Schultz v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 February 1990
• Docket Number: No. 13668,13668
• Citation: 213 Conn. 696,569 A.2d 1131
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Jane Crilly SCHULTZ, Administratrix (ESTATE OF Andrew G. SCHULTZ) v. HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.

Page 1131

569 A.2d 1131

213 Conn. 696

Jane Crilly SCHULTZ, Administratrix (ESTATE OF Andrew G. SCHULTZ) v. HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.

No. 13668.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 2, 1989.

Decided Feb. 13, 1990.

Leo Gold, Stamford, for appellant (plaintiff).

Paul E. Pollock, with whom, on the brief, was Thomas P. Parrino, Bridgeport, for appellee (defendant Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co.).

Before ARTHUR H. HEALEY, SHEA, GLASS, COVELLO and HULL, JJ.

ARTHUR H. HEALEY, Associate Justice.

The principal issue in this case is whether an endorsement to an owners', landlords' and tenants' liability insurance policy amends or adds to the policy provisions defining insured premises. The trial court, Ryan, J., found the definition of insured premises in the endorsement controlling and interpreted the provision so as to deny the plaintiff relief under the insurance policy. From this judgment, the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court. Pursuant to Practice Book § 4023, we transferred the case to this court. We find no error.

The parties stipulated to the following facts. On August 15, 1978, Phyllis G. Olschan transferred title and delivered possession of the premises known as 416 Erskine Road, Stamford (Stamford property), to the plaintiff and her husband. On September 4, 1978, the plaintiff's decedent, Andrew G. Schultz, eight years of age, was severely injured as a result of the detonation of a hand grenade that had been left on the premises. Andrew G. Schultz died about three weeks later as a result of these injuries. The plaintiff was appointed administratrix of the estate of Andrew G. Schultz and instituted an action against Olschan to recover for the bodily injuries suffered by Andrew G. Schultz and his subsequent wrongful death by reason of the negligence of Olschan. On March 13, 1985, the plaintiff obtained a judgment against Olschan in the amount of $100,000 in damages. Olschan, however, failed to pay any part of that judgment.

The plaintiff thereafter brought an action, pursuant to General Statutes § 38-175, ¹ in two counts against the Hartford Fire Insurance Company and the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company to collect the unpaid judgment. In count one of the complaint, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that Olschan had in effect on the day of the accident a liability insurance policy, number 31 RA 607453, issued by the Hartford Fire Insurance Company. In count two, the plaintiff alleged that Olschan had in effect on the day of the accident an insurance policy, number 31 OLT 195229, issued by the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company. ² The defendants denied these allegations and pleaded, by way of special defenses as to count one, that policy number 31 RA 607453 was cancelled prior to the accident involving Andrew Schultz. As to the second count, it denied that policy number 31 OLT 195229 extended coverage to the Stamford property as "insured premises." As to both counts, they denied that they had in effect a policy covering the Stamford property on the day of the accident. Prior to trial, however, the parties stipulated that the only policy in effect at the time of the accident was policy number 31 OLT 195229 issued by the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company.

No evidence was presented to the trial court. The trial court held that endorsement L-3038-2 to the policy defining the insured premises designated 1141 Fairfield Beach Road, Fairfield (Fairfield beach property), as the insured premises and not the Stamford property. The trial court stated that the parties' true intentions to insure only the Fairfield beach property were evident. The trial court found that the endorsement listed a one family dwelling as the "designated premises," and that that endorsement applied only to the Fairfield beach property. Moreover, the trial court stated that "[a]n interpretation that the alienated premises clause encompasses all premises ever alienated by [Olschan] individually, or by Lillian Goldman individually, or by both [Olschan] and Lillian Goldman jointly, would be [an] unreasonable interpretation of [the alienated premises] clause." The court concluded that the policy covered only the Fairfield beach property.

On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in concluding that (1) the defendant's policy did not extend coverage to the Stamford premises recently alienated by its insured; and (2) notwithstanding the designation of "alienated premises" as "insured premises" within the defendant's policy, it would be unreasonable to provide such coverage. Because we find that the endorsement amends the provision defining insured premises in the policy, we do not need to decide the plaintiff's second claim of error.

At the time of Andrew G. Schultz's accident, Olschan and Goldman, as named insureds, had in effect an insurance policy entitled "Owners', Landlords' and Tenants' Liability Insurance." The focus of the plaintiff's claim is on the "Additional Definition" provision in the policy and the endorsement that both contain a definition of "insured premises." The policy when issued provided, inter alia, the following:

"IV. ADDITIONAL DEFINITION

"When used in reference to this insurance (including endorsements forming a part of the policy): " 'insured premises ' means (1) the premises designated in the declarations, (2) premises alienated by the named insured (other than premises constructed for sale by the named insured ), if possession has been relinquished to others, and (3) premises as to which the named insured acquires ownership or control and reports his intention to insure such premises under this policy and no other within 30 days after such acquisition; and includes the ways immediately adjoining such premises on land."

The endorsement states in part: "It is agreed that the insurance applies to the insured premises, subject to the following additional provisions:

"1. The definition of 'insured premises' is amended to read as follows: 'insured premises' means the premises described below or designated in the policy as subject to this endorsement, including the ways immediately adjoining and including garages and stables incidental thereto, gardens incidental thereto on land not owned by the named insured, and individual or family cemetery plots or burial vaults." ³

The plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in applying the definition of insured premises in the endorsement rather than the definition in the insurance policy as originally issued. The plaintiff argues that the trial court either overlooked or ignored the policy provision requiring that the "Additional Definition" provision defining insured premises still be given effect even when there were endorsements forming a part of the policy. The introductory clause to the "Additional Definition" provision, the plaintiff maintains, makes it clear that endorsements forming a part of the policy could never alter or delete from coverage those premises included within the "Additional Definition" provision. The introductory language, to which the plaintiff refers in this context, provides: "When used in reference to this insurance (including endorsements forming a part of the policy): 'insured premises' means...." Had the defendant company desired to reserve the right to alter coverage, the plaintiff contends, it would have used the words "excluding endorsements" rather than "including endorsements" in this introductory language.

An insurance policy is to be interpreted by the same general rules that govern the construction of any written contract and enforced in accordance with the real intent of the parties as expressed in the language employed in the policy. Izzo v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 203 Conn. 305, 309, 524 A.2d 641 (1987); Griswold v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 186 Conn. 507 512-13, 442 A.2d 920 (1982); Gottesman v. Aetna Ins. Co., 177 Conn. 631, 634, 418 A.2d 944 (1979). If the "insurance coverage is defined in terms that are ambiguous, such ambiguity is, in accordance with standard rules of construction, resolved against the insurance company. 'Where the terms of the policy are of doubtful meaning, the construction most favorable to the insured will be adopted.' LaBonte v. Federal Mutual Ins. Co., 159 Conn. 252, 256, 268 A.2d 663 (1970); see also Griswold v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., [supra]; Simses v. North America Co. for Life & Health Ins., 175 Conn. 77, 84-85, 394 A.2d 710 (1978)." Beach v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 205 Conn. 246, 250, 532 A.2d 1297 (1987). If, however, the words in the policy "are plain and unambiguous the established rules for the construction of contracts apply, the language, from which the intention of the parties is to be deduced, must be accorded its natural and ordinary meaning, and courts cannot indulge in a forced construction ignoring provisions or so distorting them as to accord a meaning other than that evidently intended by the parties." Plainville v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 178 Conn. 664, 675, 425 A.2d 131 (1979). "A court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity, and words do not become ambiguous simply because lawyers or laymen contend for different meanings." Downs v. National Casualty Co., 146 Conn. 490, 494-95, 152 A.2d 316 (1959). We find the language in the introductory clause to the "Additional Definition" provision unambiguous.

We construe the introductory clause of the "Additional Definition" provision to be clear evidence of the parties' intent to include within the definition of insured premises any endorsement forming a part of the policy. The word "endorsement" has been defined as meaning "a provision added to an insurance contract altering its scope or application that takes precedence over printed portions in conflict therewith." Webster's Third New International Dictionary; see Commercial Standard Ins. v. General Trucking, 423 So.2d 168, 170 (Ala.1982). "E...