Commercial Factors of Denver v. Clarke & Waggener
Decision Date | 12 April 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 83CA0510,83CA0510 |
Citation | 684 P.2d 261 |
Parties | COMMERCIAL FACTORS OF DENVER, a Colorado corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CLARKE & WAGGENER, a professional corporation, Defendant-Appellee. . III |
Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Erickson, Holmes, Nicholls, Kusic & Sussman, John B. Kusic, Michael J. Shidler, Denver, for plaintiff-appellant.
Carpenter & Klatskin, P.C., Willis Carpenter, Janell Kinzie, Denver, for defendant-appellee.
In this declaratory judgment action, plaintiff, Commercial Factors of Denver (Commercial), appeals a judgment declaring that a deed of trust for the benefit of defendant, Clarke & Waggener, P.C. (C & W), is a valid encumbrance on property owned by Commercial. We affirm.
Raynard and Susan Fenster, husband and wife, owned in joint tenancy and occupied a house and lot (the subject property) in northwest Denver. Neither of the Fensters ever recorded any document declaring their homestead rights therein. See § 38-41-202(4), C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol. 16A). However, it was subject to the automatic homestead exemption provided for in § 38-41-202(1), C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol. 16A).
In 1979, two documents, a deed of trust and a note, were prepared for signature of both Fensters. The deed of trust purported to convey all of the subject property to the public trustee to secure a promissory note of the same date, amount not stated, payable with 12% interest to C & W on January 1, 1980. The deed of trust contained a waiver and release of homestead rights. The note was for $10,000. Raynard, but not Susan, signed both documents. The deed of trust was recorded the day after it was signed.
In 1980, the Fensters borrowed $35,000 from Commercial and secured that loan by a deed of trust on the subject property. The Fensters defaulted, Commercial foreclosed, and it acquired the property by public trustee's deed in 1981. Commercial demanded that C & W release its 1979 deed of trust. See § 38-35-109(3), C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol. 16A). When the demand was refused, this action was commenced.
In its complaint, Commercial sought a declaratory judgment that C & W's deed of trust is void in that (1) it attempts to encumber homesteaded property without being signed by both husband and wife and (2) it is an incomplete instrument because it does not include the amount of the indebtedness secured. It also sought damages and attorney's fees under § 38-35-109(3), C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol. 16A) for C & W's having recorded an invalid document purporting to create a lien against the property. C & W claimed that the deed of trust was valid, and counterclaimed for attorney's fees under § 13-17-101, et seq., C.R.S. (1983 Cum.Supp.), for having to defend against frivolous and groundless claims.
After trial, the court made detailed findings and conclusions. It then decreed that the C & W deed of trust is a valid instrument and does encumber the subject property. So holding, it entered judgment for C & W and against Commercial on its claims. Finding that the action was not groundless, it held in favor of Commercial and against C & W on its counterclaim. C & W has not cross-appealed.
Commercial's first contention on appeal is that, since the subject property was homesteaded, the signatures of both Raynard and Susan Fenster were necessary to encumber the property. We disagree.
It is undisputed the subject property was homesteaded solely by operation of the automatic provisions of § 38-41-202(1), C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol. 16A). Hence, the issue is whether, under the circumstances, Raynard could encumber his interest in the property so homesteaded without Susan's joining in the encumbrance. We hold that he can.
Section 38-35-118(1), C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol. 16A) provides in pertinent part "Except as provided in Section 38-41-202(3), to convey or encumber homsteaded property, the husband and wife ... shall execute the conveyance or encumbrance." (emphasis added)
However, § 38-41-202(3), C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol. 16A) provides:
(emphasis added)
And, § 38-41-202(4), C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol. 16A) provides:
"If the owner of the property (householder) or the spouse of such owner records in the office of the county clerk and recorder of the county where the property is situate an instrument in writing describing such property, setting forth the nature and source of the owner's interest therein, and stating that the owner or the owner's spouse...
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PART 2 HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIONS
...he owned upon his signature unless a written declaration of homestead rights was recorded. Comm. Factors of Denver v. Clarke & Waggener, 684 P.2d 261 (Colo. App. 1984). Filing a homestead claim was not a responsive pleading under C.R.C.P. 8(c). In the matter of Lombard, 739 F.2d 499 (10th C......
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HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIONS
...he owned upon his signature unless a written declaration of homestead rights was recorded. Comm. Factors of Denver v. Clarke & Waggener, 684 P.2d 261 (Colo. App. 1984). Filing a homestead claim was not a responsive pleading under C.R.C.P. 8(c). In the matter of Lombard, 739 F.2d 499 (10th C......
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PART 2 HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIONS
...he owned upon his signature unless a written declaration of homestead rights was recorded. Comm. Factors of Denver v. Clarke & Waggener, 684 P.2d 261 (Colo. App. 1984). Filing a homestead claim was not a responsive pleading under C.R.C.P. 8(c). In the matter of Lombard, 739 F.2d 499 (10th C......