial court agreed, granting summary judgment for the Ennekings on Commercial Coin's complaint on foreign judgment. Commercial Coin now alleges that this determination was in error.

a. Stephen Enneking

We note first that Commercial Coin makes no argument on appeal regarding the Illinois court's jurisdiction over Stephen Enneking. The undisputed evidence designated to the trial court in support of the Ennekings' cross-motions for...