Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. General Trucking Co.
| Decision Date | 19 November 1982 |
| Citation | 423 So.2d 168 |
| Parties | COMMERCIAL STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY v. GENERAL TRUCKING COMPANY, et al. 81-208. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Larry W. Harper of Porterfield, Scholl, Bainbridge, Mims, Clark & Harper, Birmingham, for appellant.
Thomas R. Elliott, Jr. of London, Yancey, Clark & Allen, Birmingham, for appellees.
This is an appeal from a final decree rendered in a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County. The cause was filed by Commercial Standard Insurance Company against General Trucking Company, Inc. Royal Globe Insurance Company, Loddie Williamson and Eugene Reese, as Administrator of the Estate of Gayla J. Reese. We affirm.
The issue is which insurance carrier is liable for coverage of Williamson, who was involved in a truck-pedestrian accident on July 14, 1978. As a result of that accident suit was filed by Eugene Reese against Royal's named insured, General; Commercial's named insured, Lane Trucking Co., Inc. (Lane); and Williamson. Subsequent to the claims made against General, Royal and General filed a declaratory action against Lane, its insurer Commercial, the truckdriver Williamson, and Reese. Judgment in the Reese action was rendered against the three defendants, General, Lane and Williamson.
On March 18, 1976, Williamson entered into a lease agreement with Lane which stated that Williamson was the owner-operator of his truck and that his relationship with Lane was that of an independent contractor and not that of an agent, servant, or employee of Lane. The lease agreement provided that Williamson would be responsible and liable to Lane. Williamson agreed to pay Lane for any damage to property or persons. Lane in turn would procure and pay for such public liability insurance as was required by the Interstate Commerce Commission (I.C.C.), but this fact would not modify the agreements between Lane and Williamson stated elsewhere in the lease.
In July, 1978, General needed additional trucks to haul silica from Elmore, Alabama, to Columbia, Tennessee. General entered into an agreement with Lane, whereby owners of trucks under long-term leases with Lane agreed to haul for General. General would receive the proceeds, subtract its cut and pay the owners of the trucks. Lane did not have the authority from I.C.C. to haul between Alabama and Tennessee and the hauling was done under General's I.C.C. authority. One of these trucks, owned by Williamson, was involved in the accident. Prior to the accident, Royal had issued a comprehensive automobile liability insurance policy to General with the named insured General Trucking Company, Inc., while Commercial had issued a comprehensive automobile liability insurance policy to Lane Trucking, Inc. The language of the pertinent provisions of both policies is identical.
The Commercial policy reads in part:
"II. PERSONS INSURED
....
The policy further provides:
"V. ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS.
When used in reference to this insurance (including endorsements forming a part of the policy):
................................................................................
* * *
'hired automobile' means an automobile not owned by the named insured which is used under contract in behalf of, or loaned to, the named insured....
'non-owned automobile' means an automobile which is neither an owned automobile nor a hired automobile;
'owned automobile' means an automobile owned by the named insured;"
If we disregard the Schedule of Automobiles attached to Commercial's policy, the literal language under Part V indicates that Williamson's vehicle is a "hired automobile" rather than an "owned automobile." If Williamson were an agent, servant or employee of Lane, driving a hired automobile with Lane's permission and within the scope of such permission, Williamson would fall within Part II (c) and would be a "person insured." Williamson is the owner of the hired automobile and therefore falls within Part II(ii) and is not an insured.
The language of the first sentence under Part V states: "including endorsements forming a part of the policy." Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1971) defines "endorsement" as follows: "Insurance: a provision added to an insurance contract altering its scope or application that takes precedence over printed portions of the policy in conflict therewith."
Williamson's vehicle is listed on the Schedule of Automobiles, showing the premiums paid for both "Bodily Injury Liability" and "Property Damage Liability." The language at the top of page 2 of the Schedule indicates that the Schedule is "attached to and forming part of policy number 430-15-02-53 issued by Commercial Standard Insurance Company."
This Court finds the endorsement provision under Part V and the indication that the Schedule is part of Commercial's policy to be clear evidence of the parties' intent to include the Schedule in Commercial's policy. The listing of the vehicle is a specific action that supersedes the literal definitions under Part V of the Commercial policy and makes Williamson's vehicle an "owned automobile"; Williamson therefore becomes an "insured" pursuant to Part II(c) because he is a person using an owned automobile with the permission of Lane and his operation of the vehicle was within the scope of such permission. Part II(ii) does not qualify (c) because (ii) applies to...
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